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General introduction
Context
International negotiations on climate change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was ne-
gotiated at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, known as
the “Earth Summit”, in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The purpose of this environmental
treaty is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The treaty itself
does not set binding limits for national emissions but it provides a framework for the nego-
tiations of protocols that may set binding targets for emissions reductions. The Parties to
the Convention have met annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) since 1995 to assess
the advancement in emissions reductions and negotiate international climate agreements.
Within this framework, the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 (UN, 1998) and en-
tered into force in 2005. The Protocol establishes legally binding obligations for developed
countries to reduce their emissions. It distinguishes Annex I and Non-Annex I countries.
2
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Annex I countries are industrialized countries or economies in transition.6 Non-Annex I
countries are countries with lower income. The individual targets for Annex I Parties are
listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B. The Protocol includes two commitment periods:
2008-2012 and 2013-2020. The targets for the first commitment period cover emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The target for this commitment
period for the set of all Annex B countries was a 5.2% emissions reduction compared to
the 1990 level. As the United States of America did not ratify the Protocol, the target
was actually 4.2%. The countries with binding targets in the second commitment period
are Australia, all members of the European Union (EU), Belarus, Croatia, Iceland, Kaza-
khstan, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Japan, New Zealand and Russia participated
into the first commitment period but did not renew their commitment for the second pe-
riod. Canada withdrew from the Protocol in 2012 and the United States did not ratify
it. The maximum amount of emissions (in carbon dioxide equivalent) that a Party may
emit over a commitment period is this Party’s assigned amount. Annex B countries can
trade their assigned amount units (AAU). In order to meet these targets, some countries
or regions, for example the European Union, created national or regional emissions trad-
ing schemes. The Protocol also defines the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
the Joint Implementation (JI), through which developed countries can receive credits for
financing emissions reductions projects in developing countries. These mechanisms are
6.Annex I countries are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
General introduction 4
presented in the next section.
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation
Within the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B countries can achieve their targets by trading AAU
with other Annex B countries, or by buying credits from projects performed in developing
countries or economies in transition under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint
Implementation. Under the Clean Development Mechanism, as defined in Article 12 of
the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B countries can obtain Certified Emission Reduction (CER)
credits for emissions reduction projects in developing countries. CDM projects cover a large
diversity of sectors, among which the energy sector, agriculture, transport, afforestation
and reforestation, greenhouse gases avoidance or destruction. Even if all countries are
eligible for CDM projects, two thirds of the projects have been performed in China and
India. A typical CDM project is a renewable energy project is one of these two countries.
The Joint Implementation was defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It allows an
Annex B country to gain Emission Reduction Units (ERU) for emissions reduction or
emissions removal projects in another Annex B party.
The CDM project cycle
The CDM project cycle and CDM history are well presented by Lecocq and Ambrosi
(2007). The initiator of a project defines a Project Design Document (PDD) that includes
the description of the project, the explanation of the methodology used for the baseline
definition and the emissions verification, as well as an assessment of the environmental
impacts of the project. Both the buyer and seller of the credits expected from the project
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have to obtain a Letter of Approval (LoA) from the national entity in charge of the CDM
projects review in the country where the project is planned. This entity is the Designated
National Authority (DNA), which is also responsible for the greenhouse gases inventory for
the UNFCCC. This Letter of Approval states the approval of the host country government
and the contribution of the project to this country’s sustainable development. Both PDD
and LoA are validated by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE), an independent entity,
usually an audit company, approved by the CDM executive board. The DOE checks the
methodology for the emissions baseline definition and emissions verification. The DOE
then submits the PDD to the CDM board for registration. Once the project is operational,
another DOE checks and certifies the emissions reductions achieved by the project. The
CER credits are issued by the CDM board and transferred to the project participants.
The early years of the market for carbon credits
The market for carbon credits actually started before the formalization of acceptance
of credits from the CDM by the Kyoto Protocol. The first COP, that was held in Berlin in
1995, launched a pilot phase of activities implemented jointly (AIJ), during which Annex
I parties could voluntarily implement projects in other countries to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases. These projects did not lead to credits issuance. At the end of the 1990s,
Canadian and American companies voluntarily launch projects intended to reduce carbon
emissions. A prototype of carbon fund (PCF) is established in 1999. It is launched by
six governments and fifteen companies who will be the first investors for CDM projects.
The fund is managed by the World Bank to buy credits issued from CDM or JI projects.
The fund is operational in April 2000. The first agreement to buy credits for emissions
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reductions is signed in 2002 for a project in Chili. The Dutch Government, who is a member
of this fund, develops the first carbon tenders for CDM and JI projects in 2001. After
the seventh COP in Marrakesh in 2001, more entities start to invest in carbon projects:
Japanese companies in 2002-2003, European companies one year later. After the Kyoto
Protocol enters into force, Annex B countries governments start to invest in these projects.
Since 2005, the International Transaction Log, that verifies transactions under the Kyoto
Protocol, links the CDM registry to the registry of Annex B countries.
The European carbon market
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (the EU ETS) was launched in 2005
as a tool for the EU to achieve its Kyoto Protocol targets.7 It is part of the Climate and
Energy Legislative Package, which includes three targets: 20% emissions reduction below
1990 levels by 2020, a 20% share of energy from renewable sources by 2020 (EC 2009), 20%
energy efficiency improvement by 2020. The EU ETS now includes the 28 EU member
states as well as Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. It covers more than 11,000 power
stations and industrial installations. The European cap decreases annually, and covered
installations trade European Union Allowances in order to cover their emissions. In 2013,
the cap is 2.04 billion tons and it will decrease by 1.74% each year. Like an AAU, a EUA
covers one ton of CO2 equivalent. An EUA is fungible with an AAU. While allocations
were given for free in Phase I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012) of the scheme, 40% of them
will be auctioned for Phase III (2013-2020). This share will grow over time.
7.The decision to launch a cap and trade in the EU required the majority of the votes at the European
Council while a carbon tax would have required unanimity.
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In 2004, the Linking Directive (EU, 2004) was approved to link the International Trans-
action Log (ITL), which is the Kyoto protocol registry, to the Independent Community
Transaction Log (ICTL), which is the EU ETS registry.8 This came into effect in October
2008. Since then, CER and ERU credits are accepted for compliance under the scheme
under a certain limit. For Phase II, the volume of CER and ERU that could be accepted
for compliance in the EU ETS was limited to 13% of the total amount of EUA issued for
this time period. The real use was around 4% of it. The rules of acceptance of these credits
in Phase III are stricter but as the 13% limit was not reached in Phase II, the difference
between the limit and what was actually accepted in Phase II can be used for Phase III.
For Phase II and III together, CDM and JI offsets can be used to cover emissions of 1.7
billion tons of CO2, making the EU ETS the largest market to accept these international
credits.
Since the beginning of 2012, emissions from international aviation have been included
in the EU ETS (EU, 2008). Currently, the application of the scheme to flights in and
out of Europe is under discussion and the legislation applies to all flights within Europe,
including the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade
Association space (EFTA).9
Carbon permits are traded over the counter or on platforms such as the European
Climate Exchange or the Chicago Climate Exchange (spot market and forward contracts).
8. Since January 2012, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL)has replaced the CITL. Prior to
that, accounts for stationary installations were hold in national registries. Following a revision of the ETS
Directive in 2009, EU ETS operations are now centralised in a single EU registry.
9. The European Economic Area comprises the EU member states, in addition to Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway. The members of the European Free Trade Association are Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland
and Switzerland.
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Use of CER credits in the European carbon market
The market for CER credits
On the primary CER market, projects initiators sell forward contracts for credits rep-
resenting emissions reductions that their projects are supposed to generate in the future
(Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis, 2010). This market was launched at the beginning
of the 2000s by the World Bank and the Dutch government but it really developed after
the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and the EU ETS started. On the secondary CER
market, CER that are already issued or whose expected issuance has been guaranteed by a
counterparty are traded. Before the ITL and ICTL were connected, this market was only
based on forwards contracts. The spot market for secondary CER credits developed after
the ITL and ICTL were connected in 2008.
Before 2005, a primary CER was worth less than 5 e/ton due to the uncertainty that
the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force. Between 2005 and 2007, with the launch of the
EU ETS along with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the market for secondary
CER started. A primary CER was worth between 5 and 10 e/ton, while the price of a
secondary CER was between 14 and 18 e/ton. In 2008, the primary CER price reached
more than 10 e/ton. In August 2008, a cumulative volume of 180 million primary CER
had been issued while a cumulative volume of 280 million of secondary CER had been
traded (Ellerman et al., 2010).
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Explanation of the spread between the EUA and CER prices
As the EU ETS is the main source of demand for secondary CER, variations in the
CER price are largely influenced by changes in the EUA price (Ellerman, Convery, and de
Perthuis, 2010; de Perthuis, and Jouvet, 2011). The remaining demand for CER comes
from other agents of the Kyoto protocol or other more individual entities. According to
Ellerman, de Perthuis and Convery (2010), the varying spread between the EUA and CER
prices is attributed to several factors. One is the constraint on the acceptance of CER in
the EU ETS. For example, in 2011, the announcement of stricter conditions to accept CER
in the EU ETS (ban on some controversial industrial projects) from 2013 onwards may be
correlated with the drop in the CER price. The demand and supply in the carbon market
associated with the Kyoto Protocol may also have an influence on the EUA-CER spread,
the AAU price being the price floor for CER. The difference between the prices of primary
and secondary CER is associated with the risk of the project for which CER are supposed
to be issued: risk that the project does not actually take place, country risk, risk that
it is not approved by the CDM board. The spread between the EUA and the secondary
CER prices reflects the risk that an installation may not be able to use a CER in the EU
ETS: uncertainty regarding whether the limit of CER that can be used for compliance is
reached, uncertainty on futures contracts and associated guarantees.
Other carbon markets in the world
Besides the EU ETS, other carbon markets are being developed in the world. In
Canada, emissions trading started in Alberta in 2007. It is run by the state government.
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In New Zealand, a national emissions trading scheme was launched in 2008. In Japan, a
scheme has existed in Tokyo since 2010. In the United States (US), the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative has capped emissions from power generation in ten north-eastern
states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) since 2009. In California, the cap and
trade program for greenhouse gas emissions took effect in 2012. In China, local pilot car-
bon markets are being launched in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing,
and the provinces of Guangdong and Hubei. The decision to launch a national scheme will
depend on the outcome of these trials. Finally, Australia has also operated an emissions
trading scheme since 2012. If no major change in its national climate policy occurs, a
one-way coupling between the EU ETS and the Australian scheme will be established in
July 2015, thus allowing Australian companies to use European allowances to cover their
emissions. A full two-way link is planned for July 2018.
New Market Mechanisms
While industrialized countries are responsible for most of the past emissions, emerging
and developing countries emissions represent a growing share of global emissions. Ac-
cording to the International Energy Agency, emissions from non-OECD countries might
represent up to two thirds of the world emissions in 2030 (IEA, 2010). In these countries,
nearly half of the national emissions would come from the electricity sector. In China
and India, the power sector emission would respectively represent 55 and 53% of their
national emissions. To date, the so-called Non-Annex I countries have been involved in
the carbon markets through the Clean Development Mechanism. But the projections that
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are mentioned above suggest the need to have emerging and developing countries com-
mitted into an international climate agreement beyond a project based mechanism. In
addition, the environmental benefits and the economic efficiency of the CDM have been
questioned (Schneider, 2007). As a consequence, several organizations suggested and dis-
cussed the possibility to introduce new market mechanisms to move from the CDM to a
sector-based mechanism (Baron et al., 2008; Baron et al., 2009; CCAP, 2008; Bradley et
al., 2007; ICC, 2008; IEA, 2006, 2007). These sectoral approaches, sectoral trading or
sectoral crediting, would allow coupling the energy intensive sectors, e.g. the electricity
sector, of an emerging country with the carbon market of some industrialized countries.
Although a global cap and trade is theoretically the most efficient approach (Tirole, 2009),
the world climate policy makes progress through national or regional initiatives that may
converge or coordinate. In this perspective, sectoral mechanisms would be a way to include
a larger number of countries and sectors into an international carbon market.10 It is also
expected that such mechanisms would achieve larger environmental benefits by increasing
the sectoral coverage of carbon markets, and that it would encourage early investment in
low carbon technologies in the electricity sector of emerging countries (IEA, 2005a; IEA,
2005b; IEA, 2006; Schneider et al., 2009a, Schneider et al., 2009b; Sterk, 2008). However
few quantitative analyses have actually been done to assess the real impacts to expect
from such mechanisms. Hamdi-Cherif et al. (2010) examine sectoral trading between all
developed and developing countries using a general equilibrium model. CCAP (2010) listed
the abatement options that might be implemented in emerging economies under sectoral
mechanisms. As the decision to develop new market mechanisms was formally made at
10. Even the EU ETS, which is the largest carbon market in the world today, is a sectoral scheme.
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the 17th COP in Durban in 2011 (KPMG, 2011), the need for more quantitative analysis
on the impact to expect from such mechanisms is confirmed.
Question to address
The dissertation focuses on the economic analysis of the potential impacts to expect
from the extension of the Annex I carbon market to emerging and developing countries
through new market mechanisms. It combines complementary approaches. Chapters 1 and
2 are long-term modeling approaches that use the Emissions Prediction and Policy Anal-
ysis model (Computable General Equilibrium model). The first chapter analyses trade in
carbon permits between a hypothetical cap and trade in the United States and Chinese
electricity sector. The simulation of such sectoral agreements required some implementa-
tion in the model. This work allows quantifying the impacts to expect from such a policy
in terms of carbon prices, emissions reductions, welfare changes, financial transfers and
electricity mix. In particular, we put in evidence how such a sectoral mechanism induces
carbon leakages in the rest of the Chinese economy, as well as a welfare loss for China. The
annex to Chapter 1 extends the study to the case of sectoral trading between the EU ETS
and the electricity sectors of China, India, Brazil and Mexico. The reason is that, although
the analysis done on the hypothetical US-China case in the main part of the chapter helps
to decompose the economic mechanisms occuring under this sectoral policy, the likelihood
to have a cap and trade in the US is rather low. On the contrary, the EU ETS has existed
since 2005, and if such mechanisms were used, it is more likely that they would start be-
tween the European Union and some emerging countries. The annex aims at quantifying
the transfers, welfare changes and carbon prices variations to expect then. The conclusions
General introduction 13
of Chapter 1 (welfare loss in the developing country involved, carbon leakage, carbon price
decrease) suggest that a limit should be set on the amount of permits traded, should sec-
toral trading come into effect. Hence, in Chapter 2, sectoral trading between the EU ETS
and Chinese electricity sector is simulated with a limit on the amount of permits that could
be traded between the two entities. This is done through the implementation of a trade
certificate system in the model, and it shows the distributional effect of a price difference
in a trading system. In particular, limited sectoral trading allows finding a pareto-optimal
situation that would be beneficial in terms of political feasibility while the welfare loss
observed in the emerging country when no limit is set can be seen as a drawback for such
agreements. As a complement to the general equilibrium approach conducted in the first
two chapters, Chapter 3 examines the short-term interactions between carbon markets,
given the fact that carbon permits present some characteristics of financial assets. The
methodology used is time-series analysis, on the interactions between the European car-
bon market and the market for CER in the second phase of the EU ETS. Finally, although
sectoral trading has been considered as a way to spur investment in low carbon technologies
in the electricity sector of emerging countries, Chapter 1 shows that the impact of such a
mechanism on the development of renewable and nuclear energies would be very limited.
Thus, Chapter 4 aims to characterize the conditions of deployment of these technologies in
the context of a carbon market. It consists of an econometric analysis of the deployment
of wind power in Denmark in the last decade.
General introduction 14
Dissertation structure
Chapter 1 is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of sectoral trading meant
to quantify the impacts to expect from such a mechanism. I consider unlimited sectoral
trading between a hypothetical cap and trade in the US and the Chinese electricity sector
in the main part of the chapter, and between the EU ETS and four emerging countries
(Brazil, China, India and Mexico) in annex. As the US and China are the two world largest
emitters, the US-China case allows analyzing in detail the impacts of this mechanism on
the economies involved. After extending the model to simulate sectoral trading, I look
at the impact of the mechanism on the emissions, carbon price and energy sector of each
country. I examine the impact on the rest of the Chinese economy, the financial transfers
induced and the resulting welfare changes. Unlimited trade in carbon permits between the
US and the Chinese electricity sector leads to carbon price equalization between these two
entities. In China, this reduces the total amount of electricity generated. It induces an
electricity price increase and a coal price decrease, due to a reduction in demand for coal by
power producers. This results in a substitution from electricity to coal in sectors where it is
possible. In parallel, the activity level is reduced in all Chinese sectors due to the fact that
China bears part of the emissions constraint in the US. The combination of a reduction
in the output level and a substitution effect from electricity to coal in sectors where it is
possible results in positive carbon leakages in the rest of the Chinese economy, except in the
transport and oil sectors, where substitution towards coal is not possible. In the electricity
sector, sectoral trading induces an increase in fossil generation efficiency but the resulting
carbon price is not high enough to justify low carbon technologies on an economic basis. In
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the US, the mechanism lowers the carbon price and reduces the cost of the climate policy.
Some of the electricity generation changes that would occur under the cap and trade system
are reversed. Despite the substantial financial transfers from the US to China as a result
of the permits trading, I observe a welfare gain in the US and a welfare loss in China. This
is explained by the fact that the general equilibrium effect overcomes the transfer effect in
the emerging country. Unless China sets an ambitious domestic emissions reduction target
prior to committing to such sectoral agreements, its welfare decreases as China shares
an additional constraint with the US, which is not fully compensated by the financial
transfers induced by the permits trading. Chapter 1 also includes alternative scenarios in
which China constraints its electricity sector emissions prior to organizing trade with the
US. The main conclusion of the chapter is that the combination of a welfare loss in the
emerging country involved, a drastic drop in the carbon price in the industrialized country,
and the partial reversal of the technological changes induced by the emissions constraint in
the developed country suggest that a limit would be set on the amount of permits traded
between the two regions, should such a mechanism come into effect.
While the analysis on the hypothetical US-China case in the main part of the chapter
helps to decompose the economic mechanisms induced by sectoral trading, it would be more
realistic to see such mechanisms being used between the EU and some emerging countries.
Indeed, the probability of a cap and trade system in the US is rather low whereas the
EU has set a trading scheme since 2005, and is now exploring the idea of setting up pilot
programs for new market mechanisms with emerging countries. For these reasons, the
EU ETS-emerging countries case presented in the annex to Chapter 1 allows quantifying
the impacts of sectoral trading if it were used between the European carbon market and
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Brazil, China, India and Mexico. The economic mechanisms are exactly the same as those
analyze in the main part of the Chapter on the US-China case. The main interest of
this annex is the quantification of alternative scenarios. If used with China or India, the
mechanism would result in a 75% decrease in the European carbon price and to partial
reversal of the changes that would occur in the European electricity sector under the EU
ETS if no sectoral trading is in place. In addition to the observation of welfare loss in
China and India, such results suggest that a limit would likely be set on the amount of
permits that can be traded if this sectoral mechanism comes into effect. Such a limit would
be comparable to the constraint that is set on the amount of CER that can be accepted
for compliance in the European carbon market.
Chapter 2 aims at analyzing the impacts of limited sectoral trading between the EU
ETS and China. The limit induces a carbon price difference between the entities involved.
Chapter 2 characterizes the distributional effect of such a price difference in a trading sys-
tem. The resulting welfare impacts will depend on the institutional form under which this
limit is set. In the CGE modeling, I simulate the limit by introducing a trade certificate
system. This requires allocating the rent associated with the price difference to one of the
countries involved or to another entity in the model. The analysis shows that, if the certifi-
cates revenue is allocated to China, it is possible to set a limit that makes both countries
better off relative to the case for which each of them has its own carbon constraint and
no trading is allowed between them. In comparison, in Chapter 1, when no limit is set on
the amount of permits traded, it is not possible to find such a pareto-superior situation
(the general equilibrium effect overcomes the transfer effect) unless China sets more ambi-
tious emissions reductions targets prior to organizing trade in permits with industrialized
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countries. The existence of this pareto-superior situation makes limited sectoral trading
more politically feasible than unlimited sectoral trading to include emerging countries into
international carbon trading. The limit can be seen as a way to set the part of the Euro-
pean constraint that is shared with China and it can be adjusted as a function of Chinese
domestic efforts. In addition, limited sectoral trading does not decrease the European car-
bon price as much as unlimited sectoral trading would. Hence, changes induced by the
EU ETS in the European electricity sector largely persist in presence of limited sectoral
trading. Finally, total leakages under limited sectoral trading are smaller than under un-
limited sectoral trading as the substitution effect between coal and electricity in the rest
of the Chinese economy as a consequence of the sectoral policy is reduced. Hence the limit
is also beneficial from a global emissions reduction point of view.
Chapter 3 complements the computable general equilibrium approach of Chapters 1 and
2 by time-series analysis. In order to anticipate the potential consequences of interactions
between carbon markets on the short-term variations of the carbon price, I take advantage
of the EU experience on the interactions between EUA and CER in Phase II of the EU
ETS. On the one hand, Hinterman (2010) explains the short-term variations in the EU
carbon price by the short-term abatement opportunities in the power sector, which are
function of the fuel prices and the economic activity. Hence, short-term variations of the
EUA price are well explained by the variations in the coal price, the gas price and the
economic activity. On the other hand, carbon permits are traded on financial markets and
present some characteristics of financial assets. Carbon price series present patterns of
volatility clustering and the volatility of carbon futures increases as the futures contracts
approach their expiration dates. In this chapter, I build a model that considers the demand
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for carbon permits by two kinds of agents: agents who have to buy carbon permits to cover
their emissions, and agents who may buy carbon permits as financial assets. The carbon
price, that is the result of the demand-supply equilibrium, is then driven by the factors
identified by Hintermann (coal and gas prices, and economic activity) and, potentially, by
the carbon price volatility. Indeed, if the second type of agents plays a significant role in
carbon markets, the carbon price short-term variations should be related to its volatility,
reflecting the risk that financial agents are willing to take for a given return. The existence
of the second type of agents and the relative impacts of the two types are tested through
an econometric ARCH-GARCH time series analysis. I then proceed to a causality analysis
between the EUA and CER price time series. The results show that the carbon price
volatility has no influence on the carbon permits returns, which indicates that there is
no interest for an agent who does not have to cover emissions in buying carbon permits.
The carbon price drivers identified by Hintermann in the first and second phase of the
EU ETS well explain EUA and CER price series in the second phase of the EU ETS.
Contrary to Hintermann’ s results in phase I of the trading scheme, we observe a long-
term relationship between the carbon permits price and these drivers in phase II. But the
long-term relationship is not the same for EUA and CER. Coal and gas prices influence
the EUA price through the demand for carbon permits. Any increase in coal and gas
prices results in an increase in the marginal abatement cost and in the demand for carbon
permits to cover emissions. An exception is the time period of low energy prices, during
which some agents covered by the EU ETS might use their market power to inflate the
carbon price. The impact of the coal and gas prices on the CER price seems to be driven by
a supply-side effect (increase in the supply of CER when the demand for permits rises). In
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the short-term, the influence of coal and gas prices on the CER price is comparable to their
influence on the EUA price. This suggests that, while some agents may take advantage of
the flexibility in the CER market in the long-term, this is less easy to do for day to day
adjustments. Also, both in the long-term and the short-term analysis, the EUA price is
more correlated with the European economic activity than the CER price is. These results
are consistent with the fact that EUA and CER are two different products. On the one
hand, EUA are allocated or auctioned within the EU ETS, they are used for compliance
in the European carbon market only and their volume is limited by the European cap. On
the other hand, CER are issued by the Clean Development Mechanism board, they are
traded in other markets than the EU ETS and they can be produced without any limit.
As a consequence, they are not perfect substitutes.
The causality analysis between the EUA and CER price series shows there is no long-
term relationship between EUA and CER prices. This is consistent with the observation
that the long-term estimations of the drivers of EUA and CER prices are significantly
different. The estimations reflect different mechanisms of influence of the coal and gas
prices on these two types of permits. In the short-term, EUA price granger causes the
CER price. A shock on the EUA price is transmitted to the CER price while the opposite
is not true. 60% of the CER price volatility is explained by the EUA volatility. These
observations are explained by the fact that, as the EU ETS is the largest market to accept
CER credits, the CER price is largely influenced by the European carbon market drivers
and by the EUA price. No influence of the CER price on the EUA price is observed in this
econometric analysis.
As a conclusion relative to the short-term carbon market interactions to be expected
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from the extension of carbon markets to a larger number of countries, this analysis indicates
that, although the price of carbon permits presents patterns of volatility clustering, the
price variation is not influenced by its volatility. This suggests that there is no interest
in holding carbon permits as financial assets. The fundamental economic drivers related
to the emissions coverage remain the dominant factors. Hence speculative behaviors on
an instrument whose main objective is to reduce emissions seem limited. However, our
analysis suggests that some agents covered by the EU ETS may use their market power,
in particular when energy prices are relatively low, to inflate carbon price. The CER
market also offers flexibility that may allow some agents to modify the CER supply in
some circumstances. The observation of the CER and EUA time series in Phase II of the
EU ETS also confirms the influence of policy announcements or changes on the carbon
price volatility.
Finally, Chapter 4 takes advantage of the coexistence of a carbon market and renew-
able energy support policies in Europe to better explain the impact to expect from sectoral
trading on the deployment of low carbon technologies. Indeed, some proponents of sectoral
trading or sectoral crediting suggest that these mechanisms might encourage early invest-
ment in low-carbon technologies in emerging countries. However, Chapter 1 shows that the
impact of sectoral trading on these technologies is very limited, even if these mechanisms
allow achieving more emissions reductions at a lower cost. Chapter 4 presents the econo-
metric analysis of the determinants of wind power deployment in Denmark, with probit and
tobit techniques. Denmark is chosen for its long wind power history (since 1976) and the
frequent changes in its wind support policies. The observation of the changes in the wind
support policies in parallel of the wind power deployment over time suggests a threshold
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effect, i.e. a level of support above which new wind turbines are connected to the grid and
below which no new wind capacity is built. As a consequence, the probit technique is cho-
sen to test the potential drivers of wind power deployment, some of which are determined
by the wind power producer profit function: the support policy type, the support level, the
price of electricity, the investment cost, the interest rate, and the sites availability. Tobit
analysis is used on the additional wind power capacity installed monthly to complement
the results obtained in the probit estimations. The analysis indicates that the dominant
factors are the support policy type and the support level. The influence of the interest
rate is visible in the tobit analysis but it is not clear in the probit regressions. The other
factors do not have significant impacts in our analysis. A feed-in tariff significantly brings
more wind power in than a variable or a fixed premium policy. This is explained by the
revenue certainty that a guaranteed tariff provides to investors. On average, a support
level of 20 e/MWh is needed to have new wind turbines connected to the grid with a
probably 0.5. This deployment is attained for a support level of 24 e/MWh if the support
policy is a premium. I then compare the profits expected from wind power projects and
fossil energy power plant to convert this support level into a carbon price that would make
wind power as profitable as fossil energy. I obtain a carbon price level of 28 e/ton if wind
power competes with coal plants, and 50 e/ton if it competes with gas installations. How-
ever, such figures have to be handled carefully. As the econometric analysis showed the
importance of revenue certainty for wind power producers, a carbon price alone may not
provide a sufficiently clear signal to provide wind power with comparable advantage over
fossil technologies as effective support policies. In addition, a carbon price set by a market
also presents more volatility than if it were set by a tax. As a consequence, the figures
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provided have to be seen as a necessary condition only. The carbon price level needed to
provide wind power with comparable advantage over fossil technologies would need to be
higher to compensate for uncertainty.
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Chapter 1
Unlimited sectoral trading 1
1.1. Introduction
While climate bills are discussed in the US, and the European Union has an
Emissions Trading Scheme, international negotiations aim to foster wider agree-
ments, particularly with developing countries. Including developing countries in an
international agreement is vital to the success of mitigation strategies, as developing
countries account for a signiﬁcant and growing share of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. For example, in a reference scenario deﬁned by the International Energy
Agency, global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions increase by nearly 50% between 2007
and 2030, by which time non-OECD countries account for 70% of global emissions
(IEA, 2009a). In these countries, electricity generation represents more than 50%
of total emissions. As electricity demand in developing countries is growing rapidly,
1.This chapter is a joint work with Niven Winchester, Henry D. Jacoby, and Sergey Paltsev. A version
of this paper was published under the title ‘What to expect from sectoral trading: a U.S.-China Example’
in Climate Change Economics in February 2011.
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there is a risk of long-lived investment in carbon-intensive electricity technologies.
To avoid “carbon lock-in”, electricity sectoral agreements have been proposed. Such
agreements to cover the energy intensive sectors of emerging countries could also
mitigate the risk of carbon leakage in non-Annex B countries as a consequence of
emissions reductions policies conducted in Annex B countries. Indeed Light, Kolstad
and Rutherford (1999) suggest that, in the context of increasing substitutabilities
between the various types of coal, abatement eﬀorts in Annex B countries might be
severely undermined by increased import and use of coal in emerging countries.2
Under sectoral mechanisms, developing countries could be involved in a global
agreement without making nation-wide commitments. Sectoral trading is one of
these propositions (EC, 2009). This measure involves including a sector from a
nation in the cap-and-trade program of another nation or group of nations (IEA,
2009b). For example, electricity sectors in China and India could be included in a
global cap-and-trade system, or in a system including only the electricity sector of
other countries.
Sectoral approaches have been widely proposed and discussed (Baron et al., 2008;
Baron et al., 2009; CCAP, 2008; Bradley et al., 2007; ICC, 2008; IEA, 2006, 2007).
Although sectoral approaches are less eﬃcient than a global cap-and-trade system
(Tirole, 2009), such mechanisms may encourage participation in a global climate
agreement (Sawa, 2010). Sectoral agreements are thought of as a solution to the
competitivity concern raised by ambitious national climate policies (Bradley et al,
2. Light, Kolstad and Rutherford suggest the use of taxes on coal production to face this problem but
question the political feasability of such a solution.
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2007): such agreeements could potentially level the playing ﬁeld between competitors
in sectors for which international trade plays a particularly important role. Sectoral
trading is also seen as a replacement for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Under the CDM, host countries have generally achieved only modest environmental
targets (Schneider, 2007). There is a hope that sectoral crediting and sectoral trading
will achieve greater environmental beneﬁts by moving away from a project-based
mechanism to a wider approach (IEA, 2005a; IEA, 2005b; IEA, 2006; Schneider et
al., 2009a, Schneider et al., 2009b; Sterk, 2008).
Sectoral trading has been analyzed in several studies. For example, CCAP (2010)
considers abatement options that might be implemented in emerging economies un-
der sectoral mechanisms, and Hamdi-Cherif et al. (2010) examine sectoral trading
between all developed and developing countries using a general equilibrium model.
Our analysis explores in more detail the case of two countries, so that we can
carefully analyze the potential impacts of sectoral trading on the economies involved.
In this Chapter, there is no limit to the volume of permits that can be traded between
the two entities, so that sectoral trading actually results in a common carbon market
between them. We examine electricity generation choices, internal leakage3 and
ﬁnancial transfers associated with sectoral trading. We examine sectoral trading in
CO2 between the US and China, the two largest CO2 emitters. Our analysis employs
Version 5 of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model.
3. In the analysis, we consider as a leakage any carbon emissions increase in a sector or a region in
consequence of an emissions constraint in another sector or region. This does not necessarily occur through
relocation of activities. It can be related to substitutions due to energy price changes as presented later in
this chapter.
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This paper has three further sections. Section 1.2 describes the EPPA model,
how we extend the model to allow for sectoral trading, and the scenarios we consider.
Our results are presented in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2. Modeling framework
The EPPA model is a recursive dynamic, multi-region computable general equi-
librium model (Paltsev, 2005).4 The model is designed to assess the impact of
energy and environmental policies on emissions and economic activity. Version 5
of the model is calibrated to 2004 economic data and is solved through time by
specifying exogenous population and labor productivity increases, for 2005 and for
ﬁve-year increments thereafter. As indicated in Table 1.1, 16 individual countries or
regions are represented. For each country or region, fourteen production sectors are
deﬁned: ﬁve energy sectors (coal, crude oil, reﬁned oil, gas and electricity), three
agricultural sectors (crops, livestock and forestry), and ﬁve other non-energy sectors
(energy-intensive industry, transport, food products, services and other industries).
Factors of production include capital, labor, land and resources speciﬁc to energy
production. There is a single representative utility maximizing agent in each re-
gion that derives income from factor payments and emissions permits and allocates
expenditure across goods and investment. A government sector collects revenue
from taxes and purchases goods and services. Government deﬁcits and surpluses
are passed to consumers as lump sum transfers. Final demand separately identiﬁes
4.The model is not forward-looking.
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household transportation and other household demand.
Production sectors are represented by nested constant elasticity of substitution
production functions. Production sector inputs include primary factors (labor, cap-
ital and energy resources) and intermediate inputs. Goods, including coal and gas,
are traded internationally and diﬀerentiated by region of origin following an Arm-
ington assumption (Armington, 1969), except crude oil which is considered as a
homogenous good.
In the model, electricity can be generated from traditional technologies (coal,
gas, oil, reﬁned oil, hydro and nuclear) and advanced technologies. Advanced tech-
nologies include solar, wind, biomass, natural gas combined cycle, natural gas with
carbon capture, integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle with carbon capture, ad-
vanced nuclear, wind with biomass backup, and wind with gas backup. There are
also four technologies that produce substitutes for energy commodities: shale oil
and hydrogen are substitutes for crude oil, synthetic gas from coal is a substitute
for natural gas and liquids from biomass is a substitute for reﬁned oil. Periods in
which advanced technologies become available reﬂect assumptions about technolog-
ical developments. When available, advanced technologies compete with traditional
energy technologies on an economic basis.5
Costs for advanced technologies relative to existing technologies are described
by multiplicative mark-up factors provided in Table 1.2. For electricity, mark-ups
are determined by dividing the levelized cost for each technology by the cost from
5.The model assumes that electricity is priced on an economic basis. This assumption applies as well to
China which is not fully a market economy.
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Table 1.1: EPPA model aggregation
Countries or regions Sectors Factors
Annex I Non-Energy sectors Capital
United States (USA) Crops (CROP) Labor
Canada (CAN) Livestock (LIVE) Crude oil resources
Japan (JPN) Forestry (FORS) Natural gas resources
Australia-New Zealand (ANZ) Food Products (FOOD) Coal resources
European Union (EUR) Energy-intensive industry (EINT) Shale oil resources
Transport (TRAN) Nuclear resources
Non-Annex I Services (SERV) Hydro resources
Mexico (MEX) Other industry (OTHR Wind resources
Rest of Europe and C. Asia (ROE) Solar resources
East Asia (ASI) Energy supply and conversion Land
China (CHN) Electricity generation (ELEC)
India (IND) Conventional Fossil
Brazil (BRA) Hydro
Africa (AFR) Nuclear
Middle East (MES) Wind
Rest of Latin America (LAM) Solar
Rest of Asia (REA) Biomass
Advanced gas
Advanced gas with CCS
Advanced coal with CCS
Advanced nuclear
Wind with biomass backup
Wind with gas backup
Fuels
Coal
Crude oil, refined oil
Natural gas
Shale oil
Gas from coal
Liquids from Biomass
Hydrogen
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Table 1.2: Mark-up factors for advanced technologies.
Technology Mark-up
Advanced gas 1.03
Advanced gas with CCS 1.57
Advanced coal with CCS 1.71
Advanced nuclear 1.64
Wind 1.43
Biomass 1.58
Solar 3.60
Wind with biomass backup 3.67
Wind with gas backup 1.85
Shale oil 2.50
Hydrogen 3.00
Gas from coal 3.50
Liquids from biomass 2.10
conventional sources.6 For fuels, the mark-up for each technology represents the cost
of fuel from that technology relative to the cost of fuel from the existing technology
that it competes against (e.g. production costs for oil from shale are 2.5 more
expensive than oil from conventional sources). Assumptions for mark-up calculations
are provided in Paltsev et al.(2005,2010).7
The model projects emissions of GHGs (CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, perﬂuoro-
carbons, hydroﬂuorocarbons and sulfur hexaﬂuoride) and urban gases that also im-
6. Levelized electricity cost measures the price of electricity at which a specific electricity generation
technology breaks even. For each technology, generation costs are based on lifetime costs, including upfront
investment, operation and maintenance expenditure, and fuel costs.
7. Jacoby et.al. (2004) explain that technological change in EPPA includes exogenous as well as endoge-
nous compounds. On the one hand, some technical parameters such as the mark-up factors are defined
exogenously. On the other hand, some shifts in production process can be considered as reflecting some
endogenous change. That is the case of factor substitution in response to price and income change when
it induces the use of a new technology.
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pact climate (sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, non-methane volatile
organic compounds, ammonia, black carbon and organic carbon).
Version 5 of the EPPA model is calibrated using economic data from Version 7
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Narayanan and Walmsley,
2008) and energy data from the International Energy Agency. The model is coded
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and the Mathematical Pro-
gramming System for General Equilibrium analysis (MPSGE) modeling language
(Rutherford, 1995).
Climate policy instruments in EPPA include emissions constraints, carbon taxes,
energy taxes and technology regulations such as renewable portfolio standards.
When there are emissions constraints under existing model functionality, permits
may be either: (i) not tradable across sectors or regions, resulting in sector-speciﬁc
permit prices in each region, (ii) tradable across sectors within regions but not across
regions, resulting in region-speciﬁc permit prices, or (iii) tradable across sectors and
regions, resulting in an international permit price.
In our analysis, we impose a national constraint on US emissions and a sector-
speciﬁc cap on Chinese electricity emissions. To model sectoral trading, we extend
the model to allow Chinese electricity permits to be traded for national US permits,
which equalizes permit prices across the two regimes. Although EPPA can be run
to 2100, we run our analysis only to 2030, as sectoral trading has been proposed as
an intermediary step before wider agreements are achieved. Additionally, to focus
on the impact of electricity sectoral trading, we only consider a constraint on CO2
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(rather than all GHGs).
As modeling of sectoral trading requires setting a cap on US emissions and a cap
on Chinese electricity emissions, the results of our analysis are inﬂuenced by these
constraints. As a consequence, we implement three core scenarios, which are later
supplemented with simulations examining the sensitivity of results to the constraint
on Chinese electricity emissions. In the ﬁrst scenario (NO-POLICY), there are no
emissions constraints in any region.8 In a second scenario (US-CAP), US emissions
are capped at 85% of 2005 emissions in 2015, and the cap is gradually reduced to
70% of 2005 emissions by 2030. US permits are tradable across sectors and there is
no limit on Chinese emissions in the US-CAP scenario.
To model trade in carbon permits, it is necessary to set a trading baseline for each
entity involved. In the Chinese electricity sector, the emissions level observed in the
NO-POLICY scenario (which we call the business as usual, BAU, level of emissions)
is taken as a baseline for trading in our third scenario (TRADE). Also in the trade
scenario, US emissions are capped at the same level as in the US-CAP scenario
and trade in US and Chinese emissions permits is allowed, creating an international
market for emissions permits.
We infer the impact of sectoral trading by comparing results from the TRADE
and US-CAP scenarios. Alternatively, the impact of sectoral trading could also
8. Following the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen,
China announced a target of 40% to 45% reduction in carbon intensity by 2020 compared to 2005 levels, and
a plan to build 70 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear capacity by 2020. In the US, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) may implement regulations on electricity generation from coal to address climate concerns.
In our analysis, we account for Chinese nuclear capacity target, but we do not consider China’s carbon-
intensity target or additional EPA regulations.
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be evaluated by comparing results from the TRADE scenario with results from a
scenario where US emissions are capped at the same level as in the US-CAP scenario
and there is a BAU cap on Chinese emissions (to eliminate international leakage
of emissions to China) without trading of permits. We prefer to compare results
from the TRADE and US-CAP scenarios as adoption of emissions constraints by
developing countries may be contingent on sectoral trading provisions.
In our sensitivity tests, we vary the constraint on Chinese electricity emissions
in the TRADE scenario. In one sensitivity analysis, emissions are capped at the
BAU level in 2010 and the constraint is reduced in a linear fashion so that Chinese
electricity emissions are 10% below BAU emissions in 2030. More aggressive con-
straints, which are also reduced in a linear fashion, are considered in other sensitivity
analyses. We consider Chinese electricity emissions reductions of 20%, 30%, 40%
and 50% relative to the BAU level by 2030.
1.3. Results
1.3.1. Emissions, carbon prices and welfare
Sectoral trading results in emissions transfers between the countries involved,
through a common carbon price, which impacts welfare in both countries. CO2
emissions in our three core scenarios for the US and Chinese electricity are displayed
in Figure 1.1. In the NO-POLICY scenario in 2030, US emissions are 7.2 Gt CO2 and
Chinese electricity emissions are 6.6 Gt. Chinese electricity CO2 emissions represent
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more than 45% of total Chinese CO2 emissions.
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Figure 1.1: CO2 emissions, (a) in the US, and (b) in Chinese electricity sector.
In the US-CAP scenario, US emissions, limited by the cap in each period, fall
to 4.15 Gt by 2030. The 30% reduction in US emissions is equal to 7% of global
emissions in 2030. Emissions from Chinese electricity increase slightly and are 6.8 Gt
in 2030. International leakage of emissions is driven by increased energy consumption
and an expansion of energy-intensive production outside the US
In the TRADE scenario, there is a cap on US emissions and a cap (at the BAU
level) on Chinese electricity emissions. The US buys emissions permits from China,
so US emissions increase above capped levels and Chinese electricity emissions de-
crease below their cap. In 2030, the US purchases permits for 1.94 Gt of emissions
from China, an amount equivalent to 64% of the reduction in US emissions in the
US-CAP scenario in this year.
CO2 prices and welfare changes are reported in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.9 In the US-
CAP scenario, the US permit price (in 2005 dollars) is $43 per ton of CO2 (t/CO2)
9.The welfare change figures reflect the changes in the households consumption level. They do not take
account of the environmental damages of climate change and its consequences.
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in 2015 and rises to $105 by 2030. The CO2 price in China is zero as there is no
constraint on Chinese emissions. In the TRADE scenario, the common CO2 price
in the two countries in 2030 is $21/tCO2. That is, sectoral trading decreases the US
CO2 price by $84 (80%) in 2030. The CO2 price reduction is achieved by replacing
high-cost emissions abatement options in the US with low-cost options in the Chinese
electricity sector. Scope for such replacements is enhanced by the large volume of
Chinese electricity CO2 emissions relative to total US emissions. Financial transfers
resulting from international permit trading are signiﬁcant: in 2030 the US purchases
allowances valued at $42 billion from China.
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Figure 1.2: Carbon price in the US-CAP and TRADE scenarios.
To put the value of transfers in perspective, the total value of exports from the
US to China in 2009 was $69 billion and the trade deﬁcit between China and the
US in 2009 was $227 billion. If we assume the amount of US exports to China grows
proportionally to GDP, exports would reach $103 billion in 2030. These ﬁgures
indicate that US exports to China would need to increase by 41% in 2030 to oﬀset
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ﬁnancial transfers under sectoral trading and maintain the current trade balance.10
Welfare eﬀects are expressed as equivalent variation changes in annual income
relative to the NO-POLICY scenario and do not include beneﬁts from reduced emis-
sions. Sectoral trading reduces the cost of climate policy in the US by more than
half in 2030, from 1.05% to 0.44%.
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Figure 1.3: Welfare changes relative to the NO-POLICY scenario, (a) in China, and (b) in
the US.
China experiences a small welfare increase in the US-CAP scenario as the US
emissions cap advantages Chinese producers relative to US producers in interna-
tional markets. Relative to the NO-POLICY case, changes in Chinese welfare in
the TRADE scenario are very small. The change in Chinese welfare is driven by
two opposing eﬀects: (i) ﬁnancial transfers from the US beneﬁt China, and (ii) the
constraint on electricity emissions decreases Chinese welfare (China bears part of
the US carbon constraint. In dollar terms, sectoral trading increases US welfare by
$88 billion and decreases Chinese welfare by $6 billion in 2030. Welfare in China
decreases because the rise in the electricity price increases production costs and
10. For a detailed analysis of the financial transfers resulting from international climate agreements, see
the work of Jacoby et al. (2010). The authors quantify the transfers and consequent welfare effects of such
agreements and show how they significantly vary with the allocation method chosen.
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hurts China’s international competitiveness, which outweighs beneﬁts from the sale
of permits to the US. In our example, the decrease in welfare in China indicates that
the US may need to transfer an amount greater than the value of permits purchased
to entice China to participate in a sectoral trading agreement.
1.3.2. Electricity generation in China and the United States
Electricity sectoral trading has been proposed to encourage early investment in
low-carbon electricity technologies in developing countries. Sectoral trading inﬂu-
ences electricity generation by increasing the price of electricity and changing the
relative cost of generation from diﬀerent sources. We ﬁnd that sectoral trading de-
creases the amount of electricity generated, particularly from coal, but does not have
signiﬁcant impacts on electricity generation from nuclear and renewables.
Relative to the US-CAP scenario, the Chinese electricity price rises by 21% in the
TRADE scenario in 2015 and 29% in 2030. Chinese electricity generation proﬁles
for the US-CAP and TRADE scenarios in 2030 are presented in Figure 1.4. In the
US-CAP scenario, Chinese electricity production is 36.2 exajoules (EJ) in 2030, with
23.2 EJ from coal. Sectoral trading reduces Chinese electricity generation by 4.4 EJ
(12%) in 2030. To put these numbers in perspective, US electricity production in
2009 was 14.9 EJ (EIA, 2010).
Examining generation sources in China, electricity from coal, which is the most
CO2-intensive generation source, decreases by 6.9 EJ in 2030 (30%) when sectoral
trading is introduced. This change is brought about by reduced investment in coal
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Figure 1.4: Chinese electricity generation for the (a) US-CAP and (b) TRADE scenarios.
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generation and retirement of less eﬃcient coal-ﬁred electricity capital. Generation
changes from other sources are small relative to total electricity production, although
electricity from some sources increases by large proportions. For example, sectoral
trading increases hydro electricity by 1.2 EJ (27%) and nuclear by 0.3EJ (6%).
Notably, solar and wind generation are the only advanced technologies in operation
in the US-CAP scenario and sectoral trading does not induce entry of additional
advanced technologies. These results suggest that sectoral trading is eﬀective in
preventing “carbon lock-in” by reducing coal-ﬁred electricity, but does not lead to
widespread adoption of low-carbon electricity generation in China.
In our modeling exercise, we examine sectoral trading between two countries.
In this speciﬁc case, sectoral trading also has an impact on the electricity sector of
the country that faces an economy-wide emissions constraint. In the US in 2030,
electricity generation amounts to 19.1 EJ in the NO-POLICY case, including 10.1
EJ from coal and 2.8 EJ from gas. In the US-CAP scenario, US electricity generation
decreases to 15.1 EJ, including 4.4 EJ from coal and 3.4 EJ from gas. In the TRADE
scenario, total US electricity generation increases to 17.9 EJ, including 8.0 EJ from
coal and 3.2 EJ from gas. These changes are driven by sectoral trading facilitating
more emissions from domestic sources than in the US-CAP scenario. In general, the
impact of sectoral trading will depend on the size of the countries involved and the
size and generation composition of each nation’s electricity sector.
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1.3.3. Emissions from the other sectors: “Internal leakage”
The Chinese electricity sector accounts for three-quarters of domestic demand for
coal. The emissions changes induced by sectoral trading in the other sectors of the
Chinese economy result from two eﬀects. On the one hand, the reduced use of coal for
electricity generation decreases the price of coal, which pushes most of the sectors
to substitute towards coal when this is possible. On the other hand, the carbon
constraint on the electricity sector make the electricity price rise, which tends to
lower the output of all sectors. The combination of these two eﬀect result in carbon
emissions increases in most of the other sectors, and in aggregate in positive carbon
leakage towards the rest of the Chinese economy. In our simulations, sectoral trading
decreases the price of coal in China by 8% in 2015 and 15% in 2030. Conversely,
sectoral trading increases the 2030 price of crude oil by 3%, which is driven by
increased US energy demand and its eﬀect on the international oil market. Price
changes for other energy commodities in 2030 are less than 2%.11 Ceteris paribus,
these price changes will induce Chinese ﬁrms to substitute towards coal and away
from other commodities, which will increase emissions. Opposing this change, higher
electricity prices increase production costs and ultimately reduce sectoral outputs
and emissions.
Figure 1.5 presents proportional changes in Chinese CO2 emissions by sector in
2030 for the US-CAP and TRADE scenarios. In China under the US-CAP scenario,
11.Changes in energy prices can also impact welfare via terms-of-trade effects, as discussed in Paltsev et
al. (2004).
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emissions increase in all sectors relative to the NO-POLICY case. This is due to the
US cap reducing world energy prices, especially the reﬁned oil price. These price
reductions ultimately increase energy use and emissions in China.
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Figure 1.5: Percent change in sectoral CO2 emissions in China in 2030 relative to the no
policy case.
In the TRADE scenario, however, emissions from most non-electricity sectors
increase, as producers substitute away from other energy commodities and towards
relatively cheaper coal. The two exceptions are reﬁned oil and transport.12 Changes
in sectoral emissions are driven by changes in electricity and coal prices. The in-
crease in the electricity price decreases production in all sectors. While most sectors
substitute towards coal, which increases sectoral emissions, transport and reﬁned oil
have limited scope to substitute towards coal, so emissions decrease for these sectors.
To summarize, the sectoral emissions changes are the result of two opposing eﬀects:
a decrease in production due to a higher electricity price and a substitution towards
coal when it is possible. The result of this sectoral policy is increased emissions
in all the other sectors expect the transport and the oil sectors, and, in aggregate,
12.Coal-to-liquids conversion technology is not considered in this analysis as it is unlikely to be economic
at the resulting oil prices.
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positive carbon leakage to the rest of the Chinese economy.
In aggregate, electricity emissions reductions due to sectoral trading result in
emissions increases elsewhere in the economy, or “internal leakage”. As a conse-
quence, global emissions reductions are smaller than the reductions imposed by the
cap on the US and the cap on Chinese electricity emissions. Internal leakage in 2030
for our TRADE scenario is 0.38 Gt of CO2, which represents 19% of the reduction
in Chinese emissions from electricity, or 12% of the reduction imposed on the US in
the US-CAP scenario. It is also interesting to compare internal and international
leakage across scenarios. In the US-CAP scenario, international leakage is 0.56 Gt
of CO2, which represents 18% of the reduction that is imposed on US emissions. In
the TRADE scenario, international leakage is 0.30 Gt of CO2.
To summarize results presented so far, sectoral trading allows the US to buy car-
bon permits in China and creates a common carbon price in the two countries. This
allows the US to emit above its cap while China must reduce its electricity emissions
below its cap. The resulting carbon price is lower than the one the US would face
under a US cap and trade system without sectoral trading. As a consequence, this
mechanism lowers the cost of climate policy in the US and increases welfare in the
US. In China, sectoral trading decreases the amount of electricity generated and
increases the price of electricity. Despite large ﬁnancial transfers associated with
international permit trading, there is not a large change in Chinese welfare, as in-
creased electricity prices reduce China’s international competitiveness (China bears
part of the US carbon constraint).
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Through general equilibrium eﬀects, the sectoral policy impacts the rest of the
Chinese economy. The higher electricity price induces a decrease in the activity
level in all sectors of the Chinese economy. Also, as electricity generation from
coal decreases (by 30% in 2030), the coal price decreases (by 15% in 2030), which
induces substitution towards coal in all sectors where it is possible (all the sectors
except reﬁned oil and transport). As a result, in addition to decreasing electricity
emissions, sectoral trading increases emissions in most other sectors (combination
of a substitution eﬀect and a general equilibrium eﬀect that lowers the economic
activity). In the scenario we consider, sectoral trading has little impact on electricity
generation from nuclear or renewables because of an increase in eﬃciency of coal-
based generation and a price-induced reduction in energy intensity. At this carbon
price level, the emissions reductions are not achieved through the use of renewable
or nuclear energies, but through energy consumption reduction and energy eﬃciency
improvement.
1.3.4. Alternative sectoral emissions constraints in China
Sectoral trading requires a cap on emissions from electricity in the country imple-
menting the sectoral policy. The cap may be set equal to projections from a scenario
where energy policies are assumed to remain unchanged, such as the IEA reference
scenario (IEA, 2010). In results presented so far, we followed such an approach by
using the level of Chinese electricity emissions in the NO-POLICY scenario as the
sectoral cap. Alternatively, a tighter cap may be chosen. If sectoral trading is im-
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plemented, the sectoral cap is likely to be a key issue in policy negotiations. In this
section, we explore the impact of alternative constraints on Chinese electricity emis-
sions. As noted in Section 2, we consider simulations where emissions are reduced
below the BAU level by linearly decreasing the cap each period so as to reach a
target percentage reduction by 2030. In separate simulations, we consider targets of
10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% below the BAU level by 2030. These alternative con-
straints allow us to examine the sensitivity of our results to the cap set on Chinese
electricity emissions.
Global emissions and CO2 prices in 2030 for alternatives caps on Chinese elec-
tricity emissions under sectoral trading are displayed in Figure 1.6. As the sectoral
constraint is tightened, allowances become scarcer and the CO2 price rises. Under a
50% constraint, the emissions price is $71/tCO2, more than three times larger than
the emissions price under a BAU constraint ($21). Tightening the constraint also
induces a large decrease in global emissions, from 41 Gt under a BAU constraint to
39 Gt under a 50% constraint. The signiﬁcant impact of the sectoral constraint on
the CO2 price and global emissions reﬂects the large size of the Chinese electricity
sector.
The value of permits traded internationally and proportional welfare changes
relative to the US-CAP scenario are displayed in Figure 1.7. The value of per-
mits initially rises and then falls as the sectoral constraint is tightened, reﬂecting
a combination of price and quantity eﬀects. As the sectoral constraint increases,
CO2 price increases but the volume of permits traded between the two countries
UNLIMITED SECTORAL TRADING 45
✵
✶ 
✷✵
✸✵
✹✵
✺ 
✻✵
✼✵
✽ 
❇✁U ✂✵% 20% 30% 40% 50%
C
O
2
P
ri
ce
, 
$
/t
 
Constraint on Chinese Electricity Emissions
(a)
37,5
✄☎
✆✝,5
✆✞
✆✞
,5
40
40,5
41
41,5
42
BA❯ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
G
lo
b
a
l 
E
m
is
si
o
n
s,
 G
t 
C
O
2
Constraint on Chinese Electricity Emissions
(b)
Figure 1.6: (a) The 2030 international carbon price and (b) 2030 global emissions for
alternative constraints on Chinese Electricity Sector.
decreases. Welfare in both China and the US falls as the sectoral cap is tightened,
as stricter sectoral caps increase the overall constraint on the two economies. How-
ever, while welfare in the US in these cases remains higher than the welfare in the
US-CAP scenario, welfare in China is lower than in the US-CAP scenario. In other
words, the US is always better oﬀ with sectoral trading as deﬁned here, but China
is always worse oﬀ and Chinese welfare falls swiftly as the cap is tightened.13 If
sectoral trading is to be used as an incentive to encourage China to participate in a
global agreement, these observations indicate that a moderate constraint on Chinese
emissions and transfers that exceed the value of allowances sold may be required.
Regarding electricity generation in China, higher CO2 prices under tighter con-
straints increase the eﬀects observed in the TRADE scenario (where Chinese elec-
tricity emissions face a BAU constraint). Speciﬁcally, under stricter constraints,
13.The figures of the welfare changes reported here are relative to the US-CAP scenario. The conclusions
remain the same if we consider the figures relative to the scenarios in which China has its own carbon
constraint and does not trade permits with the US.
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Figure 1.7: (a) Financial transfers between the US and China and (b) welfare changes in
the US and China, 2030.
total electricity generation decreases, generation from coal decreases, and there is a
small increase in generation from less carbon intensive technologies. The Chinese
electricity price increases with the constraint imposed on electricity emissions. For
a 30% constraint, the electricity price in 2030 increases by 61% relative to the price
in the US-CAP scenario, compared with a 29% under a BAU constraint.
The price of coal also falls by a larger amount as the constraint is tightened (e.g,
relative to the NO-POLICY case, the 2030 coal price falls by 24% when there is
a 30% constraint, compared to 15% under a BAU constraint). Larger coal price
reductions are associated with larger amounts of internal leakage, although leakage
rates are similar across scenarios (where the leakage rate is deﬁned as the amount
of internal leakage divided by the reduction in electricity emissions speciﬁed by the
sectoral cap). For example, under a 30% constraint, internal leakage is 0.61 Gt,
which represents a leakage rate of 18%. Under a 50% constraint, internal leakage
is 0.74 Gt and the leakage rate is 18%. In comparison, under a BAU constraint
internal leakage is 0.38 Gt and the leakage rate is 19%.
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1.4. Conclusions
Sectoral trading measures have been proposed to encourage early action and
investment in low carbon technologies in developing countries. To analyze the po-
tential impacts of such a mechanism, we considered sectoral trading between the
Chinese electricity sector and a national US cap-and-trade program. Sectoral trad-
ing results in the carbon price equalization between the two entities involved, as if
they had a common carbon market. Our central analysis sets a BAU cap on CO2
emissions from Chinese electricity and an economy-wide reduction on US CO2 emis-
sions of 30% of 2005 emissions by 2030. Under sectoral trading, in 2030, the Chinese
electricity sector sells 1.94 Gt of CO2 allowances to the US and the price US ﬁrms
pay for permits is $21 per tCO2 (in 2005 dollars), compared to $105 in the US when
there is a US cap without sectoral trading. The sale of permits to the US decreases
Chinese electricity emissions and increases Chinese electricity prices.
Emission decreases in China are driven by reductions in electricity generation
from coal, but there is only a small increase in low-carbon electricity generation.
Thus, our results suggest that sectoral trading will be eﬀective at reducing coal-
ﬁred generation but that, in the absence of other regulatory policies, it does not
spur wide-spread adoption of advanced technologies. In the US, as sectoral trading
decreases the carbon price, US electricity emissions are greater than under sectoral
trading. Notably, electricity generation from coal in the US is higher under sectoral
trading than without this mechanism.
In China, decreased coal-ﬁred electricity generation also reduces the price of coal.
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While the electricity price increase tends to reduce output in all sectors in China,
the coal price decrease induces an increase in coal consumption. The combination of
these two eﬀects (substitution eﬀect and general equilibrium eﬀect) in consequence
of the cap on Chinese electricity emissions results in increased emissions in most
other sectors. The two exceptions are reﬁned oil and transport sectors that see their
emissions decrease as the substitution towards coal is not possible in these sectors.
In aggregate, internal leakage is 0.38 Gt, around 6% of Chinese BAU electricity
emissions. This results in a global emissions reduction that is less than the sum of
the reductions imposed on the US and on Chinese electricity sectors.
We also analyzed sectoral trading when Chinese electricity emissions are capped
below BAU levels. Tighter constraints on Chinese electricity emissions decrease
global emissions and increase the CO2 price. Tighter caps on electricity emissions
also amplify changes in Chinese electricity generation observed in our core sectoral
trading scenario. In turn, larger changes in generation proﬁles result in larger reduc-
tions in the coal price and ultimately larger absolute internal leakage, but internal
leakage rates (the unanticipated absolute emission increase divided by the emission
reduction constraint) did not change signiﬁcantly.
Our results also indicate that, under a BAU constraint on Chinese electricity
emissions, sectoral trading increases welfare in the US, but not in China, relative
to a scenario where China does not participate in an agreement with the US. As
the constraint on electricity emissions is tightened, Chinese welfare declines sharply.
The reason is the US carbon cap is shared with the Chinese electricity sector. The
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resulting economic constraint for China is not compensated by the ﬁnancial transfers
associated with the trade in carbon permits.
The conclusions of this chapter (welfare loss in China, impact on the US carbon
price and reversal of some of the changes otherwised induced in the electricity gen-
eration in the US) suggest that a limit would be set on the volume of permits that
can be traded between the two entities, should sectoral trading come into eﬀect.
Such a limit would be comparable to the limit that is set on the volume of CDM
credits that are accepted for compliance in the EU ETS. While unlimited sectoral
trading leads to carbon price equalization between the countries involved, limited
sectoral trading would induce a price diﬀerence between the two regions, and, hence,
interesting distributional eﬀects, the analysis of which is the motivation for Chapter
2.
Our sectoral trading analysis considered the speciﬁc case of trading between the
US and the Chinese electricity sector. Considering a diﬀerent set of countries would
likely yield diﬀerent results. For example, if a country implementing the sectoral
policy was a small economy, the sectoral constraint would have a smaller inﬂuence
on the CO2 price and ﬁnancial transfers induced by sectoral trading would decrease.
In Annex, we quantify the impact of sectoral trading between the EU ETS and four
developing countries. The economics mechanisms are exactly the same as in the core
part of the chapter, the purpose of this annex is to quantify the consequences in terms
of carbon price, electricity generation, and ﬁnancial transfers and to compare the
results with those presented for the US-China case.
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A. Annex: Application to the case of trading between the
EU ETS and emerging countries
A.1. Motivation
Sectoral trading has been proposed in international climate change negotiations.
This mechanism provides an avenue for extending existing carbon markets to sectors
in developing countries, which may spur deployment of low-carbon technologies. In
the main part of Chapter 1, we analyzed the impacts of sectoral trading in carbon
permits between a hypothetical US cap-and-trade regime and the Chinese electricity
sector. We considered a US China example, as the two nations are the largest
emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2), and focusing on only two countries allowed us to
analyze sectoral trading in a simpliﬁed setting. However, as the EU may use this
mechanism to extend its carbon market externally, this appendix considers sectoral
trading involving the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which has
been in operation since 2005. Speciﬁcally, we analyze sectoral trading between
the EU ETS and electricity sectors in China, India, Mexico and Brazil, both for
each nation individually and all nations simultaneously. The mechanisms that take
place are exactly the same as in the main part of the chapter. The goal of this
complementary analysis is to provide quantiﬁcations and to compare the results
with what is observed in the US-China case. This annex has four further sections.
Section A.2 details how we model the EU ETS and the scenarios we consider. Results
are presented in section A.3. Section A.4 concludes and compares results from our
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supplementary analysis with those obtained on the US-China case in the main part
of the chapter.
A.2. Modeling framework
As in the core part of Chapter 1, our analysis employs version 5 of the MIT
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, adjusted to account for
China’s target to build 70 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear capacity by 2020. Also similar
to our US China example, we only consider constraints on CO2 emissions and trade
in CO2 permits for the period 2010-2030. The European Union (EU) has set a series
of climate and energy goals to be met by 2020 (EC, 2010). These goals, known
as the “20-20-20“ targets, include (i) a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions
of at least 20% below 1990 levels, (ii) 20% of energy consumption from renewable
sources, and (iii) a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected
levels, achieved by energy eﬃciency improvements. Given the uncertainty in the way
these targets may be fulﬁlled, we do not include the 20-20-20 goals in our analysis.
Instead, we calibrate the electricity generation proﬁle for the EU in EPPA using an
International Energy Agency policy scenario projection (IEA, 2010).
To approximate the EU ETS in the EPPA model, we set a progressive constraint
on electricity and energy intensive industries in the EU and allow trade in CO2
permits among member states. The constraint stipulates emissions reductions in
both sectors of 28% in 2020 and 42% in 2030, relative to 1990 emissions. Important
features of the EU ETS not included in our approximation are the availability of
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oﬀsets through the Clean Development Mechanism, the possible inclusion of aviation
from 2012, and provisions for banking of allowances.
We consider seven scenarios. The NO-POLICY scenario assumes that climate
policies are not implemented by any region. Our EU-ETS scenario implements
the EU ETS emissions constraint described above, and is applied in the remaining
ﬁve scenarios. In the CHN scenario, emissions from the Chinese electricity sector
are capped at the level observed in the NO-POLICY scenario, and trade in CO2
permits between the EU and the Chinese electricity sector is allowed. Similarly,
our MEX, IND and BRA scenarios set NO-POLICY caps on electricity emissions
in, respectively, Mexico, India and Brazil, and allow trade in CO2 permits between
each nation and the EU ETS. Our ﬁnal scenario, ALL4, implements NO-POLICY
caps on electricity emissions in China, India, Brazil and Mexico and allows the EU
to trade CO2 permits with all four nations.
To foreshadow results from the above scenarios relative to ﬁndings from the
main report, EU emissions from Electricity and Energy-intensive industry in the
NO-POLICY case are 1.68 Gigatons (Gt) and US emissions in the same scenario
are 7.19 Gt, both in 2030. Therefore, EU-China sectoral trading will have a smaller
impact on Chinese electricity generation than US China sectoral trading. Also,
sectoral trading will have a larger impact on the EU than on the US
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A.3. Results
A.3.1. Emissions and carbon prices
As in the US-China example analyzed in the main part of the chapter, sectoral
trading allows the developed region to buy cheap emissions permits in developing
countries. The quantity of permits transferred as well as the reduction in the CO2
price due to sectoral trading depends on the number and the size of the developing
countries involved, and the electricity generation proﬁle of partner countries.
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate emissions from EU ETS sectors.
For our seven scenarios, we present EU Electricity and Energy-intensive industry
emissions under the EU ETS in Figure 1.8. Sectoral trading with Mexico or Brazil
has little impact on EU ETS emissions. In contrast, sectoral trading between the EU
and China, India or all four nations facilitates a signiﬁcant increase in EU emissoins.
In the NO-POLICY scenario, EU ETS emissions are 1.78 Gt in 2020 and 1.86 Gt
in 2030. In the EU-ETS scenario, EU ETS emissions decrease to 1.52 Gt in 2020
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and 1.29 Gt in 2030. In the MEX and BRA scenarios, compared to the EU-ETS
scenario, EU ETS emissions increase by 3% of the reduction imposed by the EU ETS
cap. In contrast, EU ETS emissions increase by 72% of the reduction imposed by
the cap in the CHN scenario. In the ALL4 scenario, EU ETS emissions are 1.74
Gt in 2030, which represents an emissions increase equal to 79% of the reduction
imposed by the cap.
To analyze the impact of sectoral trading on countries with sectoral constraints,
we present Chinese and Mexican electricity emissions for selected scenarios in Figure
1.9. While Chinese emissions decrease by roughly the same in the CHN and ALL4
scenarios, the change in Mexican emissions heavily depends on the involvement of
other countries. Chinese and Mexican electricity emissions in the NO-POLICY
scenario are, respectively, 6.59 Gt and 0.12 Gt in 2030. Chinese 2030 electricity
emissions decrease by 6% in the CHN scenario and 5% in the ALL4 scenarios. Mex-
ican electricity emissions decrease by 17% in the MEX scenario, but only 2% in
the ALL4 scenario. Electricity emissions in India and China are not displayed in
Figure 2, but we describe key changes below. Indian 2030 electricity emissions are
2.63Gt in the NO-POLICY case and decrease by 13% in the IND scenario and 6%
in the ALL4 scenarios. Brazilian 2030 electricity emissions are 0.069 Gt in 2030 and
decrease by 26% in the BRA scenario and 2% in the ALL4 scenario.
Changes in electricity emissions inﬂuence the number of permits sold to the EU.
In the CHN scenario, permits for 0.41 Gt of CO2 are transferred to the EU from
China in 2030, and the EU sources 0.33 Gt of CO2 permits from India in the IND
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Figure 1.9: Electricity emissions in (a) China and (b) Mexico.
scenario. Under sectoral trading with Mexico and Brazil, transfers of CO2 permits
to the EU are much smaller ( around 0.02 Gt in both scenarios).
EU CO2 prices are presented in Figure 1.10. The EU carbon price is strongly
aﬀected by sectoral trading with China or India but is only reduced by a small
percentage when trading with Mexico or Brazil. In the EU ETS scenario, the permit
price is $32 per metric ton of CO2 (tCO2) in 2030.14 The 2030 permit price decreases
by 88% (to $4/tCCO2) in the CHN scenario and by 80% (to 6/tCO2) in the IND
scenario. The CO2 price in both the BRA and MEX scenarios is around $30/tCO2,
an 8% decrease. In the ALL4 scenario, the CO2 price decreases by 92% (to $3/tCO2).
Compared to the impact of sectoral trading between the US and China in the
main text, sectoral trading between the EU and China or India has a much larger
impact on the CO2 price. This result is driven by the small volume of emissions
covered by the EU ETS compared to the quantity of US emissions. Due to the large
changes in EU ETS emissions and the CO2 price in these scenarios, international
14.The EU CO2 price is lower than some other estimates of future CO2 prices as we do not consider
banking of emissions allowances.
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Figure 1.10: EU ETS carbon price.
negotiations may call for a limit on sectoral mechanisms involving some country
pairs, in the same way as there is currently a limit of the amount of CDM credits
accepted for compliance in the EU ETS. In contrast, the impact of sectoral trading
between the EU ETS and Mexico or Brazil on EU emissions and CO2 prices is much
smaller.
A.3.2. Financial transfers
Permit sales are associated with ﬁnancial transfers at a common carbon price.
The quantity of ﬁnancial transfers is inﬂuenced by the size and the number of coun-
tries involved in the sectoral agreement. We summarize ﬁnancial transfers in the
CHN and IND scenarios in Table 1.3, and ﬁnancial transfers in the ALL4 scenario
are reported in Table 1.4.
In the CHN scenario in 2020, the CO2 price is $2/tCO2 and 206 Mt of permits
are traded, resulting in a ﬁnancial transfer from the EU to China of $401 million.
In 2030, the CO2 price is $4/tCO2, 413 Mt of permits are traded and the ﬁnancial
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Table 1.3: Carbon prices and financial transfers in the CHN and MEX scenarios.
Scenario CHN MEX
Year 2020 2030 2020 2030
CO2 price, $/t 1.9 3.7 11.7 29.4
Permits transfers, Mt CO2 206 413 9 19
Financial Transfers, $ million 401 1,535 101 566
transfer is $1,535 million. The quantity of permits traded in the MEX scenario is
less, but CO2 prices ($12/tCO2 in 2020 and $29/tCO2 in 2030) are higher than
in the CHN scenario. As a result, ﬁnancial transfers in the MEX scenario ($101
million in 2020 and $566 million in 2030) are about one-quarter of those in the CHN
scenario. To put these numbers in perspective, the EU trade deﬁcit with China was
e133 billion ($184 billion) and the EU trade surplus with Mexico was e6 billion ($8
billion), both in 2009.
In the ALL4 scenario, the CO2 price is $1.5/tCO2 in 2020 and $2.7/tCO2 in
2030. China sells more permits to the EU (156 Mt CO2 in 2020 and 299 Mt CO2 in
2030) than any other nation. The ﬁnancial transfer from the EU to China is $229
million in 2020 and $798 million in 2030. India is the second largest seller of permits
to the EU and sells 63 Mt of permits in 2020 and 148 Mt in 2030. Compared to
the number of permits oﬀered by China and India, a small number of permits are
sold by Brazil and Mexico. In 2030, the EU purchases 451 Mt of CO2 permits, 66%
from China, 33% from India and 1% from Brazil and Mexico. Also in 2030, the EU
purchases $1.2 billion worth of foreign permits. In comparison, the EU’s aggregate
trade deﬁcit with the four countries was e129 billion ($179 billion) in 2009.
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Table 1.4: Carbon price and financial transfers in the ALL4 scenario
2020 2030
CO2 price, $/t 1.5 2.7
Permits transfers, Mt CO2
EUR 221 451
CHN -156 -299
IND -63 -148
BRA -0.9 -1.7
MEX -1.3 -2.5
Financial transfers, $ million
EUR -324 -1,205
CHN 229 798
IND 92 395
BRA 1 5
MEX 2 7
In our US-China example in the main part of the chapter, around $40 billion of
permits were traded internationally. Financial transfers for sectoral trading scenar-
ios involving the EU are smaller than in the US China case, as US economy-wide
emissions are larger than emissions covered by the EU ETS.
A.3.3. Electricity generation
Sectoral trading drives changes in electricity generation proﬁles, both in the EU
and in countries selling permits. As for changes in the CO2 price, the eﬀect of
sectoral trading on electricity generation choices in the EU from trading with China
and India is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from trading with Mexico and Brazil. Also, the
impact of sectoral trading on electricity generation proﬁles in developing countries
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depends on the size of the partner country. For example, in the US-China example
in the main report, sectoral trading induced a 12% decrease in electricity generation
in China in 2030, but the corresponding decrease is 2.3% in the CHN scenario, and
1.7% in the ALL4 scenario.
Under the CHN scenario in China in 2030, compared to the NO-POLICY sce-
nario, electricity generation from coal decreases by 1.3 exajoules (EJ) (6%), genera-
tion from hydro increases by 0.28 EJ (6%), and there are small proportional changes
in generation from other sources. In the ALL4 scenario, changes in Chinese elec-
tricity generation are smaller: generation from coal decreases by 4% and generation
from hydro increases by 4%.
In the MEX scenario, proportional changes in Mexican electricity generation
sources are larger than the corresponding changes in China under the CHN sce-
nario. Compared to the NO-POLICY case in 2030, electricity generation in Mexico
decreases by 0.06 EJ (6%). This change is associated with a 0.06 EJ (43%) decrease
in generation from coal, a 0.01 EJ (16%) increase in generation from hydro, and 0.02
EJ (5%) increase in generation from gas. In the ALL4 scenario, changes in Mexican
electricity generation are smaller due to competition from other countries. The total
amount of electricity generated in Mexico decreases by less than 1% compared to
the NO-POLICY scenario, and generation from coal decreases by 6%.
There are only small electricity generation changes in the EU in the MEX and
BRA scenarios. For example, compared to the NO-POLICY case, generation from
coal decreases by 56% in the EU ETS scenario and the corresponding decrease in
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the MEX scenario is 54%. In contrast, there are large changes in EU electricity
generation when there is sectoral trading between the EU and China or India, or
between the EU and all four countries. For example, generation from coal in the EU
decreases by 15% and 11% in, respectively, the CHN and ALL4 scenarios (compared
to 56% in the NO-POLICY scenario).
The observation that sectoral trading with large emitters may reverse most of
the changes induced by the EU ETS, further supports our assertions that limits may
be placed on sectoral mechanisms in international negotiations.
A.4. Conclusions
Sectoral trading can be used to extend CO2 markets in developed nations to
developing countries. In this annex, we examined the impact of sectoral trading
between sectors included in the EU ETS and electricity sectors in China, India,
Mexico and Brazil, both individually and simultaneously. The economic mechanisms
that take place are exactly the same as in the main part of the chapter. The goal
is to provide quantiﬁcations of the EU CO2 price, the ﬁnancial transfers and the
electricity generation proﬁles in the countries involved.
In our analysis, under sectoral trading between the EU and China or India,
without a limit on the quantity of permits traded, the EU carbon price decreased
by more than 75% and the EU purchased permits equal to more than 50% of the
reduction in 2030 emissions set out by the EU ETS. In contrast, under sectoral
trading between the EU and Mexico or Brazil, the amount of permits purchased
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was less than 4% of the 2030 emissions reduction dictated by the EU ETS, and the
CO2 price decreased by less than 8%. In 2030, sectoral trading between the EU
and electricity sectors in all four countries reduced the EU CO2 to $3/tCO2 and
the EU purchased permits equal to 79% of the emissions reduction called for by the
EU ETS. Most of these permits were sourced from China and India.
Changes in electricity generation due to sectoral trading depend on the relative
sizes of the countries participating in the agreement. Sectoral trading between the
EU ETS and China had a small impact on Chinese electricity generation, but a
signiﬁcant impact on EU electricity generation. In China, a small decrease in gen-
eration from coal and a small increase in generation from hydro were observed. In
the EU, sectoral trading with China reverses a large amount of electricity generation
changes induced by the EU ETS. Conversely, sectoral trading between the EU ETS
and Mexico resulted in large changes in electricity generation in Mexico, but only
small changes in the EU. In Mexico, sectoral trading resulted in a large decrease
in generation from coal, a signiﬁcant increase in generation from hydro and a small
increase in generation from gas.
We close by comparing our results for EU ETS sectoral trading with results for
US-China sectoral trading presented in the main part of the chapter. In 2030, EU-
China sectoral trading reduced the EU CO2 price from $32/tCO2 to $4/tCO2, and
US-China sectoral trading reduces the US CO2 price from $105/tCO2 to $21/tCO2.
The quantity of permits traded and ﬁnancial transfers under sectoral trading be-
tween the EU ETS and the four countries considered are much smaller than in the
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US China example. Under US China sectoral trading, permits valued at $42 billion
were traded, but only $1.5 billion worth of permits were traded under EU-China sec-
toral trading. These diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in the quantity of emissions
from EU ETS sectors and US economy-wide activity. In our simulations without
climate policy, emissions from EU ETS sectors were 1.86 Gt and US economy-wide
emissions were 7.19 Gt, both in 2030. As a result, EU-China sectoral trading had
a smaller impact on electricity generation in China than US China sectoral trading.
Conversely, EU-China sectoral trading had a larger inﬂuence on EU electricity gen-
eration than the impact of US-China sectoral trading on US electricity generation.
EU-China sectoral trading reversed a large part of the changes brought about by
the EU ETS. As a result, maximum limits may be placed on sectoral mechanisms,
so that each nation involved in an international agreement undertakes meaningful
domestic action. The analysis of the consequences of setting such a limit is the
motivation for Chapter 2. Still, the ability of sectoral mechanisms to reverse changes
induced by domestic policies in the developed countries is a decreasing function of
the size of the entity wishing to purchase emissions permits. Sectoral trading would
have smaller impacts if all Annex 1 nations used this mechanism simultaneously with
national cap-and-trade policies, than in the examples considered in our analysis.
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Chapter 2
Limited sectoral trading between the
EU ETS and China1
1. Introduction
Carbon markets are developing around the world as policy instruments to re-
duce greenhouse gases emissions. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) has existed since 2005. Elsewhere, national or subnational carbon mar-
kets are also operating in Australia, Japan, New Zealand and California (Trotignon
et al., 2011). Interconnections between them may develop (e.g., a full link between
the European and the Australian trading schemes is planned for 2018). Pilot carbon
markets are also being trialed in China, in ﬁve cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing,
Shanghai, and Shenzhen) and two provinces (Hubei and Guangdong) (EDF and
IETA, 2013).
1.This chapter is a joint work with Niven Winchester.
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To date, Non-Annex I countries2 have been involved in carbon markets through
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deﬁned in Article 12 of the Kyoto Proto-
col (UN, 1998). For each project approved by the CDM Executive Board, a certain
amount of credits, called Certiﬁed Emission Reductions (CER) are issued.3 Many
of these projects are renewable energy projects in India or China, e.g., the Huadian
Fuqing Niutouwei wind power project in China. These CERs can be traded and
sold in the carbon markets of Annex I countries. Among these carbon markets, the
EU ETS is the largest one to accept CERs for compliance. Similarly, under the
Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) deﬁned in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol,
Emissions Reduction Units (ERU) can be emitted for projects occurring in Annex
B countries and traded in other Annex B countries.4 The EU accepts ERUs and
CERs for compliance in the European carbon market (EU, 2004). In Phase II of the
EU ETS (2008-2012), the limit set on the amount of ERUs and CERs used in the
ETS was 13% of the total amount of European allowances (EUA). This limit was
not reached.
For major developing countries, new market mechanisms are being considered
to move away from the CDM to a wider approach. These countries could then
be involved in a global agreement without making nation-wide commitments. This
improvement is supported by the decision of the 2011 United Nations (UN) Cli-
mate Conference in Durban to set up such mechanisms under the United Nations
2.The lists of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries were defined in the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998).
3. Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) present the process through which CER units are issued and the sectors
and developing countries in which most CDM projects take place.
4. Annex B countries are Annex I countries with an emission reduction or a limitation commitment under
the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998).
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Sectoral trading is one of
the propositions (EU, 2009). It involves including a sector from one nation in the
cap-and-trade system of another nation or group of nations (IEA, 2009b). For ex-
ample, Chinese or Indian electricity sectors could be linked to the emission trading
schemes of some Annex I countries. Such approaches have been widely discussed
(Baron et al., 2008; Baron et al., 2009; CCAP, 2008; Bradley et al., 2007; ICC,
2008; IEA, 2006a, 2006b; IEA, 2007). Although they are less eﬃcient than a global
cap-and-trade system (Tirole, 2009), they may encourage participation in an inter-
national climate agreement (Sawa, 2010). As emissions reductions achieved through
the CDM have been criticized (Schneider, 2007), there is a hope that a sectoral
mechanism would achieve greater environmental beneﬁts (IEA, 2005a; IEA, 2005b;
IEA, 2006a, 2006b; Schneider et al., 2009a, Schneider et al., 2009b; Sterk, 2008) and
take advantage of a wider set of abatement opportunities (CCAP, 2010).
Several previous studies have investigated the impact of sectoral trading. Hamdi-
Cherif et al. (2010) analyzed sectoral trading between all developed countries and
the electricity sector of developing countries. Chapter 1 analyzes the hypothetical
US-China case, with trading between a national policy in the US and an electricity
cap in China. These studies showed that, with unlimited sectoral trading, carbon
prices in the two systems are equalized and a large proportion of the emissions
reductions speciﬁed in Annex I sectors are implemented in Non-Annex I sectors.
Hence carbon price decreases in Annex I regions resulted in a partial reversal of
the technological changes induced by Annex I carbon policies in the absence of
LIMITED SECTORAL TRADING BETWEEN THE EU-ETS AND CHINA 67
sectoral trading. Sectoral trading reduces electricity generation from coal in the
developing country involved but it has a limited impact on the deployment of low
carbon technologies, such as renewable or nuclear energies. Previous studies also
show that such a sectoral policy leads to carbon leakage to the rest of the emerging
country economy due to a reduction in fossil fuel prices (substitution eﬀect towards
coal in some sectors). The annex of Chapter 1 shows that the European carbon price
would decrease by more than 75% if there were unlimited sectoral trading between
the EU ETS and Chinese or Indian electricity sectors. This suggests that policy
makers would limit the amount of permits that could be traded, in the same way
that caps are imposed on the volume of CERs and ERUs accepted for compliance
in the EU ETS, if sectoral mechanisms are adopted. On the case of CDM credits,
Forner and Jotzo (2002) analyze how a cap on sinks projects could be used to improve
the beneﬁts for developing countries. They argue in favour of a supply side cap. If
we transpose their conclusion to the case of sectoral trading, this is consistent with
the requirement of an own action component for the new market mechanisms : a
developing country willing to trade permits with the EU ETS would have to set a
domestic cap on the corresponding sectors.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of setting a limit on the
amount of carbon permits that could be traded under sectoral trading. Such a limit
can be seen as a way to set the part of the European emissions constraint that is
shared with China. It induces a price diﬀerence between Chinese and European
carbon permits. As a consequence, some actors may buy cheap Chinese permits
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and sell them at a higher price in Europe. Even if the capture of the corresponding
rents by these actors depends on the institutional form this limit would take, such
a price diﬀerence would have distributional impacts, which are analyzed here. The
eﬀects on leakages and global emissions reductions are also presented. The analysis
considers the case of a coupling between the EU ETS and Chinese electricity sector
over the time period 2015-2030.
This paper has three further sections. Section 2 describes relevant policies, the
modeling framework and the scenarios considered. Section 3 presents the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Modeling framework
The analysis in this chapter extends the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy
Analysis (EPPA) model. For the presentation of the model, I refer to Section 1.2. In
the following sections, I describe the implementation of limited sectoral trading in
EPPA and the modiﬁcations done to the model to represent the policies taken into
account for the analysis, i.e. the EU ETS and its extension to the aviation sector
as well as the use of oﬀsets through the CDM.
2.1. Limited sectoral trading
Climate policy instruments in EPPA include emissions constraints, carbon taxes,
energy taxes and technology regulations such as renewable portfolio standards.
When there are emissions constraints under existing model functionality, permits
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may be either: (i) not tradable across sectors or regions, resulting in sector-speciﬁc
permit prices in each region, (ii) tradable across sectors within regions but not across
regions, resulting in region-speciﬁc permit prices, or (iii) tradable across sectors and
regions, resulting in an international permit price. Modeling sectoral trading requires
extending the model to allow trade between international permits and sector-speciﬁc
permits.
A trade certiﬁcate system is introduced to set the limit on the amount of sectoral
permits that can be imported from the developing country (e.g., China) to the
international carbon market of Annex I countries (e.g., the EU ETS). The number of
certiﬁcates issued is a fraction, α, of the total amount of permits allocated in Annex I
countries’carbon markets. Each permit exported from developing countries to Annex
I regions requires a trade certiﬁcate, which limits the number of permits imported to
α times the number of permits issued in Annex I regions. The CGE modeling forces
an accounting of the rents associated with such certiﬁcates. Although it could be
allocated to any agent in the model, the revenue from the certiﬁcates is distributed
either to the importer or exporter of permits. It will ultimately depend on how the
policy is designed. In the model, alternative revenue allocations are considered by
endowing certiﬁcates to either Chinese or European households. As a consequence,
the impact of the sectoral trading policy on the welfare in the countries involved
depends on this allocation choice, as discussed in Section 3.4.
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2.2. European and Chinese energy and climate policies
At the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009, the EU
committed to achieve a 20% emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 2020 (UN,
2009).5 This reduction is part of the 20-20-20 targets, which are to be met through
the application of the Climate and Energy Legislative Package. Two other goals
include raising the share of the EU power production from renewable resources to
20% and improving the energy eﬃciency in the EU by 20% by 2020. The EU ETS
is a key instrument for reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions. Started in
2005, it now covers more than 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 31
countries.6 Credits from CDM and JI are accepted for compliance in the EU ETS
under a speciﬁc limit. For Phase II of the scheme (2008-2012), this limit was 13% of
the total amount of EU allowances. Banking and borrowing is allowed within each
phase.
In this analysis, the EU ETS is modeled as a carbon market covering the EU
electricity sector and energy-intensive industries. To achieve an economy-wide 20%
emissions reduction, the emissions constraint imposed on these sectors is a 42%
reduction below 1990 levels by 2030. Banking of allowances is modeled by specifying
a carbon price in the base period that grows at an assumed discount rate of 5% per
year. The base period carbon price is chosen to target cumulative emissions speciﬁed
5.The EU offered to increase its emissions reduction to 30% by 2020 if other major economies in the
world commit to significant emissions reductions. The options for moving beyond a 20% reduction by 2020
are analyzed in a Communication published by the European Commission (EC, 2010).
6. In addition to the 28 EU Member States, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein also participate in the
European trading scheme.
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by the cap. In the modeling exercise, no distinction is made between Phase III (2013-
2020) and Phase IV (2021-2028).
In 2009, before the Copenhagen Conference, China announced a target to reduce
its carbon intensity by 40 to 45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level. Modeling
sectoral trading between the Chinese electricity sector and the EU ETS requires
setting a trading baseline for Chinese emissions, below which China can sell emissions
reductions to the EU. In the current analysis, to reﬂect emissions reductions due to
the Chinese intensity target, we impose a 10% reduction target on Chinese electricity
sector emissions by 2030 compared to the no policy emissions level. This reﬂects
the own action component requirement related to these new market mechanisms. It
is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Forner and Jotzo (2002) as explicited in the
introduction.
2.3. Aviation sector and the EU ETS
Since the beginning of 2012, emissions from international aviation have been
included in the EU ETS (EU, 2008). Currently, the application of the scheme to
ﬂights in and out of Europe is under discussion and the legislation applies to all ﬂights
within Europe, including the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and
European Free Trade Association space (EFTA).7,8 The annual average of 2004,
7.A global solution for international aviation emissions is expected from the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) General Assembly that will take place in autumn 2013. If no progress is made, the
EU ETS legislation will apply to all flights to and from European countries, regardless of the origin or
destination of each flight.
8. The European Economic Area comprises the countries of the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway. The members of the European Free Trade Association are Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and
Switzerland.
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2005 and 2006 aviation emissions within, from and to covered European countries
was 221 million tons. The cap set on European aviation was 97% of this reference
in 2012, and 95% from 2013 onwards. Given the high growth rate predicted for the
sector and the high cost of abating aviation emissions, the aviation sector will likely
purchase permits from the general EU ETS (Malina et al., 2012).
The impact of demand for permits by the aviation industry may be compensated
by the use of CDM and JI credits.9 From 2008 to 2010, installations under the
EU ETS surrendered CERs to cover 277 million tons of CO2-equivalent emissions
and ERUs to cover 23 million tons of CO2-equivalent. The limit on CER and ERUs
in phase II of the EU ETS (13% of the amount of EUAs issued under the European
cap) was not reached. By extrapolating these ﬁgures to 2011-2030 and comparing
them to the limit set on the amount of CER and ERU allowed in the EU ETS, we
ﬁnd an approximation of CDM and JI credits that could be used by the aviation
sector to cover their emissions.
In the analysis, we consider that aviation emissions grow at an annual rate of
3%. We decrease the general EU ETS cap deﬁned in Section 2.2 by all aviation
emissions above the aviation cap that could not be covered by estimated CDM and
JI credits available for compliance in the EU ETS. This simpliﬁcation does not take
account of the marginal abatement cost curve for CDM and JI projects, but it allows
the speciﬁcation of a cap on emissions net of demand for permits by the aviation
9. For the time period 2008-2020, the limit of CDM and JI credits accepted for compliance in the EU ETS
is 1.7 billion tCO2. All projects are accepted except nuclear energy projects, afforestation and reforestation
activities, and, from 2013 onwards, projects involving the destruction of industrial gases. Credits from large
hydropower projects are subject to conditions.
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industry and use of CDM and JI credits. In practice, non-aviation and aviation
sectors may purchase CDM and JI credits. As a net cap is used in the modeling
framework, the results do not depend on which sectors use the CDM and JI credits.
The impact of alternative assumptions regarding the availability of CDM and JI
credits is considered in Section 3.5.
2.4. Scenarios
Five core scenarios are used to analyze the impact of sectoral trading with a
limit on the amount of permits that can be traded. In the No-Policy scenario, no
emissions constraints are imposed. This scenario provides the “business as usual
emissions” trajectory for Chinese electricity sector. In the China-cap scenario, an
emissions constraint is imposed on the Chinese electricity sector only, with a target of
10% reduction below business-as-usual emissions by 2030. In the EU ETS Scenario,
cumulative emissions between 2005 and 2030 are reduced by 7.7 billion tons relative
to the No-Policy Scenario. This emissions reduction accounts for the use of CDM and
JI credits and emissions targets speciﬁed for aviation and other EU ETS sectors. In
the Trade Scenario, sectoral trading is allowed between the EU ETS and the Chinese
electricity sector without a limit on sectoral trading. In the Limit Scenario, sectoral
trading is allowed but the amount of carbon permits that can be imported from
China to the EU ETS for each time period is limited to 10% of the total amount of
European allowances for this time period (α = 0.1). Given the constraint imposed
on the EU ETS sectors, this fraction limits trade of certiﬁcates to 158, 143, 128 and
LIMITED SECTORAL TRADING BETWEEN THE EU-ETS AND CHINA 74
113 million respectively in 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. In alternative variants of the
Limit Scenario, we consider limits of 5, 10 and 20%.
We assign the certiﬁcates revenue to the EU in the core simulations. Alternative
allocations of the certiﬁcate revenue are considered in additional simulations, in
particular for the welfare analysis.
3. Results
3.1. Emissions transfers and carbon prices
Unlimited sectoral trading leads to a carbon price equalization between the two
entities involved. Under limited sectoral trading, as long as the limit is bounding,
carbon prices in the two regions are not equalized and the diﬀerence in prices in the
two regions depends on α.
Emissions in the Chinese electricity sector and in the sectors covered by the
EU ETS are presented in Figure 2.1, and carbon prices in each region are displayed
in Figure 2.2. If China sets a cap on its electricity sector and does not trade carbon
permits abroad (China-cap), Chinese electricity emissions are 5.92 billion tons in
2030 (Figure 2.1a), 0.66 billion tons less than No-Policy emissions and the Chinese
carbon price for the electricity sector is $6.2/tCO2 (Figure 2.2a). If the EU ETS is
not coupled with Chinese electricity sector (EU ETS), the European carbon price
is $39.7/tCO2 in 2030 (Figure 2.2b) and the emissions covered by the EU ETS
amount to 1.30 billion tons in 2030, compared to 1.96 in the No-Policy Scenario
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Figure 2.1: CO2 emissions in (a) the Chinese electricity sector, and (b) EU ETS sectors.
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Figure 2.2: Carbon price in (a) the Chinese electricity sector, and (b) the EU ETS.
(Figure 2.1b).
If unlimited sectoral trading is allowed between the two entities (Trade), Chinese
carbon permits corresponding to 410 million tons CO2 are exported to Europe and
the carbon price is equalized across the two systems at $10.2/tCO2. Emissions from
the sectors covered by the EU ETS are 1.66 billion tons while those from the Chinese
electricity sector are 5.51 billion tons in 2030.10
In the Limit Scenario, imports of Chinese permits cannot exceed 10% of the
10.The amount of permits transferred in 2030 is the difference between Chinese electricity emissions in the
China-Cap and the Trade scenarios in 2030. It is not equal to the difference between European emissions
specified under the EU ETS and the Trade scenario in 2030, as banking and borrowing allow European
agents to fulfill part of their 2030 emissions reductions obligations in previous periods.
LIMITED SECTORAL TRADING BETWEEN THE EU-ETS AND CHINA 76
Table 2.1: Carbon prices and volume of permits transferred in 2030.
Volume of permits Chinese carbon EU carbon
transferred (Mt CO2) price ($/tCO2) (price $/tCO2)
China-Cap - 6.24 -
EU ETS - - 39.7
Limit α = 0.05 57 6.78 31.4
Limit α = 0.1 113 7.2 25.9
Limit α = 0.15 170 7.62 20.3
Limit α = 0.2 228 8.05 15.7
Trade 410 10.2 10.2
number of permits issued under the EU ETS for each time period. This limit is 113
million in 2030. In this scenario, Chinese emissions are equal to 5.81 billion tons of
CO2, while EU emissions are 1.43 billion tons in 2030. The limit set on the volume
of permits that can be traded between the regions induces a carbon price diﬀerence
between the two entities. The carbon price is $25.9/tCO2 in Europe and $7.20/tCO2
in China in 2030. This diﬀerence has distributional impacts that are examined in
Section 3.4.
Carbon prices and the volume of permits transferred vary with α. The stricter
the limit, the lower the amount of permits that are transferred from China to the
EU, and the larger the price diﬀerence between the two regions (see Table 2.1).
When α = 0.05, the volume of permits traded is 57 million tons in 2030 and the
carbon price is $6.78/tCO2 in China and is $31.4/tCO2 in Europe. In comparison,
when α = 0.2, the volume of emissions transferred is 410 million tons and the 2030
carbon price is $8.05/tCO2 in China and $10.2/tCO2 in the EU ETS.
Table 2.1 also reports results when there is no limit on sectoral trading. Under
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unlimited sectoral trading, the European carbon price decreases by 74% and under
limited sectoral trading, this reduction is 34% if α = 0.1 and 21% if α = 0.05.
The diﬀerence between the Chinese and the European carbon prices induced by
the limit α corresponds to the certiﬁcate price. The capture of this rent by either
China or the EU has distributional impacts, which are analyzed in Section 3.4.
3.2. Electricity generation profiles
Carbon emissions constraints in China and the EU change electricity generation
proﬁles in the two regions. Previous analysis shows that unlimited sectoral trad-
ing between Europe and China would reverse most of the changes induced by the
EU ETS in the European electricity sector. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present electricity
generation in China and Europe in the No-Policy, China-Cap, EU ETS, Trade and
Limit (when α = 0.1) scenarios.
In China, unlimited sectoral trading enhances the changes induced by the con-
straint on Chinese electricity sector. For example, electricity production from coal
decreases by 6% in the Trade Scenario relative to the China-Cap Scenario. Electric-
ity production from low-carbon technologies is also impacted: in the Trade Scenario,
relative to the China-Cap Scenario, electricity production from nuclear energy in-
creases by 1.2%, hydropower increases by 4.5%, and wind and solar power increases
by 2.1%. The price of electricity increases by 6.7% in the Trade Scenario, which
decreases demand and ultimately production by 2% compared to the China-Cap
Scenario. When sectoral trading is limited (α = 0.1), these eﬀects are smaller. Rel-
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Table 2.2: Electricity generation in China in 2030 (EJ)
No-Policy China-Cap Trade Limit
Coal 22.6 20.3 19.1 20.1
Oil 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.87
Nuclear 4.09 4.19 4.24 4.20
Hydro 4.67 5.12 5.35 5.17
Solar and wind 1.86 1.93 1.97 1.94
Traditional gas 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.21
NGCC* 1.79 2.11 2.08 2.05
Total 36.1 34.7 33.86 34.51
* NGCC refers to natural gas combined cycle.
ative to the China-Cap Scenario, the electricity price increases by 2.9% and the total
amount of electricity generated decreases by 0.5% in the Limit Scenario. Also in
this scenario, the total amount of electricity produced is 34.51 exajoules (EJ) out
of which 11.31 EJ is from low carbon technologies, compared to a total of 34.7 EJ,
including 10.72 EJ from low carbon technologies in the China-Cap Scenario.
In Europe, unlimited sectoral trading partially reverses technological changes
induced by the EU ETS. Setting a limit on the amount of carbon permits that can
be imported from China to Europe reduces this eﬀect. For example, in comparison to
the EU ETS Scenario, electricity production from coal increases by 38% in the Trade
Scenario and by 14% in the Limit Scenario. Additionally there is greater generation
from low-carbon technologies in the Limit Scenario than the Trade Scenario: nuclear
power production increases by 3.6%, hydropower production increases by 5%, and
solar and wind power production increases by 2.5%.
In summary, unlimited sectoral trading between the EU ETS and the Chinese
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Table 2.3: Electricity generation in Europe in 2030 (EJ)
No-Policy EU ETS Trade Limit
Coal 4.23 2.64 3.65 3.02
Oil 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.50
Nuclear 4.01 4.39 4.15 4.30
Hydro 1.54 1.73 1.60 1.68
Solar and wind 1.18 1.26 1.21 1.24
Traditional gas 2.11 1.94 2.05 1.99
NGCC 0.16 0.69 0.46 0.64
Total 13.72 13.16 13.6 13.37
electricity sector would slightly enhance the development of low-carbon electricity
technologies in China relative to an isolated cap on electricity emissions while de-
creasing the total amount of electricity produced. In Europe, this would partly
reverse changes induced by the EU ETS in European electricity generation. Lim-
iting the amount of carbon permits that could be imported from China to the EU
would reduce these eﬀects.11
3.3. Leakage and Aggregate Emissions Reductions
From 2005 to 2030, the cumulative emissions reduction constraint imposed in the
analysis is 7.06 billion tons in Europe and 4.73 billion tons in China. These caps
induce leakage of emissions to non-covered sectors and regions (see Table 2.4).
Chapter 1 shows how sectoral trading induces leakages in the Non-Annex I coun-
tries involved. As the electricity sector is constrained, electricity price rises, which
11.Given the fact that Chinese electricity production is nearly three times that in Europe in 2030, a
similar change in absolute values is proportionally more significant in Europe than in China.
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decreases output in other sectors (general equilibrium eﬀect). At the same time,
there is a decrease in the price of coal and a substitution toward this input in many
sectors (substitution eﬀect). As a consequence of the combination of these two ef-
fects, all sectors see their emissions increase, except the transport, electricity and oil
sectors, in which substitution to coal is not possible. In aggregate, there is positive
leakage to the rest of the Chinese economy. The amount of cumulative leakage to
the rest of the Chinese economy is 1.25 billion tons of CO2 under limited sectoral
trading and 1.71 billion tons when no limit is set on the amount of permits that
can be traded. In Europe, leakage to the rest of the economy is negative. As the
EU ETS covers not only the electricity sector but also energy-intensive industries,
this result is driven by the output eﬀect dominating the substitution eﬀect between
coal and electricity (i.e. there is not a large substitution from electricity to coal in
non-electricity sectors as in the China-Cap Scenario). If international leakage is also
taken into account, we observe that aggregate leakage is signiﬁcantly smaller when
there is limited sectoral trading (2.42 billion tons of CO2) than when international
trade in permits is not restricted (3.39 billion tons of CO2). This result is explained
by the fact that, when there is limited sectoral trading, a larger proportion of the
reduction in emissions takes place within the EU ETS, which has a broader sectoral
coverage. In other words, emissions reductions in China target the electricity sec-
tor only while they relate to the electricity sector as well as other energy-intensive
industries in Europe. Taking into account the constraints imposed in Europe and
China, and total leakage, we conclude that aggregate emissions reductions at the
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Table 2.4: Cumulative leakage and emissions reductions relative to the No-Policy Scenario
for the time period 2005 - 2030 (billion tCO2).
EU ETS China-Cap Limit Trade
Leakage to the rest
of the Chinese economy 0.36 0.67 1.25 1.71
Leakage to the rest
of the EU economy -0.15 0.02 -0.12 -0.07
Leakage to the rest
of the world 1.72 0.29 1.29 1.74
Total leakage 1.93 0.98 2.42 3.39
Global emissions reductions 5.13 3.75 9.37 8.40
world level are higher under limited sectoral trading than in the other scenarios.
3.4. Welfare impacts
The welfare impact of sectoral trading is driven by two eﬀects. On the one hand,
trade in carbon permits induces ﬁnancial transfers from the Annex I country to the
Non-Annex I region (transfer eﬀect). On the other hand, the constraint on the Non-
Annex I country electricity sector makes electricity more expensive, which causes
a decrease in aggregate output (general equilibrium eﬀect). Chapter 1 shows that
unlimited sectoral trading improves welfare in Annex I regions but decreases it in
Non-Annex I regions. This is driven by the constraint imposed in the Annex I region
being more stringent than the constraint imposed on Chinese electricity sector. As
such, the general equilibrium eﬀect dominates the transfer eﬀect in non-Annex I
regions when there is sectoral trading. As a consequence, while sharing the carbon
constraint improves welfare in the Annex I country, this is not necessarily so in the
Non-Annex I country.
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Table 2.5: 2030 Welfare changes relative to the No-Policy scenario (percent).
Scenarios In China In the EU
China-Cap -0.14 0.00
EU ETS 0.00 -0.27
Trade -0.23 -0.17
As noted in Section 2, modeling limited sectoral trading by introducing a trade
certiﬁcate system requires making a choice regarding the allocation of the revenue
from the certiﬁcates, which inﬂuences welfare in each region. We consider separate
cases where the revenue is allocated to China or the EU. Table 2.5 reports welfare
changes for the China-Cap, EU ETS and Trade Scenarios relative to the No-Policy
Scenario. Table 2.6 reports welfare changes for the Limit scenario with alternative
values of α, and with allocation of the certiﬁcate revenue to Chinese or European
households.
In the China-Cap and the EU ETS scenarios, the welfare changes compared to the
No-Policy Scenario (-0.14% in China in the China-Cap scenario, -0.27% in Europe in
the EU ETS case) are driven by the constraints on emissions in each region. Under
unlimited sectoral trading (Trade), the EU is better oﬀ but China is worse oﬀ, as the
general equilibrium eﬀect dominates the revenue eﬀect in China (China bears part
of the European carbon constraint, while it only has its own emissions constraint
when no carbon permits trading is allowed with the EU).
The welfare changes induced by limited sectoral trading are tightly linked with
the distributional impacts of the price diﬀerence between Chinese and European
permits. If the certiﬁcate rent (which corresponds to the price diﬀerence between
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Table 2.6: 2030 Welfare changes in the Limit scenario relative to the No-Policy scenario
for alternative values of α (percent).
In China In the EU
Scenarios Rent to China Rent to the EU Rent to China Rent to the EU
Limit, α = 0.2 -0.18 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17
Limit, α = 0.15 -0.16 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19
Limit, α = 0.1 -0.14 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21
Limit, α = 0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.24 -0.23
the European and the Chinese carbon permits) is allocated to Chinese households,
any import of permits from China to the EU will result in a beneﬁt for Chinese
households corresponding to the certiﬁcate price multiplied by the number of per-
mits. For example, in the α = 0.1 scenario, a European company willing to buy a
Chinese carbon permit to use it in the European carbon market will have to pay
$7.2/tCO2 for the permit in addition to $18.7/tCO2 to Chinese households for the
corresponding certiﬁcates (prices are given in Table 2.1). There is a positive trans-
fer for China. Symetrically, if the rent is allocated to European households, there
is a positive transfer eﬀect for the EU: EU households may buy carbon permits at
$7.2/tCO2 and use them like permits at $25.9/tCO2.
In addition to this transfer eﬀect, the general equilibrium eﬀect explained in
Chapter 1 (electricity price increase that constraints all economic sectors) also takes
place, even if it is reduced as a consequence of the limit. The combination of the two
result in the welfare changes presented in Table 2.6. As explained above, welfare is
higher in China if Chinese households receive the revenue than if certiﬁcate revenue
is allocated to the EU. For example, for α = 0.1, welfare decreases by 0.14% in China
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if certiﬁcate revenue goes to Chinese households, but it decreases by 0.18% if the
revenue is allocated to the EU. This corresponds to a welfare change increase of +
0.04 percentage point if the certiﬁcates revenue is allocated to Chinese households.
In Europe, welfare increases by + 0.02 percentage point (from −0.23% to −0.21%)
if the certiﬁcate revenue is allocated to European households.
In addition, the welfare in China decreases as the limit α increases, while welfare
in Europe increases with α. This is related to the general equilibrium eﬀect and
the dissymmetry in the carbon constraints as mentioned above; while sharing the
constraints is welfare improving for Europe, it is not necessarily so for China, unless
the latter has a a more ambitious domestic emissions reduction target prior to trading
permits with the EU.
Table 2.7 summarizes changes in electricity prices, aggregate output, net exports
and the terms of trade as a consequence of the policy. We observe that the electricity
price in China in 2030 rises by 6.7% in the Trade Scenario and by 2.9% in the Limit
Scenario (α = 0.1) relative to the China-Cap scenario. The aggregate output of
Chinese economic sectors decreases by 0.11% in the Trade Scenario and 0.02% in
the Limit Scenario. These results reﬂect the fact that the mechanisms observed in
Chapter 1 are reduced under limited sectoral trading. Exports decrease by 4.9%
in the Trade Scenario and by 3.3% in the Limit Scenario but the terms of trade
increase by 0.04% in the Trade Scenario and by 0.01% in the Limit Scenario.
Compared to the Trade Scenario, for which China is always worse oﬀ relative
to the China-Cap scenario, it is interesting to note that, under limited sectoral
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Table 2.7: Change in electricity price, aggregate output, net exports and the terms of trade
in China in 2030, relative to the China-Cap scenario (percent).
Scenarios Change in Change in Change in Change in
electricity aggregage net the terms
price output exports of trade
Limit +2.89 -0.02 -3.32 +0.01
Trade +6.72 -0.11 -4.90 +0.04
trading, there exists a limit for which China is at least as well oﬀ as in the China-
Cap Scenario, providing the certiﬁcate revenue is allocated to China. The EU is
also better oﬀ in this scenario. As one entity is better oﬀ without the other being
worse oﬀ, this situation (Limit scenario with α = 0.05 or 0.1) is pareto superior to
the situation in which each region has its own constraint and no trading is allowed
between them. Of the cases considered here, welfare is greater when α = 0.1.
The limit corresponding to the pareto-optimal situation depends on the domestic
emissions reduction target of each of the partners. The more ambitious the emissions
reduction target in the developing country, the higher the limit (α) can be to make
both entities better oﬀ. This is particularly interesting in terms of political feasibility
and international negotiations.
3.5. Sensitivity analysis
In Section 2.3, we explained how European aviation emissions are included in
the analysis, taking into account an approximation of the use of CDM and JI credit
by this sector. In this subsection, we present the change in results when European
aviation emissions are included in the analysis without compensation through CDM
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Table 2.8: Carbon prices, permits traded, and emissions without CDM and JI credits.
Scenarios Volume of Chinese EU carbon Chinese EU ETS
permits carbon price electricity sectors
transferred price ($/tCO2) sector emissions
(Mt CO2) ($/tCO2) emissions (billion
(billion tCO2) tCO2)
China-Cap - 6.24 - 5.9 1.95
EU ETS - - 43.4 6.6 1.28
Limit 114 7.19 27.7 5.8 1.41
Trade 435 10.4 10.4 5.5 1.65
and JI projects. The results are summarized in Table 2.8. Under this adjustment,
the carbon price in the EU ETS scenario in 2030 is $43.4/tCO2 and emissions from
the sectors covered by the scheme are 1.28 billion tons. In the Limit Scenario, the
European carbon price decreases by 36% with α = 0.1, and by 17% if α = 0.05.
Carbon prices in European and Chinese electricity sectors equalize at $10.4/tCO2
in 2030 in the Trade Scenario. Under unlimited sectoral trading, 435 million tons of
Chinese carbon permits are sold to Europe in 2030, compared to 114 million tons
in the Limit Scenario. Emissions from the sectors covered by the EU ETS reach
1.65 billion tons in the Trade Scenario in 2030 and 1.41 in the Limit Scenario. The
carbon price in China is $7.19/tCO2 in the Limit Scenario and $10.4/tCO2 in the
Trade scenario. The welfare analysis presented in the previous section is robust to
this sensitivity test.
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4. Conclusions
In the UNFCCC negotiations, new market mechanisms are proposed to extend
Non-Annex I countries participation in carbon markets beyond the current project-
based CDM. Sectoral trading is one such proposition. To prevent a large proportion
of the reduction in emissions shifting from Annex I to Non-Annex I regions, limits on
sectoral trading have been suggested. This paper characterizes the impact of limited
sectoral trading between the EU ETS and Chinese electricity sector. Setting a limit
on the volume of permits that can be traded induces a price diﬀerence between the
entities involved. Some agents may take advantage of the corresponding rent by
buying cheap permits and selling them at a higher price. The consequences would
depend on the institutional form this limit actually takes. In all cases, it would have
distributional eﬀects, which we want to analyze here. The choice is made to simulate
this limit through the implementation of a trade certiﬁcate system in the EPPA
model. We ﬁnd that, while carbon prices in the European and Chinese electricity
sectors equalize at $10.2/tCO2 under unlimited sectoral trading, the carbon price
is $25.9/tCO2 in Europe and $7.2/tCO2 in the Chinese electricity sector when the
amount of Chinese carbon permits imported in the EU cannot exceed 10% of the
number of permits issued under the EU ETS. This price diﬀerence corresponds
to the price of the certiﬁcates. The change in the EU carbon price represents a
34% decrease compared to when there is no sectoral trading. If the amount of
Chinese permits that is accepted in the ETS is 5 or 20% of the number of EUA
allowances, the EU carbon price is respectively $31.4/tCO2 and $15.7/tCO2. We
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observe that, while unlimited sectoral trading slightly enhances adoption of low-
carbon technologies induced by the emissions reduction constraint in the Chinese
electricity sector, this eﬀect is diminished under limited sectoral trading. Low carbon
technologies represent 31% of a total of 36.1 EJ of electricity produced in China
if there is a 10% emissions reduction constraint on this sector. Under unlimited
sectoral trading with the EU ETS, the absolute amount of electricity from low carbon
technologies increases by 0.84 EJ but the total amount of electricity produced in
China decreases by 2%. If there is a limit on the amount of permits traded, electricity
from low carbon technologies represents 11.31 EJ, which is 33% of the total amount of
electricity generated in China. In Europe, while unlimited sectoral trading partially
reverses the changes in the electricity sector induced by the EU ETS, a limit on
this mechanism moderates this eﬀect. If no trading is allowed between the EU ETS
and Chinese electricity sector, low carbon electricity in Europe produces 7.38 EJ in
2030. With limited sectoral trading, low-carbon electricity production in Europe is
7.22 EJ in 2030, compared to 6.96 EJ if no limit is set on the volume of permits that
can be traded with China.
Regarding aggregate emissions, we observe that international leakage and leakage
to the rest of the Chinese economy are lower when a limit is set on the amount of
permits that can be traded than without it. This is explained by the fact that, under
limited sectoral trading, more emissions reductions take place under the EU ETS,
which covers, not only the European electricity sector, but also all energy-intensive
industries. As a consequence, global world emissions reductions are higher under
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limited sectoral trading than in the other scenarios.
Welfare changes in both regions involved depend on the way the revenue from the
certiﬁcates is allocated. The diﬀerence between Chinese and European carbon prices
has a distributional eﬀect on each region. The certiﬁcates revenue allocation to one
of the countries results in a net positive transfer equal to the certiﬁcate price times
the volume of permits transfered for this country. In addition to this transfer eﬀect,
there is also a general equilibrium eﬀect related to the constraint sharing between
the two regions. Welfare change is the result of the combination of the two. While
unlimited sectoral trading induces welfare loss in the developing country involved
(the ﬁnancial transfers do not compensate for the economic constraint due to sharing
the cap with the Annex B country), we ﬁnd that, under limited sectoral trading,
there exists a limit that makes both regions better oﬀ or at least one region as well oﬀ
and the other better oﬀ relative to when there is no international trade in emissions
permits. This point is particularly interesting in terms of political feasibility in
international negotiations. In the analysis, this pareto superior situation is reached
when the volume of Chinese permits imported to Europe cannot exceed 10% of the
volume of EUA allowances deﬁned by the European cap.
To conclude, a sectoral trading mechanism would allow some Non-Annex I coun-
tries to participate in the carbon market developed by Annex I countries. If a limit
is set on the amount of permits that can be traded, such a mechanism would not
decrease the carbon price in the Annex I country as much as when there is no limit.
As a consequence, it would not reverse the changes initiated in the electricity sector
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of the Annex I country as much as unlimited sectoral trading would. In terms of
leakage and aggregate emissions reductions, limited sectoral trading also yields bet-
ter results than unlimited sectoral trading. Finally, we observe that, if the revenue
from the certiﬁcates is allocated to Chinese households, distributional eﬀects allow
ﬁnding a limit that makes both regions involved better oﬀ compared to the case
in which no trading is allowed between the two regions. Considering all aspects
analyzed in Chapter 1 and 2, limited sectoral trading seems much more feasible and
interesting than unlimited sectoral trading.
LIMITED SECTORAL TRADING BETWEEN THE EU-ETS AND CHINA 91
Chapter 3
Short-term interactions between
carbon markets1
1. Introduction
1.1. Context
Carbon markets are developing around the world. The European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) started in 2005. Under the Clean Development Mech-
anism, Certiﬁed Emission Reduction (CER) credits issued for approved projects in
Non-Annex I countries (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007) can be used by Annex I coun-
tries to meet their emission reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol. Under the
Joint Implementation, Emission Reduction Units (ERU) from projects in Annex B
countries can be used by other Annex B countries to meet their targets.
1.This chapter is a joint work with Djamel Kirat.
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CER and ERU are accepted for compliance in the EU ETS under a speciﬁc limit.
In Phase II of the scheme, this limit was 13% of the amount of EUA issued under
the European cap. Although CDM credits can be sold in various carbon markets in
the world, the EU ETS is the largest one to accept them. A consequence is that the
price of CDM credits is largely inﬂuenced by the EU ETS, as explained by Ellerman,
Convery, and de Perthuis (2010).
Within the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC), new market mechanisms such as sectoral trading are also considered to
involve Non-Annex I countries in a global carbon market beyond the CDM. At the
17th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Durban in December 2011, a new deal to
commit India and China, the main host countries for CDM projects, to cut emis-
sions indicated that, even if the Clean Development Mechanism would continue,
new market mechanisms would be created to assist developing countries in meeting
part of their targets under the Convention. A review of the existing market-based
mechanisms by the UNFCCC was also decided.
In parallel, in the course of the year 2011, the EU announced its intention to
reduce the volume of CER credits accepted for compliance in the EU-ETS. For
example, in July 2011, at the launch of the Sandbag’s report Buckle Up! 2011
Environmental Outlook for the EU ETS, the Climate Action Commissioner’s speech
to the European Parliament stated that the use of international oﬀsets would be
limited from 2013 onwards, and that it would increasingly focus on projects in least
developed countries. It was also indicated that credits from some controversial gas
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projects would be banned and that the EU would push for a reform of the Clean
Development Mechanism.
Besides the EU ETS, national or sub-national systems are already operating in
Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, and are planned in
Canada, South Korea and Switzerland. In August 2012, the European Commission
and Australia announced agreement on a pathway for linking the EU ETS and the
Australian emissions trading scheme. A full link between the two cap-and-trade
systems is planned for no later than July 1st 2018. Based on a mandate from the
Council, the Commission is also negotiating with Switzerland on linking the EU
ETS with the Swiss ETS. These examples show that interactions between diﬀerent
carbon markets are likely to develop and evolve. Economic analyses are needed to
enlighten the impacts to expect from them.
Macroeconomic studies using computable general equilibrium models have been
done to assess the long-term impacts of such interactions. Hamdi-Cherif et al. (2010)
analyzed sectoral trading if it were to be used between all Annex I and Non-Annex
I countries. In Chapter 1 (Gavard et al., 2011a), the impact of sectoral trading on a
hypothetical US-China coupling is assessed using the Emission Prediction and Policy
Analysis ( EPPA) model. The impacts to expect from coupling the EU ETS with
the electricity sector of China, India, Brazil and Mexico are assessed in the annex
of the same chapter (Gavard et al., 2011b). These studies quantify the long-term
impacts of a sectoral carbon market coupling on total and sectoral emissions, carbon
leakages and ﬁnancial transfers between the countries involved.
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More analysis is needed to examine the short-term interactions between car-
bon markets and, in particular, the potential consequences of the fact that carbon
derivatives are now traded like ﬁnancial products. The following literature review
summarizes previous research works that explain the carbon price dynamics (fun-
damental economic drivers and ﬁnancial perspective), as well as analyses done on
other commodities to test the impact of their ﬁnancial nature relative to the eco-
nomic fundamentals.
1.2. Literature
Carbon price is the result of equilibrium between the demand for carbon permits
and the supply of allowances under the European cap. In this paper, we consider
two kinds of demand.
On the one hand, installations covered by the EU ETS have to buy permits for
compliance with their emissions contraints. At the microeonomic level, each of these
installations takes the carbon price as exogenous and makes an abatement decision
as a function of it. This leads to the equalization between the marginal abatement
cost and the carbon price (Rubin,1996, and Schennach, 2000). The demand for
permits by installations that have to cover emissions depend on the general economic
activity as well as the energy production structure. For example, in the power
sector, the demand for permits depends on the switching possibilities between the
various technologies available for electricity production. Under the assumption that
the power sector is the main source of demand for European allowances, this is used
SHORT-TERM INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CARBON MARKETS 96
by Hinterman (2010) to develop a model that explains the carbon price fundamental
economic drivers. His analysis focuses on the carbon price short-term variations in
the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS. Hintermann ﬁnds that carbon price variability is well
explained by the coal and gas prices variations due to the switching opportunities
between coal and gas in the power sector, which are the main short-term abatement
opportunities.
On the other hand, there might be a demand for carbon permits by investors who
would use them as ﬁnancial assets. Carbon derivatives are traded on ﬁnancial mar-
kets (e.g. the European Carbon Exchange, and the European Energy Exchange) and
present characteristics of ﬁnancial products. For exemple, the carbon price presents
patterns of volatility clustering, that is to say periods of high volatility followed by
periods of low variability. Carbon derivates also validate the Samuelson hypothesis,
as reported by Chevallier (2009). As he analyzes the relationship between European
carbon futures and macroeconomic risk factors related to bond and stock markets,
he points out that the futures prices volatilities increase as the futures contracts
approach their expiration, which is a characteristic of ﬁnancial assets. He also ﬁnds
that the European carbon market is only remotely connected to macroeconomic
variables related to stock and bond markets. Another characteristic of a ﬁnancial
asset is that the volatility is related to the return: the higher the volatility of an
asset, the riskier this asset, the higher the return expected by agents who could hold
it. If carbon price presents this characteristic, there should be an interest for agents
in holding some carbon permits even if they do not have to cover carbon emissions.
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On the contrary, if the risk is not remunerated, there should not be any interest for
agents in buying carbon permits if they do not have to cover emissions.
In this paper, we examine to what extent the carbon price variations reﬂect
the existence of such agents, in addition to the demand by installations covered by
the emissions trading scheme. The goal is to enlighten the speciﬁc nature of car-
bon permits and the consequences regarding short-term interactions between carbon
markets. Some research works already developed models combining the fundamen-
tal economic dynamics and the ﬁnancial nature of some commodities to test the
respective impact of each on a commodity price. For example, Slade and Thille
(1997) confront the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Hotelling rule
(Hotelling, 1931) on the case of copper price, based on the cost function of copper
mines.2 They ﬁnd that the Hotelling rule is not easily veriﬁed while the impact of
the return on the price volatility is easily observed, in line with the CAPM.
1.3. Question to address
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the short-term interactions between dif-
ferent carbon markets given the ﬁnancial asset characteristics of carbon permits. To
do so, we take advantage of the coexistence of EUA and CER in the second phase
of the EU ETS. While EUA were then given to installations covered by the scheme,
CER are issued by the CDM board for projects undertaken in Non-Annex I coun-
tries. The limit of CER and ERU accepted for compliance in the European market
2. Slade and Thille use detailed installation level data on extraction costs. These data are provided by
Denise Young (1992). It is not possible to conduct a similar analysis here without access to the abatement
cost for individual installations.
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in Phase II was 13% of the amount of EUA deﬁned by the European cap. This limit
was not reached. We ﬁrst build a model that combines the fundamental dynamics
of carbon price identiﬁed by Hintermann and the ﬁnancial characteristics of an asset
for which risk is remunerated (the carbon permit return increases with its volatility).
Using time series analysis, we estimate it on EUA and CER prices to determine the
dominant factors. We then look at the short-term interactions between EUA and
CER price series.
1.4. Structure of the paper
In Section 2, we examine the long-term and short-term drivers of CER and EUA
prices. The factors identiﬁed in the long-term estimations (coal and gas prices,
economic activity) are used for the short-term analysis. The model developed in
the latter combines the ﬁnancial asset characteristic of risk remuneration and the
fundamental carbon price dynamics explicited by Hintermann (2010). Using time
series analysis, we estimate it on EUA and CER prices in the second phase of the
EU ETS to see to what extent carbon price volatility has an impact on the return
of carbon permits. Given the results obtained in Section 2, the Section 3 focuses
on the short-term interactions between the EUA and CER price series. Section 4
concludes.
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2. Long-term and short-term drivers of carbon permits price
In this part, we estimate long-term and short-term carbon price drivers. The
long-term analysis is useful for and complementary to the short-term analysis in
which we examine whether the carbon price volatility inﬂuences its return.3 We test
the existence of a long-term relationship between the carbon price, the gas price,
the coal price and the economic activity. To do so, we extend the work already done
by Kirat (2013) on EUA to CER.
This is then useful for the short-term analysis, in which we test the ﬁnancial na-
ture of carbon permits. For this short-term analysis, we develop a model combining
the fundamental carbon price drivers identiﬁed by Hintermann (2010) and the risk
remuneration term associated with the potential demand from agents who would
hold carbon permits as ﬁnancial assets. On the one hand, Hintermann explains the
carbon price variations with a model based on fuel switching opportunities between
coal and gas in the power sector. He tests it on the European allowance price serie
in the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS. On the other hand, carbon permits are traded on
ﬁnancial markets. If carbon permits are ﬁnancial assets, the carbon permits return
should compensate for the carbon price volatility. The model we develop combines
the power sector related carbon price dynamics and the potential ﬁnancial dimen-
sion of carbon permits. We estimate it on EUA and CER price series in the second
phase of the EU ETS using time series analysis.
3. In the econometric analysis presented in this chapter, “long-term relationships” refers to relationships
between the variables in absolute levels, while “short-term relationships “refers to relationships between the
day-to-day variables variations.
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2.1. Data
We use CER and EUA time series from the Phase II of the EU ETS. Given the
fact that the volume of EUA and CER futures contracts is dominant over the volume
of spot contracts, we use futures price series. They are constructed by rolling over
futures contracts after their expiration date. The source for EUA and CER price
series is the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) database. We use data from February
26th, 2008 to November 12th, 2012 for EUA and data from March 14th 2008 to
November 12th 2012 for CER. Natural gas and coal prices4 are also taken from the
ICE. We use month-ahead contracts price series. Exchange rates from the European
Central Bank are used to convert the natural gas price from £ to e and the coal price
from $ to e. The Euro Stoxx 50 index is used to represent the economic activity.
There are several reasons for the use of this proxy. First, daily data are available
while industrial production is only reported quarterly. Daily data on the aggregate
European electricity production or consumption are hard to ﬁnd. National level
data that are available present some seasonality and do not well reﬂect the changes
in the economic activity. Finally, other authors also use this proxy for analysis of
the European trading scheme. Thas is, for example, the case of Bredin and Muckley
(2010).
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 respectively show the EUA and CER futures price series and
their variations (or returns). Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of their
4.The coal price we use is the API2 CIF (Cost, Insurance, Freight) with delivery in ARA (Amsterdam,
Rotterdam and Antwerp).
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Figure 3.1: Logarithmic EUA and CER futures prices.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, CER and EUA price series present two breaks.
Following Kirat and Ahamada (2011), we use the Clemente Montanès and Reyes
test to detect them. In this test, break dates are endogenous. It includes two test
procedures. The Additive Outlier (AO) procedure applies a ﬁlter to detrend the
series before performing the unit root test. It captures sudden changes in the series.
The Innovational Outlier (IO) procedure detrends and performs the unit root test
at the same time. It captures incremental changes in the mean of the series.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the EUA and CER futures returns.
Variable Nb. of Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
EUA futures return 1195 -0.00075 0.024 -0.093 0.193
CER futures return 1182 -0.00234 0.031 -0.179 0.195
The results of the test are summarized in Table 3.2. Both test procedures show
that the EUA and CER futures price series presents two break dates. They are
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Figure 3.2: (a) EUA and (b) CER price variations.
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slightly diﬀerent depending on the test procedure but they are very close, which
reveals the robustness of the results. EUA and CER futures price series present
breaks in November 2008 and November 2011.
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Table 3.2: Results of the Clemente Montanès and Reyes tests on EUA et CER permit prices (in logarithms).
EUA future price CER future price
Test procedure IO AO IO AO
Series Level Variation Level Variation Level Variation Level Variation
DU1 -0.016 0.002 -0.546 0.0036 -0.006 -0.005 -0.471 -0.021
(-4.67) (1.47) (-49.46) (1.955) (-1.90) (-0.669) (-22.90) (-2.79)
{0.000} {0.141} {0.000} {0.052 {0.058} {0.504} {0.000} {0.005}
DU2 -0.016 0.0005 -0.606 0.0011 -0.006 -0.0003 -1.298 0.016
(-4.82) (0.287) (-63.43) (0.608) (-1.39) (-0.038) (-72.74) (2.08)
{0.000} {0.774} {0.000} {0.543} {0.163} {0.970} {0.000} {0.037}
ρ−1 -0.028 0.925 -0.034 -0.895 -0.005 -0.899 -0.014 -0.904
(-5.36) (-25.43) (-4.67) (-10.66) (-1.427) (-24.34) (-2.473) (-10.12)
[-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49] [-5.49]
Conclusion I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Significant 13/10/08 03/11/08 21/11/08 23/11/11
dates of breaks 15/09/11 28/11/11 28/11/11 16/12/11
Note: The values in () and [] are respectively the t-statistics and the critical values at the 5% significance level tabulated by Clemente
Montanès and Reyes. Values in {} are p-values.The null hypothesis of the unit root test is rejected when the t-statistic is smaller than
the critical value.
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2.2. Long-term analysis
Following Kirat (2013), we adopt a general to speciﬁc approach to choose the
best suitable representation of a long-term relationship.
The general relationship includes the gas price, the coal price, the economic
activity and non-linear terms as follows:
PCO2t = α0+α1P
gas
t +α2P
coal
t +α3Gt+α4(P
gas
t )
2+α5(P
coal
t )
2+α6P
coal
t P
gas
t +vt (3.1)
where PCO2t , P
gas
t , P
coal
t are respectively the logarithms of the carbon price, the gas
price and the coal price in period t, and Gt is the economic activity (also in loga-
rithm). vt is the error term. The existence of a co-integration relationship (Johansen,
1991 and 1995) between the carbon price, the coal price, the gas price and the eco-
nomic activity is tested with the Johansen cointegration test. Table 3.3 presents the
results of the test when including linear terms only. Table 3.4 presents the results
of the test when including non-linear terms as well. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the
results of the test when taking into account the two structural breaks. These tests
clearly indicate that, for each type of permit, one cointegration relationship exists
between the permit price, the coal and gas prices, and the economic activity at the
1% signiﬁcance level.
We now estimate these relationships on the EUA and CER price series. The
estimation on the EUA futures price series is already done in Kirat (2013). It is
reported here to be put in parallel of the estimation of the relationship for the CER
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Table 3.3: Results of the Johansen’s cointegration tests (p-value).
Dependent variable EUA price CER price
Null hypothesis Trace test Max. eigenvalue test Trace test Max. eigenvalue test
None 0.012** 0.047** 0.005*** 0.015**
At most 1 0.124 0.190 0.137 0.226
At most 2 0.320 0.425 0.299 0.544
At most 3 0.162 0.162 0.072 0.072
Note: *** and ** respectively refer to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 and 5% significance
levels.
Table 3.4: Results of the Johansen’s cointegration tests (p-value) with nonlinear terms.
Dependent variable EUA price CER price
Null hypothesis Trace test Max. eigenvalue test Trace test Max. eigenvalue test
None 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
At most 1 0.024** 0.293 0.036** 0.344
At most 2 0.071 0.267 0.091 0.149
At most 3 0.191 0.570 0.357 0.542
At most 4 0.208 0.303 0.468 0.625
At most 5 0.363 0.455 0.451 0.619
At most 6 0.188 0.188 0.140 0.140
Note: *** and ** respectively refer to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 and 5% significance
levels.
Table 3.5: Results of the Johansen’s cointegration tests with two structural breaks (EUA).
Null hypothesis Trace statistic Critical value (1%) Critical value (5%) P-value
None 177.73 178.88 167.21 0.011**
At most 1 110.58 142.62 132.15 0.452
At most 2 72.67 110.18 100.92 0.767
At most 3 42.46 81.67 73.61 0.944
At most 4 24.44 57.16 50.32 0.955
At most 5 10.48 35.50 30.89 0.974
At most 6 1.84 19.74 15.34 0.988
Note: *** and ** respectively refer to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 and 5% significance
levels. The critical values are tabulated by Giles and Godwin (2012). They also provide code that
generates corresponding p-values.
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Table 3.6: Results of the Johansen’s cointegration tests with two structural breaks (CER).
Null hypothesis Trace statistic Critical value (1%) Critical value (5%) P-value
None 178.28 178.92 167.24 0.011**
At most 1 111.04 142.66 132.19 0.439
At most 2 73.57 110.22 100.96 0.742
At most 3 42.25 81.71 73.66 0.947
At most 4 24.39 57.21 50.36 0.956
At most 5 10.03 36.54 30.93 0.980
At most 6 3.16 19.77 15.37 0.934
Note: *** and ** respectively refer to rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% significance
levels. The critical values are tabulated by Giles and Godwin (2012). They also provide code that
generates the corresponding p-values.
price series. The structural breaks identiﬁed in Section 2.1 are taken into account
through the use of dummy variables. Table 3.7 and 3.8 respectively present the
results for EUA and CER prices. For EUA, regression (C) is the general speciﬁ-
cation including non-linear terms. Regressions (A), (B) and (D) are restrictions.
Restrictions (B) and (A) are better than restriction (D) as the likelihood ratio test
allows to reject the null hypothesis for regression (D) (the null hypothesis assumes
that both α1 and α4 are equal to zero). The Akaike and the Bayesian information
criteria allow to favour regression (B) to regressions (A) and (C).
As regression (B) includes non-linear terms, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients
associated with the coal and gas prices requires computing the corresponding elas-
ticities. The results are presented in Figure 3.3. In this speciﬁcation that best
captures the complexity of the interactions between the coal, gas and carbon prices,
the elasticity of the EUA price with regard to the coal price depends on the gas
price, while the elasticity with regard to the gas price depends on the coal price.
The higher the coal price, the stronger the eﬀect of the gas price on the carbon
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Table 3.7: Estimation results of the long-run equation for the EUA price.
Equation (A) (B) (C) (D)
P
gas
t -1.770*** -4.805
(0.251) (3.621)
(P gast )
2
-2.379*** 4.106
(0.348) (5.075)
P coalt -1.009*** -1.048*** -1.126*** -1.941***
(0.311) (0.307) (0.349) (0.309)
(P coalt )
2
-0.310*** -0.313*** -0.309*** 0.407***
(0.106) (0.103) (0.104) (0.059)
P
gas
t P
coal
t 0.867*** 0.883*** 0.900*** 0.071***
(0.118) (0.117) (0.107) (0.019)
Eurext 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.453*** 0.490***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062)
Break1 -0.208*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.216***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Break2 -0.582*** -0.583*** -0.585*** -0.573***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cons 0.175 2.607*** 6.783 0.084**
(0.398) (0.488) (5.039) (0.416)
Likelihood 977.61 978.29 978.73 923.25
R− squared 0.9140 0.9140 0.9141 0.9058
AIC -1939.23 -1940.58 -1939.47 -1832.50
BIC -1898.54 -1899.88 -1893.69 -1796.89
LR tests χ2(1)= 2.24 [0.13] χ
2
(1)= 0.90 [0.34] χ
2
(2)= 110.98 [0.00]
Note: Standard errors are in (); *, ** and *** respectively refer to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels of estimated coefficients.
price, and symetrically, the higher the gas price, the stronger the eﬀect of the coal
price on the carbon price. This is understandable as an increase in either the coal
or gas price creates a tension in the market, which enhances the eﬀect of the other
factor. Before and after 2009, both elasticities are positive. This is consistent with
Hintermann’s expectations on the inﬂuence of the coal and gas prices on the carbon
market (Hintermann, 2010): higher fossil energy prices result in higher abatement
costs for electricity generation. What is less intuitive is the fact that both elastici-
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ties are negative in 2009. This coincides with time periods of low energy prices in
relation with the economic crisis. Kirat (2013) suggests that, in this time period, the
market is actually not eﬃcient, and that some electricity producers use their market
power to inﬂate the carbon price. Kirat bases his explanation on the statement
made by Hintermann that, in some circumstances, some agents in the EU ETS may
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to inﬂate carbon price. Given the fact that emissions allowances
were given for free during the second phase of the EU ETS, the abatement cost of
dominant ﬁrms may become negligible when the gas or coal price is relatively low.
These agents may then ﬁnd it advantageous to keep some permits in order to make
the price rise and sell them later.
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Figure 3.3: The EUA price elasticities with regard to the coal and gas prices.
Regarding the impact of the other parameters, the EUA price increases by 0, 45%
when the economic activity rises by 1%. The structural breaks indentiﬁed above are
conﬁrmed (the associated Break1 and Break2 dummy variables are associated with
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signiﬁcant coeﬃcients).
For the CER price, regression (G) is the general form, while regressions (E)
and (F) are restrictions. We ﬁnd that restriction (E) is the speciﬁcation that best
captures the CER price long-term dynamics. The gas price elasticity of CER price
is -0.54 while the coal price elasticity is 0.51. This could be explained by a supply-
side eﬀect. Indeed, the CER market oﬀers some ﬂexibility. Many CDM projects
registered in the CDM pipeline have actually not yet been used to issue permits.
Some agents possess CER but do not use them. In addition, some companies covered
by the EU ETS also manage a large number of CDM projects and credits. Hence,
when the demand for carbon permits rises, there is a possibility to increase the CER
supply. For example, when the gas price increases, power companies covered by the
scheme may switch part of their power production to coal installations, which tends
to increase their need of permits to cover emissions. They may then decide to supply
CER to the market, which would reduce the CER price. On the contrary, when the
coal price increases, power generation may switch to gas plants. The demand for
permits to cover emissions then decreases and the incentive to increase the supply
of CER to the market disappears. This is consistent with the fact that, while the
volume of EUA is set by the European cap, the volume of CER in the market is
ﬂexible. There is no limit to the amount of CER produced in the world and, in
addition, the limit of CER and ERU accepted for compliance in the EU ETS was
not reached in the second phase of the scheme.
The elasticity of the CER price with regard to the economic activity is 0.25. The
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observation that it is much lower than the corresponding elasticity for the EUA price
can be explained by the fact that, while EUA can only be traded in the European
carbon market and that the volume of EUA is clearly set by the European cap, the
volume of CER in the market is ﬂexible (at the global level, there is no limit on
the amount of CER produced annually) and CER can be traded in markets outside
Europe. They are two diﬀerent products that coexist in Europe but they are not
perfect substitutes. For this reason, it is understandable that the EUA price is more
correlated with the European activity than the CER price is. Finally, the structural
breaks identiﬁed in Section 2.1 are conﬁrmed.
2.3. Short-term analysis
We now test to what extent the ﬁnancial nature of EUA and CER inﬂuence their
price by examining their short-term drivers. In this perspective, we develop a model
that includes the short-term variations of the factors identiﬁed in the long-term
analysis, in addition to a risk remuneration term.
2.3.1. Model
We consider two kinds of agents: EU ETS installations that have to buy credits
to cover their emissions, and agents who do not have to cover emissions, but who
can buy and sell carbon credits as ﬁnancial assets.
If only EU ETS agents buy carbon permits, carbon price is mainly driven by the
short-term abatement opportunities in the power sector, as explained by Hintermann
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Table 3.8: Estimation results of the long-run equation for the CER price.
Equation (E) (F) (G)
P
gas
t -0.538*** -16.830* -14.922*
(0.088) (9.115) (8.834)
(P gast )
2
22.290* 20.178*
(12.427) (12.006)
P coalt 0.509*** 0.467*** 0.512
(0.114) (0.108) (0.663)
(P coalt )
2
0.105
(0.220)
P
gas
t P
coal
t -0.174
(0.198)
Eurext 0.255*** 0.251*** 0.243**
(0.095) (0.096) (0.104)
Break1 -0.471*** -0.504*** -0.516***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.041)
Break2 -1.110*** -1.117*** -1.115***
(0.035) (0.017) (0.036)
Cons 1.305* 23.448* 20.894*
(0.735) (12.600) (12.166)
Likelihood 103.42 106.74 107.32
R− squared 0.8771 0.8778 0.8779
AIC -194.84 -199.49 -196.64
BIC -164.38 -163.96 -150.96
LR tests χ2(1)= 7.80 [0.05] χ
2
(1)= 1.15 [0.56]
Note: Standard errors are in (); *, ** and *** respectively refer to the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels of estimated coefficients.
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(2010). Carbon price variations then depend on the coal price P coalt , the gas price
P gast , and the economic activity Gt:
∆Pt = f(P
gas
t , P
coal
t , Gt) (3.2)
where ∆Pt is the ﬁrst log diﬀerence of the permit price Pt.
If only the second type of agents buy carbon permits, rt, the ex-post permit
return in period t, that is equal to ∆Pt, depends on the risk free rate rf , and on
the risk premium µt, that is itself a function of σ2t , the conditional variance of the
return:
Et−1(rt) = rf + µt (3.3)
with µt = µ(σ2t ) and µ
′ > 0.
The existence of this second type of agents should be reﬂected by a positive
impact of the carbon price volatility on its return.
The carbon price dynamics is then driven by the coexistence of the two kinds of
agents, reﬂected in the combination of the two equations presented above:
Et−1(rt) = rf + µt + f(P
gas
t , P
coal
t , Gt). (3.4)
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2.3.2. ARCH, GARCH, and GARCH-M models
In this section, we present a summary of the time-series models used for the
estimation.
The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model. The ARCH
model (Engle,1982) represents a process for which the error term depends on the
error terms in the previous time periods. More precisely, the square of the error term
follows an autoregressive process (AR). ARCH models are commonly employed in
modeling ﬁnancial time series that exhibit time-varying volatility clustering, i.e. pe-
riods of high volatility followed by periods of low variability. This is the case here,
as seen in Figure 3.2.
An ARCH process of order q can be described by a mean and a variance equations
(respectively (3.5) and (3.6)) to characterize the return of a ﬁnancial asset as follows:
rt = ra + εt (3.5)
σ2t = ω +
q∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i (3.6)
Where ω > 0, and αi is a coeﬃcient that depends on i.
- rt is the return of the asset at time t,
- ra is the average return
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- εt is the residual return at time t deﬁned as:
εt = σtzt (3.7)
with zt the standard residual return (independent and identically distributed
random variable with a zero mean and a unity variance), and σ2t the conditional
variance. The return is a function of a constant term and an error term (3.5). The
conditional variance of the residual returns depends on the residual returns in past
periods (3.6).
The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.
The GARCH model (Bollerslev, 1986) is a generalization of the ARCH model in
which the conditional variance also depends on its own lags.
The GARCH(p,q) model can be represented by the following set of equations:
rt = ra + εt (3.8)
σ2t = ω +
q∑
i=1
αijε
2
t−i +
p∑
j=1
βjσ
2
t−j (3.9)
Where ω > 0, and αi and βj are coeﬃcients that respectively depend on i and j.
- rt is the return of the asset at time t,
- ra is the average return
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- εt is the residual return at time t deﬁned as:
εt = σtzt (3.10)
with zt is a standard residual return (independant and identically distributed
random variable with a zero mean and a unity variance), and σ2t is the conditional
variance.
The GARCH in the mean model (GARCH-M). The return of a ﬁnancial as-
set may depend on its volatility. The GARCH in the mean model (GARCH-M)
developed by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) describes this phenomenon. It is
an extension of the GARCH model in which the mean depends on the conditional
variance. GARCH-in-mean is most commonly used in evaluating ﬁnancial time se-
ries when a theory supports a tradeoﬀ between asset risk and return. For a simple
GARCH-M(1,1) model, the mean and variance equations are the following:
rt = ra + λσ
2
t + εt (3.11)
σ2t = ω + αε
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1 (3.12)
where λ is a parameter called the risk premium parameter. If λ is positive, the
return is positively related to its volatility. In other words, the higher the risk, the
higher the covariance, the higher the asset return to compensate for the risk.5
5. Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) assume that the risk premium is an increasing function of the condi-
tional variance of εt: the greater the conditional variance of returns, the greater the risk premium needed
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2.3.3. Model estimation
The short-term relationship (equation 3.13) uses the diﬀerentials of the variables
identiﬁed in the long-term relationship. The addition of the error correction term
vt−1 reﬂects the cointegration: if the associated coeﬃcient is negative, the return
to the long-term equilibrium is conﬁrmed. This Error Correction Model allows to
represent the fact that the short-term relationship tends to bring carbon price back
to the equilibrium deﬁned in the long-term relationship.
∆PCO2t = β0 + f(∆P
gas
t ,∆P
coal
t ,∆Gt) + βvvt−1 + εt (3.13)
The ﬁrst part of equation (3.13) is the short-term relationship between carbon
permits return and the variations of the main drivers, which are the coal and gas
prices and the economic activity, in line with Hintermann’s model. Under the as-
sumption that the power sector is the main source of demand for carbon permits,
the short-term variations in the carbon price are related to the economic activity
and the short-term abatement opportunities in this sector.
As in the long-term analysis, we test the inclusion of linear and non-linear terms
in the relationship.
We observe the existence of heteroskedasticity in the series. For this reason, it is
appropriate to apply ARCH and GARCH models to the series, and the GARCH-M
model to test the impact of the volatility on the price series.
to compensate for the asset to be held by an agent for portfolio diversification.
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Following the GARCH-M(1,1) presented in section 2.3.2 and the model developed
in section 2.3.1, the mean equation is written as follows:
∆PCO2t = β0 + β1∆P
gas
t + β2∆P
coal
t + β3∆Gt + β3(∆P
gas
t )
2 + β4(∆P
coal
t )
2
+ β5∆P
gas
t ∆P
coal
t + βvvt−1 + βhh
2
t + εt (3.14)
The variance equation is
h2t = ω + γ1ε
2
t−1 + γ2h
2
t−1 (3.15)
Equation 3.14 includes h2t , the conditional variance of the error term. In line with
the GARCH-M econometric model and the model developed in section 2.3.1, this
reﬂects the fact that the price volatility may impact the carbon permit return. If βh,
the associated coeﬃcient, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, it will reﬂect the risk
premium, i.e. the increased return to compensate for the increased volatility and
increased risk. If βh is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the increased volatility
does not inﬂuence the price diﬀerential.
Table 3.9 presents the results of the estimation of the short-term relationship on
CER and EUA futures price series. Both for EUA and CER, the existence of the
long-term relationship is conﬁrmed as βv, the coeﬃcient associated with the previous
period error term, vt−1, is negative.
In the short-term relationship, the coeﬃcients associated with the drivers iden-
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Table 3.9: Estimation results of the short-term (error correction) equation.
Short term Model CER price variations EUA price variations
Mean equation Mean equation
vt−1 -0.009** -0.010*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
∆P gast -5.567*** -5.513*** -6.645*** -6.643***
(1.010) (1.036) (1.019) (1.020)
∆(P gast )
2
8.077*** 8.002*** 9.675*** 9.671***
(1.446) (1.479) (1.441) (1.442)
∆P coalt -0.333 -0.330 -0.284 -0.284
(0.215) (0.215) (0.223) (0.223)
∆(P coalt )
2
0.141*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
∆(P gast P
coal
t ) -0.097** -0.097** -0.129 -0.129
(0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042)
∆(Eurext) 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.210*** 0.210***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
cons -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
h2t -1.403 0.035
(1.162) (1.868)
Variance equation Variance equation
ARCH 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.140*** 0.140***
GARCH 0.811*** 0.810*** 0.855*** 0.855***
cons 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Note: Standard errors are in (); *, ** and *** respectively refer to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels of estimated coefficients.
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tiﬁed by Hintermann are signiﬁcant: the coal and gas prices impact carbon price in
a non linear way. While the relationship between the EUA price and the coal and
gas prices was diﬀerent from the relationship between the CER price and the fossil
energy prices in the long-term analysis, the impact of the gas and coal prices on
the EUA and CER prices are very close in the short-term estimation. This can be
explained by the fact that the supply-side eﬀect suggested in Section 2.2 to explain
the impact of the coal and gas prices on the CER price in the long-term analysis
may not be possible in the short term.
As in the long-term estimations, the economic activity is higher for EUA than
for CER, but the diﬀerence is smaller than in the long-term analysis. The economic
activity elasticity is 0.18 for the CER price and 0.21 for the EUA price. I would
suggest that the reason for which it is higher for EUA than for CER is the same
as in the long-term analysis (tighter link between the EUA price and the European
economic activity). I would explain the smaller diﬀerence in the short-term analysis
by the fact that agents may not take advantage of the ﬂexibility in the CER market
as easily in the short-term than in the long-term.
The coeﬃcient associated with the volatility is not signiﬁcant. This indicates
that the volatility of EUA and CER does not inﬂuence their price variations. There
is no risk premium associated with an increased volatility of the EUA or CER prices.
This means that there is no interest for an agent in holding EUA and CER as an
asset if this agent does not have to cover carbon emissions: the risk taken would not
be remunerated. From a policy point of view, this is interesting as it suggests that
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speculative behaviours on this policy instrument are limited.
To conclude, we ﬁnd that the main factors used by Hintermann to explain the
EUA price in the ﬁrst phase of the EU-ETS are dominant drivers of the EUA and
CER prices in the second phase of the scheme: the carbon price is related to the coal
and gas prices as well as the economic activity due to the switching opportunities
in the power sector, the main source of demand for carbon permits in the European
market. However, while Hintermann does not ﬁnd any long-term relationships in
Phase I of the EU-ETS and focuses on the short-term analysis only, we do observe
a co-integration phenomenon in Phase II both for EUA and CER prices: there exist
long-term and corresponding short-term relationships (including the error correction
terms) between the carbon price, the coal and gas prices, and the economic activity.
Regarding the ﬁnancial dimension of carbon permits, we observe that both EUA
and CER prices present patterns of volatility clustering, which is a characteristic
of ﬁnancial products. However, we do not ﬁnd that the price diﬀerentials of these
permits is inﬂuenced by their respective volatilities. In other words, the return of
these permits does not compensate for their respective risks. This can be explained
by the fact that carbon permits are not associated with some production process
as would be an asset like a share in a company. On the one hand, the permit
volatility is associated with policy announcements related to the EU ETS regulation,
for example regarding changes in the acceptance of CDM credits in the European
market or decisions to couple the ETS with other carbon markets. On the other
hand, the return is expected to increase as the cap is tightened, but improvements
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in installations covered by the scheme to reduce their emissions tend to a decrease
in the carbon price. The conclusion is that there is little interest for an agent who
does not have to cover carbon emissions in holding a permit as an asset. In terms of
public policy, this can be seen as an advantage with regards to the main objective of
carbon markets, as it avoids speculation on an instrument the main role of which is
to cap emissions. The next section focuses on the short-term interactions between
the EUA and CER prices.
3. Short-term interactions between the EUA and CER prices
As shown in the previous sections, EUA and CER prices are inﬂuenced by the
same drivers: the coal price, the gas price and the economic activity. For each of
them separately, it is possible to observe a co-integration phenomenon: there exist
a long-term and a corresponding short-term relationship that includes the previous
period error term and brings carbon price back to the equilibrium deﬁned in the
long-term relationship.
For both the CER and the EUA prices, we observe volatility clustering. But
there is no interest in holding EUA and CER as assets for agents who do not have
to cover carbon emissions as an increased volatility of the carbon permits is not
compensated by a higher return.
Given these characteristics, we analyze the interactions between EUA and CER
prices. We ﬁrst determine whether there is a long-term or short-term relationship
between them. We test a causality relationship between EUA and CER prices using
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the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. We then estimate the risk inherent to each
type of carbon permit and the correlation between CER and EUA risks.
3.1. Causality analysis
We ﬁrst test the existence of a cointegration relationship between EUA and CER
price series. The observation of their values (Figure 3.1) or their price diﬀerence (Fig-
ure 3.4) over time already suggests that there is no long-term relationship between
them. The Engle Granger cointegration test conﬁrms it: although EUA and CER
prices have common drivers, they are not cointegrated (Table 3.10).
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Figure 3.4: EUA and CER price difference (in logarithm).
Table 3.10: Results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test.
Null hypothesis test statistic 1% Critical value 5% Critical value
PCER and PEUA are not cointegrated 3.801 -3.906 -3.341
Note: the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the test statistic is below the critical value.
Critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1990, 2010).
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We use the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to test the causality relationship
between the EUA and CER prices. We estimate the following VAR model including
two lags (According to the Akaike and Hannan-Quinn information criteria):


∆PEUAt = α1 + β1∆P
EUA
t−1 + γ1∆P
EUA
t−2 + δ1∆P
CER
t−1 + λ1∆P
CER
t−2 + ε1t
∆PCERt = α2 + β2∆P
EUA
t−1 + γ2∆P
EUA
t−2 + δ2∆P
CER
t−1 + λ2∆P
CER
t−2 + ε2t
where ∆PEUAt and ∆P
CER
t are respectively the price variations of EUA and CER
in period t, and ε1t and ε2t the error terms corresponding to each relationship.
The results of the Granger causality tests are presented in Table 3.11. We ﬁnd
that short-term variations in the EUA price cause variations in the CER price, but
that the opposite is not true. The null hypothesis that variations in the price of
EUA does not cause variations in the price of CER is rejected, while the hypothesis
that variations in the price of CER does not cause variations in the price of EUA is
not.
Table 3.11: Results of the Granger causality tests.
Null hypothesis LR statistic Granger causality test (Prob >χ2)
∆PEUA does not Granger cause ∆PCER 17.171 0.000***
∆PCER does not Granger cause ∆PEUA 4.5805 0.101
Note: *** and ** respectively refer to rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% significance
levels.
In order to perform an impulse-response analysis, we use the Cholesky decom-
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position to orthogonalize ε1 and ε2. The estimation of the VAR model is used to
simulate a shock on EUA price and look at the impact on the CER price, and, sy-
metrically, simulate a shock on CER price and look at the impact on the EUA price.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the results of the analysis. We observe that a shock on the
EUA price is immediately transmitted to the CER price. This eﬀect is amortized in
two days and it disappears after four days. On the contrary, a shock on the CER
price has no impact on the EUA price.
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Figure 3.5: Response in the variation of the logarithmic CER price to an impulse in the
variation of the logarithmic EUA price.
We also proceed to the variance decomposition of the EUA and CER prices.
This allows to assess the share of the CER price volatility that is explained by the
EUA price volatility and, symetrically, the share of the EUA price volatility that is
explained by the CER price volatility. The results are presented in Table 3.12.
We ﬁnd that the EUA price volatility explains 60% of the CER price volatility,
SHORT-TERM INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CARBON MARKETS 126
−.01
0
.01
.02
.03
0 2 4 6 8
Time (days)
95% Confidence interval Orthogonalized impulse response function
Figure 3.6: Response in the variation of the logarithmic CER price to an impulse in the
variation of the logarithmic EUA price
Table 3.12: Variance decomposition of the forecasted errors.
Variance decomposition of ∆PEUA Variance decomposition of ∆PCER
Period ∆PEUA ∆PCER ∆PEUA ∆PCER
1 100% 0% 61.96% 38.04%
2 99.68% 0.32% 60.31% 39.69%
3 99.66% 0.34% 60.39% 39.61%
4 99.65% 0.35% 60.42% 39.58%
5 99.65% 0.35% 60.42% 39.58%
6 99.65% 0.35% 60.42% 39.58%
7 99.65% 0.35% 60.42% 39.58%
8 99.65% 0.35% 60.42% 39.58%
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while the CER price volatility has no impact on the EUA price volatility. All these
results are consistent with the fact that the main demand for CER is the EU ETS
(Ellerman et al., 2010), which causes the CER price to be inﬂuenced by the EUA
price and not the opposite.
3.2. Estimation of the correlation between the risks of the carbon permits
In this section, we estimate the correlation between the risk inherent to each
type of permit. We consider the interdependence between the risks embedded in
the EUA and CER prices and we model the conditional volatility of these carbon
permits price variations in a manner that allows the existence of a time varying
conditional correlation matrix. We specify the following model with Dynamic Con-
ditional Correlation (Engle, 2002; Engle and Sheppard, 2001) DCCE(1,1) errors:




∆PEUAt = α1 + β1∆P
EUA
t−1 + γ1∆P
EUA
t−2 + δ1∆P
CER
t−1 + λ1∆P
CER
t−2 + ε1t
∆PCERt = α2 + β2∆P
EUA
t−1 + γ2∆P
EUA
t−2 + δ2∆P
CER
t−1 + λ2∆P
CER
t−2 + ε2t
(ε1t, ε2t)
T | Ωt  N(0, Ht) where Ωt is the available information at time t
(3.16)
The DCCE(1, 1) model is deﬁned as:
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

Ht = DtRtDt
Dt = diag(
√
h11t,
√
h22t)
Rt = (diag Qt)
1/2 Qt (diag Qt)
−1/2
where the 2× 2 symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix Qt is given by:
Qt = (1− θ1 − θ2)Q+ θ1ut−1uTt−1 + θ2Qt−1
Here u is the matrix of standardized residuals, Q is the 2× 2 unconditional vari-
ance matrix of ut, and θ1 and θ2 are non-negative parameters satisfying θ1 + θ2 < 1.
The DCC(1, 1) model can be estimated either in one single step or in two steps.6
In the latter case, the conditional-mean equations and the conditional variances of
EUA and CER price variations are ﬁrst estimated using a GARCH(1, 1) speciﬁca-
tion corresponding to the VAR model. The standardized residuals are then used to
model the correlation in an autoregressive manner to obtain the time-varying con-
ditional correlation matrix. The conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht is the
product of the diagonal matrix of the conditional standard deviation Dt with the
conditional correlation matrix Rt and the matrix Dt. The Rt =


1 ρ12t
ρ21t 1

 ma-
trix reﬂects the instantaneous conditional correlation between EUA and CER price
variations. Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 respectively represent the EUA and CER price
volatility, the volatility diﬀerence, and ﬁnally the dynamic conditional correlation
6. See the Appendix for more details regarding the model estimation.
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between them.
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Figure 3.7: EUA and CER price risks.
We observe that the conditional correlation between the volatilities of the EUA
and CER prices is positive and high. It varies between 0.41 and 0.92. Its mean is
0.81. For comparison, Engle (2002) ﬁnds that the dynamic conditional correlation
between the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ Composite varies be-
tween 0.4 and 0.9 on the time period 1990-2000. Gupta and West (2013) observe
that the DCC between the prices of various types of coal imported to India is close
to 1, and Marzo and Zagaglia (2008) show a DCC close to 0.8 between the prices of
crude oil and heating oil. The DCC observed here between the prices of CER and
EUA is high compared to what is seen for traditional ﬁnancial products, but it is
in line with the DCC observed between the prices of commodities that have some
degree of substitutability.
CER and EUA volatilities are very close until November 2011. Afterwards, the
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Figure 3.8: Difference between EUA and CER price risks.
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
Co
nd
itio
na
l c
or
re
la
tio
n
7/1/2008 7/1/2009 7/1/2010 7/1/2011 7/1/2012
Date
Figure 3.9: Dynamic conditional correlation between the EUA and CER prices.
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CER price volatility is much higher, while the CER return remains lower than the
EUA return. November 2011 also coincides with the second break in the CER price
series identiﬁed in section 2.1. This can be explained by the policy changes and
announcements presented in introduction. In 2011, the EU announced its intention
to reduce the volume of CER credits accepted for compliance in the EU-ETS. In
July 2011, at the launch of the Sandbag’s report Buckle Up! 2011 Environmental
Outlook for the EU ETS, the Climate Action Commissioner’s speech to the Euro-
pean Parliament stated that the use of international oﬀsets would be limited from
2013 onwards, and that it would increasingly focus on projects in least developed
countries. It was also indicated that credits from some controversial gas projects
would be banned and that the EU would push for a reform of the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism. In addition, one of the main outcomes of the 17th COP in Durban
in November 2011 was the agreement on a new deal to commit India and China to
cut emissions. Although the deal indicated that the Clean Development Mechanism
would continue, it was decided to develop new market mechanisms to assist devel-
oping countries in meeting part of their targets under the Convention. A review of
the existing market-based mechanisms by the UNFCCC was decided.
To summarize, the results of this econometric analysis of the short-term inter-
actions between European carbon permits and CDM credits are well explained by
the link between the two corresponding markets. EUA and CER are two diﬀerent
kinds of carbon permits used to cover emissions. In the second phase of the EU
ETS, EUA were given to installations covered by the scheme. CER are issued by
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the CDM board for projects undertaken in Non-Annex I countries. Although CER
can be used in several carbon markets in the world, the largest one to accept them
is the EU ETS. The limit of CER and ERU accepted for compliance in Phase II of
the EU ETS was 13% of the amount of EUA issued under the European cap, but
this limit was not attained. As the EU ETS is the largest market to accept CER
for compliance, the CER price is inﬂuenced by the EUA price. The EUA and CER
prices are driven by the same factors. The CER price volatility is inﬂuenced by the
EUA price volatility but the opposite is not true. No cointegration relationship is
found between the EUA and CER prices. Ellerman et al. (2010) indicate that the
price diﬀerence between EUA and CER is related to the risk that the limit of CER
and EUA accepted for compliance in the EU ETS is reached.7 This is consistent
with our observation that the CER price falls and that the CER price volatility
increases after announcements of stricter acceptance of CER in the EU ETS and
annoucements of changes and reforms in the CDM. While Section 2 showed that
the carbon price volatility has no inﬂuence on its return, the inﬂuence of policy
announcements on the volatility of the carbon price is clearly observed in Section 3.
This is a point to be careful at when links between carbon markets are developed,
in a context in which a source of criticism of these market-based instruments is the
price uncertainty.
7. Ellerman suggests that it is also related to a delivery risk, mainly the risk of CER futures contracts
not to be backed by already issued CER.
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4. Conclusion
This paper examines the interactions between the EUA and CER prices taking
into account the potential ﬁnancial nature of carbon permits. The objective is to
determine whether carbon price volatility is a dominant driver of the carbon price,
beyond the fundamental economic drivers, and to infer the consequences in terms of
short-term carbon market interactions. The analysis is done econometrically on the
EUA and CER price series in the second phase of the EU ETS. In the short-term
analysis, we develop a model that combines the risk remuneration associated with
the potential ﬁnancial nature of carbon permits, and the fundamental carbon market
dynamics explicited by Hinterman. We use this model to test to what extent the
volatility of each type of carbon permit inﬂuences its return. Although patterns of
volatility clustering are observed in their price series, the volatility does not have a
signiﬁcant impact on their return. This means that there is no interest in holding
carbon permits as assets for an agent who does not have to cover carbon emissions.
The main carbon price drivers remain those identiﬁed by Hinterman: the coal price,
the gas price and the economic activity. This is explained by the dominance of the
power sector in the European carbon market. Contrary to Hinterman, we ﬁnd that
there exists a co-integration phenomenon between the carbon price, the coal and
gas prices: there is a long-term relationship between the carbon price, the coal and
gas prices, and the economic activity. The existence of this long-term relationship
is conﬁrmed by the negative impact of the previous period error term in the short-
term relationship (error correction model). But this long-term relationship is not the
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same for the EUA price and for the CER price. This indicates that the long-term
dynamics of EUA and CER prices are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This is consistent with
the fact that EUA and CER are two diﬀerent products, issued and used according to
diﬀerent regulations. EUA are issued at the European level, their volume is deﬁned
by the European cap and they can be used for compliance in the EU ETS only.
CDM credits are issued by the CDM board, they can be traded worldwide, and
there is no limit on the amount of CER produced annually.
In the long-term estimations, we observe that the elasticity of the EUA price with
regards to the coal and gas prices is positive except in 2009, when energy prices are
low. This suggests that, while any increase in the coal or gas price normally results
in an increase in the carbon price due to higher abatement costs, this relation may
not be true when energy prices are low. Some agents may then use their market
power to inﬂate the carbon price, resulting in market ineﬃciencies. The long-term
relationship between the coal, gas and CER prices is also interesting. We suggest
the existence of a supply-side eﬀect, related to the ﬂexibility in the CER market.
Some agents that run CDM projects and/or manage CER credits may modify the
volume of CER they supply as a function of the demand for carbon permits, and
hence of the gas and coal prices variations.
Such behaviours are not visible in the short-term analysis, as it might be less
easy to use the ﬂexibility in the CER market from one day to the other.
Both in the long and short-term analyses, we observe that the EUA price is
more correlated with the European economic activity than the CER price is. This
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is explained by the fact that the volume of EUA is set by the European cap and
that EUA can only be traded in Europe, while CER can be traded in other markets
than the EU ETS and there is no limit on the amount of CER produced annually.
Regarding the interaction between the CER and EUA prices, we ﬁnd that there
is no long-term relationship between them even if they are driven by the same
factors. This corroborates the observation done in Section 2.2 that EUA and CER
prices present signiﬁcantly diﬀerent long-term dynamics. On the contrary, a short-
term relationship is observed: the EUA price inﬂuences the CER price. 60% of
the CER price volatility is explained by the EUA volatility. This is consistent
with the observation done in Section 2 that, in the short-term, the EUA and CER
price follows comparable dynamics with regards to the coal and gas prices and the
economic activity. This is related to the fact that the main source of demand for
CER is the EU-ETS. We also ﬁnd that the EUA and CER volatilities are very close
until November 2011. Afterwards, the CER volatility is much higher and the CER
price falls. This can be related to policy announcements regarding limitations on the
acceptance of CER in the European carbon market in the course of the year 2011:
limitation on international oﬀsetting from 2013 onwards, focus on least developed
countries, ban on some controversial industrial projects and support to reform the
CDM. November 2011 also clearly coincides with the 17th COP that lead to an
agreement on a new deal to commit China and India, the main CDM projects host
countries, to cut emissions. One of the achievement of this COP was also the decision
to develop new market mechanisms.
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In summary, no long-term relationship between the EUA and CER price series
can be found. EUA and CER are diﬀerent products to cover emissions. CER
are issued by the CDM board for projects in Non-Annex I countries. There is no
worldwide limit on the annual amount of credits issued annually and they can be
traded in several carbon markets in the world. EUA were given to installations
covered by the European carbon market at the beginning of its second phase. They
can be used for compliance in the EU ETS only and the volume of allowance issued
annually is set by the European cap. Even if the EUA and CER prices depend
on similar factors (the economic activity as well as the coal and gas prices), their
long-term dynamics are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
On the contrary, their short-term dynamics is very close. The EUA price largely
inﬂuences the CER price which is consistent with the fact the the EU ETS is the
largest market to accept CER for compliance. We do not observe any inﬂuence of
the CER price on the EUA price. The CER and EUA returns are not inﬂuenced
by their respective volatilities. The EUA volatility inﬂuences the CER volatility.
The fall in the CER price and its volatility increase at the end of the second phase
of the EU ETS are associated with announcements of changes and reforms in the
CDM, and of stricter limits on the amount of CER accepted for compliance in the
EU-ETS.
Regarding the consequences for future carbon market interactions, this work
shows that, although the price of carbon permits presents patterns of volatility
clustering, the price variation is not inﬂuenced by its volatility. This suggest that
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there is not interest in holding carbon permits as ﬁnancial assets. In terms of climate
policy, this is rather positive as it limits speculative behaviours on an instrument
the main objective of which is to reduce emissions. However, our analysis suggests
the use of their market power by some agents covered by the EU ETS, in particular
when energy prices are relatively low. The CER market also oﬀers ﬂexibility that
may allow some agents to modify the CER supply as a function of the gas and coal
prices (supply-side eﬀect). Finally, if interactions between carbon markets develop,
more policy announcements or changes in one of the regions involved may have an
inﬂuence on the carbon price. At the same time, the increased market liquidity may
limit any increase in the carbon price volatility. Such points would be interesting
to examine deeper, as a source of criticism of such schemes is the carbon price
uncertainty.
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Appendices
3.a. Two-step estimation of DCCE models.
The estimation of the parameters of multivariate models is based on the maximum-
likelihood method. With Gaussian residuals, the likelihood function is:
LT =
T∑
t=1
log f(yt | θ, η, It−1)
Here f(yt | θ, η, It−1) = |Ht|−
1
2 g(H
−
1
2
t (yt − µt)), the density function of yt given
the parameter vector θ and η. We assume that (yt − µt)  N(0, IN). Thus, the
log-likelihood function is:
LT (θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
[
log |Ht|+ (yt − µt)′H−1t (yt − µt)
]
The Gaussian likelihood provides a consistent quasi-likelihood estimator, even if
the true density is not Gaussian. In the case of a DCC model the log-likelihood
consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part depends on the volatility parameters and the
second one on the parameters of the conditional correlations given the volatility
parameters. With Ht = DtRtDt, we obtain:
LT (θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
[
log |DtRtDt|+ u′tR−1t ut
]
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where ut = D
−1
t (yt − µt) and u′tR−1t ut = (yt − µt)′D−1t R−1t D−1t (yt − µt). With this
notation, the log-likelihood is:
LT (θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
[
log |DtRtDt|+ u′tR−1t ut
]
LT (θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
[2 log |Dt|+ u′tut]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
− 1
2
T∑
t=1
[
log |Rt|+ u′tR−1t ut − u′tut
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1LT (θ
∗
1) Q2LT (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2)
where θ∗1 represent the parameters of the conditional variance Dt and θ
∗
2 those of
the conditional correlation Rt. The log-likelihood function can then be written as
follows:
LT (θ) = Q1LT (θ
∗
1) +Q2LT (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2)
The coeﬃcients (θ∗1, θ
∗
2) are estimated in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate
θ∗1 = argmaxQ1LT (θ
∗
1) and, in the second one, we estimate θ
∗
2 = argmaxQ2LT (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2).
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3.b. Estimation results of the DCCE model.
Table 3.13: Estimation results of the DCC model.
Variance equation
CER price variations EUA price variations
ARCH 0.167*** (0.000) 0.144*** (0.000)
GARCH 0.832*** (0.000) 0.855*** (0.000)
cons 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Correlation parameters
θ1 0.054*** (0.000)
θ2 0.879*** (0.000)
Note: P-values are in (); *, ** and *** respectively refer to the
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels of the estimated coefficients.
SHORT-TERM INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CARBON MARKETS 141
Chapter 4
Carbon price and wind power
support in Denmark
1. Introduction
1.1. Context
In Europe, the climate and energy package aims at meeting the European Union
(EU) climate and energy targets for 2020: reducing the EU greenhouse gases emis-
sions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, raising the share of the EU energy consump-
tion produced from renewable resources to 20%, and improving the energy eﬃciency
in the EU by 20%. Within this package, national renewable energy (RE) support
policies (EU, 2009) coexist with a common carbon market. While the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is designed to curb carbon emissions,
renewable energy support policies aim at increasing the share of renewable energy
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sources in total energy consumption. However, renewable energy resources are not
necessarily the most eﬃcient way to decrease carbon emissions. Palmer and Bur-
traw (2005) as well as Fischer and Newell (2008) underline that if the main goal
is to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, renewable energy support policies are less
cost-eﬀective than a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. Energy consumption
reduction as well as eﬃciency improvement might be other ways to reduce emis-
sions. The coexistence of these instruments raises several questions. What is the
actual abatement cost of renewable energy support policies? What is their impact
on carbon price? What is the impact of the latter on renewable energy deployment?
Do the instruments mutually reinforce or weaken one another?
Some studies already enlighten these questions. For example Marcantonini and
Ellerman (2013) calculate the annual CO2 abatement cost of renewable energy in-
centive in Germany in the time period 2006-2010. They ﬁnd that CO2 abatement
cost of wind power is relatively low (the average for 2006-2010 is 43 e/tCO2) while
CO2 abatement cost for solar energy is very high (the average for 2006-2010 is
537 e/tCO2). Fischer and Preonas (2010) develop a theoretical framework to ex-
plain interactions between overlapping energy and climate policies. Morris (2009)
shows that, in the U.S., a renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS) in addition
to an emission trading scheme would increase welfare cost compared to a trading
scheme alone. The reason is the RPS reduces the ﬂexibility for power producers
to choose the cheapest abatement solutions. Other studies on RPS in the United
States question the interest to add such support policies in addition to a national
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cap-and-trade system (Paltsev et al., 2009; McGuiness and Ellerman, 2008). On the
European case, Weigt et al. (2012) model the German power sector to analyze the
carbon abatement due to renewable energy in Germany and the impact of carbon
price on this, for the time period 2006-2010. They estimate that CO2 emissions from
the electricity sector are reduced by 10 to 16% of what estimated emissions would
have been without any RE policy. They also ﬁnd that the abatement attributable to
RE injection is 4 to 10% greater in the presence of a carbon price than otherwise. In
conclusion, Weigt et al. actually ﬁnd that both instruments reinforce one another.
Relative to the impact of renewable support policies, and the carbon price level
that would have comparable eﬀect, Blanco and Rodrigues (2008) compute a carbon
credit level equivalent to each national wind support policy in eﬀect in Europe in
2006. Their analysis includes the 27 member states of the European Union. They
use assumptions on the amount of greenhouse gases avoided by wind energy but they
do not take account of the actual impact of each policy on wind power deployment.
On the other hand, many studies compare the impact of various types of renewable
support policies, without necessarily taking into account the stringency level of each
of them. It is the case of Menz and Vachon (2006) on the United States experience.
1.2. Main question addressed
The purpose of the work presented here is to analyze the conditions that lead
to wind power deployment, to infer the carbon price level that would provide wind
power with a comparable price advantage over fossil technologies, and to compare
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this level with the carbon price observed in the second phase of the EU-ETS. The
analysis focuses on Denmark, which has a long wind power history including several
support policy changes over time. The wind power proﬁt function is then used
to identify the parameters that might impact wind power deployment. A discrete
choice econometric model (probit) is used to test the eﬀect of these parameters on
new on-shore1 wind turbine connections to the grid on a monthly basis for the time
period 2000-2010, i.e. after the market liberalization that took place in 1999.2 Tobit
technique is used to estimate the eﬀect of the same parameters on the additional wind
power capacity installed each month. The probit estimates allow calculating the
probability of new connections to the grid as a function of the support policy type and
the support level. The support level needed to attain wind power deployment with
a probability of 0.5 can be converted into a carbon price that would provide wind
power producers with a comparable price advantage compared to coal or gas power
plant owners. This carbon price is computed from the diﬀerence in proﬁtability
between renewable and fossil fuel technologies.
1.3. Structure
In Section 2, the history of wind power in Denmark is presented as the context
of the work. At the aggregate level, the observation of wind capacity over time in
parallel with the support policy changes already provides some indications about
1.On-shore wind capacity and generation were respectively 2.82 GW and 5.072 TWh in Denmark in
2009, compared to 0.662 GW and 1.644 TWh for off-shore wind. Total power capacity was approaching
13 GW in 2009 and total power generation was 34 TWh (see Figures 4.1 and 4.4).
2. The choice is made to focus on on-shore wind power only as off-shore wind power is significantly
different, for example in terms of cost and grid infrastructure development.
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the impact of the various types of support and about the support level needed to
have wind power deployment.
The econometric analysis that quantiﬁes these impacts is presented in Section
3. The model that is used is based on the proﬁt function for wind energy. The
database preparation is explained. The results of the probit and tobit analysis are
presented. The probit estimates on the observation of connection of new turbines to
the grid show that the support level and the support policy type are the dominant
factors. This is also conﬁrmed in the tobit analysis on the additional wind power
capacity installed monthly. A feed-in tariﬀ regime3 signiﬁcantly brings more wind
power in than a ﬁxed premium (in the order of several tens MW each month), which
underlies the importance of revenue certainty for investors. The tobit analysis also
shows that for each additional e/MWh of support, the additional capacity installed
each month increases by several hundred kW. Past electricity prices, which are taken
as a proxy for electricity price projections, do not present any signiﬁcant inﬂuence.4
The interest rate eﬀect is not visible in the probit analysis but it appears as a
signiﬁcant factor in the tobit regressions: when the interest rate increases by one
percentage point, the monthly added capacity decreases by 5 to 12 MW. Neither
the probit, nor the tobit technique shows any signiﬁcant impact of the cost term.
The number of turbines already installed is used as a proxy for the sites availability
and does not have a clear eﬀect either. Finally no obvious diﬀerence between the
3.A feed-in tariff is a guaranteed price that power producers receive for every kWh they produce, instead
of receiving the market electricity price. It provides more revenue certainty than a premium policy under
which the electricity price uncertainty remains, despite the premium that is offered on top of it.
4. The estimations were also tested using forward prices. The results are in line with what is observed
with past electricity prices, but the time series available for spot prices are longer than for forward prices.
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impacts of a variable and a ﬁxed premium is found.5 The probability of connection
of new turbines as a function of the support policy type and the support level is
calculated from the probit estimates. It indicates that on average 20 e/MWh is the
support level needed, in addition to electricity price, to have a probability of 0.5 to
observe connection of new turbines to the grid. The robustness of these results is
then discussed.
In Section 4, the comparison between the proﬁts expected from wind power
projects and fossil fuel power plants is used to compute a carbon price that would
provide wind power producers with a price advantage comparable to the support
level needed to see new connections of turbines to the grid with probability 0.5.
2. Wind energy in Denmark
Denmark is chosen for its long wind power history, the frequency of changes in
the type and level of its wind support policies and the large amount of data available
for wind energy.
On shore wind support policies began in Denmark in 1976 (Energistyrelsen;
Jaureguy-Naudin, 2010). They are summarized in Table 4.1. Between 1976 and
2000, several policies juxtaposed each other and sometimes overlapped. From 1976
to 1989, the Danish state reimbursed part of the investment for building wind tur-
bines. The support was originally 40% of the investment cost and was then reduced
gradually until the scheme was cancelled in 1989. From 1984 to 2001, the electricity
5.This result is to be taken carefully, as, in the observations, the variable premium did not vary except
for two months.
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price paid to producers of wind power was 85% of the local retail price of electricity
excluding taxes. In 1991, a ﬁxed price premium of 36 e/MWh was introduced in
addition to the previous scheme. It was in place until 2001.
In 1999, the Danish electricity market was liberalized. Existing turbines were
then covered by a special feed-in tariﬀ (FIT) which resulted in a comparable income
for producers as under the previous support scheme. For existing wind turbines
connected before the end of 1999, producers received a feed in tariﬀ of 80 e/MWh
for a number of full load hours (25,000 full load hours for turbines below 200 kW,
15,000 full load hours for turbines below 600 kW, 10,000 full load hours for turbines
larger than 600 kW). After full load hours were used, producers received a feed-in
tariﬀ of 58 e/MWh until the turbine was ten years old. They then received a price
premium of maximum 13 e/MWh until the turbine was 20 years old. The sum of
market price and price premium was limited to 48 e/MWh. An additional price
premium of 3 e/MWh was paid to cover balancing costs6 in the electricity market.
6.A producer, for example a wind turbine owner, has to forecast the production on day ahead and sell
it to the power exchange. Any deviations from the forecasted wind production are covered by means of
regulating power. The costs of offsetting the imbalances in wind power production are charged to turbine
owners. The 3 e/MWh allowance is paid to turbine owners to help them pay these balancing costs.
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Table 4.1: On-shore wind support policies in Denmark (Source: Jauréguy-Naudin, 2010).
Date of connection to Support scheme
the grid
From 1976 to 1989 Financial support from the Danish state.
From 1984 to 2001 Electricity price paid to producers: 85% of the local retail price,
excluding taxes.
From 1991 to 2001 Fixed premium of 36 e/MWh in addition to the previous scheme.
Existing turbines bought Feed-in tariff of 80 e/MWh for a number of full load hours.
before the end of 1999 Then feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh until the turbine is 10 years old.
Then premium of 13 e/MWh or less until the turbine is 20 years old.
From 2000 to 2002 Feed-in tariff of 58 e/MWh for 22,000 full load hours.
Then premium of 13 e/MWh or less untile the turbine is 20 years old
with a limit of 48 e/MWh on the sum of market price and premium.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh.
From 2003 to 2004 Premium of 13 e/MWh or less until the turbine is 20 years old, with
a limit of 48 e/MWh on the sum of market price and premium.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh
From 2005 to Fixed premium of 13 e/MWh until the turbine is 20 years old.
February 20th 2008 Additional premium of 3 e/MWh
After February 21st 2008 Premium of 34 e/MWh for the first 25,000 full load hours.
Additional premium of 3 e/MWh.
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From 2000, four policies were successively in place. For turbines connected to the
grid between 2000 and 2002, producers received a ﬁxed feed-in tariﬀ of 58 e/MWh
for the ﬁrst 22,000 full load hours. They then received the wholesale spot market
electricity price (37 e/MWh in 2008) in addition to a premium of 13 e/MWh, until
the turbine is 20 years old. The sum of the market price and the price premium
was limited to a maximum of 48 e/MWh. In 2002, the support scheme changed
from a feed-in tariﬀ to a variable premium to better integrate with the recently
liberalized electricity market. For turbines connected to the grid in 2003-2004, the
premium scheme was associated with a cap on the total remuneration per unit of
electricity produced. For the ﬁrst 20 years of the turbine lifetime, producers received
the wholesale spot market electricity price in addition to a premium of 13 e/MWh.
The sum of the market price and the price premium was limited to 48 e/MWh.
In 2005, the cap on the total remuneration per unit of electricity produced was
removed. For turbines connected to the grid between January 2005 and February
20th 2008, producers received the wholesale spot market electricity price in addition
to a premium of 13 e/MWh for the ﬁrst 20 years of the turbine lifetime. In 2008,
the current regime came into eﬀect when the premium was increased. For turbines
connected to the grid after February 21st 2008, producers receive the wholesale spot
market electricity price in addition to a premium of 34 e/MWh for the ﬁrst 25,000
full load hours. Under all four regimes and for the entire lifetime of the turbine, an
additional allowance of 3 e/MWh has been paid to producers to cover balancing
costs.
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Figure 4.1: On-shore wind capacity in Denmark since its early stage.
Aggregate on-shore wind capacity in Denmark in the last decades is presented
in Figure 4.1.7 Its observation in parallel with the support policy history shows a
correspondence between the growth in capacity and the support scheme: most of the
growth in wind capacity occurred either between 1995 and 2002, or after 2008, which
means either under a premium of 36 e/MWh, a feed-in tariﬀ of 58 e/MWh or under
a premium of 34 e/MWh. Given electricity prices in 2000-2002, the feed-in tariﬀ
of 58 e/MWh can be seen as equivalent to a premium of more than 30 e/MWh,
under revenue certainty equivalence. This suggests a threshold eﬀect, that is to say,
the existence of a support level above which new turbines are connected to the grid
and below which no new connections are made.
The purpose of the analysis presented in this paper is to take advantage of this
diverse history of wind power in Denmark to quantify the impact of wind support
policies and to infer a carbon price that would attain comparable wind power de-
7.Data source: Energistyrelsen.
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ployment. Econometric analysis is used to do this empirical analysis and a discrete
choice model is chosen as an appropriate approach to analyze the connection of new
turbines to the grid each month and take account of a possible threshold eﬀect.
Tobit analysis on the additional capacity that is installed monthly complements the
results from the probit technique.
The analysis is done for on-shore wind power for the time period 2000-2010. I
indeed chose to focus the analysis on the time period after liberalization. There are
several reasons for that. First, after liberalization, policies are clearly juxtaposed
and they do not overlap. Then, for the econometric analysis that is used in the
analysis, it would not be possible to ﬁnd a consistent electricity price time series
before and after liberalization. A premium on top of a government set electricity
price is indeed not comparable to a premium on top of a market electricity price.
Finally, the current debate on the coexistence of renewable energy support policies
and an emission trading scheme is conducted in the context of a liberalized electricity
market. This work provide some insights on the issue in this context.
3. Econometric analysis of the conditions of wind power de-
ployment
The econometric analysis uses both probit and tobit techniques. It is based on
the proﬁt function for wind energy producers. After the latter is presented, the
econometric model is introduced and the data preparation is explained. Results are
then presented and their robustness is discussed. At this stage, I do not introduce
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the comparison between wind power and fossil technologies. Indeed companies like
Vattenfall and DONG Energy that also have activities in thermal power production
do own some of the wind turbines in Denmark, but two thirds of the Danish wind
power capacity is actually owned by individuals (e.g. farmers) who make their
decision on a cost-return point of view. Hence, I base the following econometric
analysis on the proﬁt function of wind power only. I introduce the comparison with
the other power production technologies in Section 4.
3.1. Profit function for wind energy
For power production from technology i, the proﬁt Πi for each kWh produced
can be deﬁned as follows:
Πi =
∫ T
0
(pit + x
i
t − emit − vcit)q(t)e−rtdt− FCi∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
(4.1)
where:
pit is the electricity price received by power producers at time t,
xit is the potential premium received by producers if technology i is subject to some
support policy t,
emit is the emission penalty if technology i produces emissions that are subject to
some mitigation policy,
vcit represents the other variable costs for technology i,
q(t) is the quantity of electricity produced at time t,
r is the discount rate,
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FCi represents the ﬁxed costs for technology i,
and T is the plant lifetime.
Hence Πi can be decomposed in the sum of an electricity price revenue, Pe, and
a premium revenue, Xi, minus emissions costs, Ei , and other costs, Ci, as follows:
Πi = Pe +Xi − Ei − Ci (4.2)
where:
Pe =
∫ T
0
pitq(t)e
−rtdt∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
(4.3)
Xi =
∫ T
0
xitq(t)e
−rtdt∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
(4.4)
Ei =
∫ T
0
emitq(t)e
−rtdt∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
(4.5)
Ci =
∫ T
0
vctq(t)e
−rtdt∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
+
FCi∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
. (4.6)
For a renewable technology r, there is no emission cost and the proﬁt function is
Πr = Pr +Xr − Cr. (4.7)
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For wind power, costs are mainly ﬁxed costs.
Cr ≈ FCr∫ T
0
q(t)e−rtdt
. (4.8)
Cr can be approximated by the upfront investment cost. A large part of it is the
turbine price, which depends on the turbine capacity. The quantity of electricity
produced is a function of the turbine capacity as well and the wind power density
(W/m2) of the site where it is built. Hence Cr is a function of the investment cost
in e/kW divided by the wind power density of the turbine site.
3.2. Econometric model
The decision to build a new turbine depends on the proﬁt that can be expected
from it. The decision is made only if the proﬁt is positive or equal to zero. Hence,
given the proﬁt function described above, this decision may depend on the electricity
price projections, the investment cost and the interest rate when the decision is made
to connect a new turbine on a given site. The wind characteristics of the site that
is chosen may also have an inﬂuence as well as the availability of good sites.
Although in the four regimes considered between 2000 and 2010, the support
policy actually varies between the main part of the turbine lifetime (i.e. the ﬁrst
22,000 full load hours for the regime in place from 2000 to 2002, the ﬁrst 20 years
of operation for the regimes in place from 2003 to February 20th 2008, and the ﬁrst
25,000 full load hours for the regime in place after February 21st 2008), and the rest
of it, the bulk of the support revenue comes from what is received in the main part of
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the turbine lifetime8. Hence, the support policy I consider for each of these four time
periods in the econometric analysis is the support actually provided in the main part
of the turbine lifetime. For turbines connected to the grid between 2000 and 2002,
wind power producers receive a feed-in tariﬀ of 58 e/MWh, i.e. a ﬁxed tariﬀ that is
independent of the electricity price. This revenue certainty is particularly favorable
for investment. For turbines connected to the grid in 2003 and 2004, wind power
producers receive a premium of 13 e/MWh or less in addition to the electricity
price. The variable premium is computed as a function of the electricity price: if
electricity price is below 35 e/MWh, the premium is 13 e/MWh; if electricity price
is between 35 and 48 e/MWh, the premium is the diﬀerence between the electricity
price and 48 e/MWh; if electricity price is above 48 e/MWh, there is no premium.
For turbines connected to the grid between 2005 and February 20th 2008, wind
power producers receive a ﬁxed premium of 13 e/MWh in addition to the price of
electricity. For turbines connected after February 21st 2008, power producers receive
a ﬁxed premium of 34 e/MWh in addition to the price of electricity. In addition,
for all regimes, wind power producers receives 3 e/Mwh for balancing costs.
In terms of time scales, although the exploration of a site may start up to ﬁve
years before a turbine is connected to the grid on that site, there is usually one year
between the start of the actual building of the turbine and the date of connection
to the grid. The start of the building of the turbine can be seen as the point of
irreversibility in the decision process. Hence appropriate lags are taken into account
8.The typical lifetime of a wind turbine is 20 years.
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for the relevant explanatory variables of the econometric analysis as explained later
on.
3.2.1. Probit model
Probit analysis is chosen to examine the impact of electricity price projections,
the support type (feed-in tariﬀ, ﬁxed premium or variable premium), the support
level and the levelized cost on the decision to build a new turbine. This decision is a
binary variable and is observed through the connection or the absence of connection
of new turbines to the grid per month. As the electricity price and support level
impacts may vary with the type of support policy that is used, dummy variables are
introduced to characterize the support policy type and to diﬀerentiate the support
level and the support policy type eﬀects. The econometric model used for the probit
analysis is the following:
Prob(Yt = 1|At) = F (β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 FIT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ FIT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n + β9 Rt,−n + β10 TotTbt)
(4.9)
where:
Yt is a binary variable: it is worth 1 if at least one new turbine is connected to
the grid in time period t, it is equal to 0 otherwise.
At is the vector of all explanatory variables considered.
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F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Elecpricet represents electricity price projection at time t.
Supportt is the support level at time t. If the policy type is a ﬁxed premium,
Supportt is the premium itself. If the policy type is a feed-in tariﬀ, the support level
is calculated as the diﬀerence between the tariﬀ and the electricity price at time t.
FIT and V P are the dummy variables for the feed-in tariﬀ and the variable
premium policies. The ﬁxed premium policy is taken as the reference category. The
use of a dummy variable for each policy allows disentangling the support policy type
impact from the support level impact. The variable Supportt ∗ FIT (respectively
Supportt ∗ V P ) is the interaction term between Supportt and the dummy variable
FIT (respectively V P ). In the database, the interaction term between the V P
dummy variable and the Supportt variable was almost perfectly collinear with the
VP dummy variable. The reason is that, in 2003 and 2004, electricity price was such
that the support variable as I calculate it is the full premium (13 e/MWh) for most
of the observations during that time period.
Costt is the levelized cost of wind power. For wind power, costs are mainly ﬁxed
costs and the levelized cost can be approximated by the investment cost divided by
the quantity of electricity produced during the turbine lifetime. The investment cost
itself is the product of the investment cost in e/kW and the turbine capacity, while
the quantity of electricity produced during the turbine lifetime is function of the
turbine capacity, the turbine lifetime, and the wind potential of the site where the
turbine is built. As a consequence, the levelized cost does not depend on the turbine
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capacity as higher energy production compensates for the increase in the turbine
price (Bolinger and Wiser, 2011). Neither wind power density, nor the capacity
factor is observed when there is no new connection to the grid. Investment cost in
e/kW is then taken as a proxy for the cost term.
Rt is the interest rate of long-term Danish government bonds.
TotTbt is the number of turbines already installed at time t. It is a proxy for the
sites availability: the higher the number of turbines already installed, the lower the
number of remaining sites that are available.
Lags up to ﬁve years are tested for the electricity price and up to two years
for the support level, the interest rate and the cost term. These values correspond
to the length of the decision process to build a new turbine, as explained in the
introduction of Section ??. Past electricity prices are used as a proxy for electricity
price projections. I tested the use of forward contracts prices, but the spot market
oﬀers the longest data series (as early as July 1999).
Given the proﬁt function described previously, β2 and β3 are expected to be
positive while β8 and β9 are expected to be negative. Previous comparisons between
various types of wind support policies (for example Menz and Vachon, 2006) conclude
that a feed-in tariﬀ regime attains larger wind power deployment (Couture et al.,
2010). For this reason, β4 is expected to be positive. On the contrary, β5 is expected
to be negative as a variable premium would provide wind power producers with a
lower revenue certainty than a ﬁxed premium.
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3.2.2. Tobit model
I use tobit analysis to estimate the eﬀect of the same factors on the additional
capacity that is installed each month. I include the same explanatory variables
as for the probit analysis. I add Dec02, a dummy variable for December 2002,
month for which a signiﬁcantly larger capacity of wind power was installed (226
MW compared to 10MW on average for the time period 2000-2010).9 The model
for the tobit analysis is the following:
AddCapt = (β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 FIT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ FIT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n
+β9 Rt,−n + β10 TotTbt + β11 Dec02)∗I[Bt > B∗](4.10)
where:
AddCapt is the additional capacity installed each month,
I[.] is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the relation speciﬁed as argument is
true, zero otherwise,
Bt is the latent variable deﬁned as:
Bt = β1 + β2 Elecpricet,−n + β3 Supportt,−n + β4 FIT + β5 V P
+β6 Supportt ∗ FIT + β7 Supportt ∗ V P + β8 Costt,−n + β9 Rt,−n
+β10 TotTbt + β11 Dec02
9.The addition of a significantly larger wind power capacity in December 2002 is explained by the fact
that it was the last month the feed-in tariff regime was in place. This is consistent with the clear preference
of wind power producers for guaranteed tariffs, as mentionned in Section 3.2.1.
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B∗ is the threshold value of Bt below which no new turbine is connected to the
grid.
3.3. Data preparation
A monthly database on the time period 2000-2010 is built. The values of the
variables needed for the econometric analysis and introduced above are deﬁned as
follows.
Data on Danish wind turbines come from Energinet (energinet.dk), the Danish
transmission system operator for electricity and natural gas. A large database on
all turbines that have been in operation in Denmark allows identifying the date of
connection of each Danish turbine to the grid so that they can be grouped into
monthly observations, in order to deﬁne AddCapt, the additional capacity installed
each month, and Yt, the binary variable representing the connection (Yt = 1) or
absence of connection (Yt = 0) of new turbines to the grid in Denmark each month.
Electricity price data come from NordPool. Monthly averages are calculated
from hourly data on working days only10 from 1999 to 2010.11 I chose to use the
spot market because it provides the longest electricity price time series, but I also
tested the estimations with forward contracts and futures electricity prices for the
time periods for which these series are available. I found similar results as with the
10.Data on working days only are used instead of data on all days, as the latter are available from 2002
only while the former are available from 1999 onwards. Regressions were run on the time period 2002-2010
with the two electricity price series. No significant difference was observed. Average is done on available
data: West Denmark only from 01/07/1999 to 28/09/2000 and West and East Denmark from 29/09/2000.
11. The comparison between the averages on electricity price when weighted with hourly wind power
production (hourly wind power production data are found on energinet.dk) and the simple averages proved
that the difference between them was not significant. This allowed taking simple averages in the econometric
analysis.
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spot price average. Monthly averages are corrected for inﬂation12 so that all ﬁgures
are in constant e2000. Electricity price data are reported in appendix.
The support variable is deﬁned as the premium of the policy under which tur-
bines are connected to the grid each month, including the 3 e/MWh allowance for
balancing costs mentioned in Section 2. When the support policy is a feed-in tariﬀ, I
deﬁne Supportt as the diﬀerence between the feed-in tariﬀ and the electricity price at
time t. Hence for the feed-in tariﬀ period (2000-2002), the support variable is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the electricity price and 61 e/MWh (sum of 58 e/MWh
of feed-in tariﬀ and 3 e/MWh allowance for balancing costs). Electricity price is
never above 61 e/MWh in that time period. When the support policy is a variable
premium, I deﬁne Supportt as a function of the electricity price and the maximal
value of the premium. For the time period 2003-2004, given the variable premium
policy presented in Section 2, three cases are considered. For the months for which
electricity price is above 48 e/MWh, the support variable is deﬁned as 3 e/MWh
(balancing cost allowance only). For the months for which electricity price is below
35 e/MWh, the support variable is deﬁned as 16 e/MWh corresponding to 13 e
of premium in addition to 3 e of balancing costs allowance. For the months for
which electricity price is between 35 and 48 e/MWh, the support is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between electricity price and 48 e in addition to the 3 e allowance for
balancing costs. When the support policy is a ﬁxed premium, Supportt is deﬁned
as the value of the premium. For the time period from 2005 to February 20th 2008,
12. Inflation data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, end of period
consumer prices.
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the support variable is deﬁned as 16 e/MWh corresponding to 13 e/MWh of ﬁxed
premium and 3 e of balancing cost allowance. For the time period after February
21st 2008, the support, before correction for inﬂation, is deﬁned as 37 e/MWh cor-
responding to 34 e/MWh of ﬁxed premium in addition to 3 e of balancing cost
allowance. As is done for the electricity price, the support premium is corrected for
inﬂation so that all ﬁgures are in constant e2000.
For the cost term, yearly wind power investment cost data from the European
Wind Energy Association are used as a proxy (Moccia et al., 2011). They are also
corrected for inﬂation, so that Elecpricet, Supportt and Costt are all in real terms
in the database.
Rt is the interest rate of Danish ten-year government bonds (source : OECD).
Regarding endogeneity concerns, Yt might have an impact on Elecpricet without
lag. For the premium time period (after 2002), this is not a problem since what is
tested in the analysis is the possible impact of electricity price projections at the date
when the decision to build a turbine is made. These electricity price projections are
based on past electricity prices. Yt cannot have an impact on past electricity prices
due to the causality principle. In this time period, endogeneity concerns between
Yt and the support variable are also excluded since Yt is deﬁned monthly as the
presence or absence of connections of new turbines to the grid each month while the
support policy changes every two or three years. In the FIT time period (2000-2002),
Supportt is computed from Elecpricet and there could be endogeneity between Yt
and the support variable. However the feed-in tariﬀ does provide a premium and
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the question remains whether the level of implicit premium matters. The dummy
variable FIT helps to control for this situation. Regressions were run on the whole
time period as well as on the post-FIT period only (after 2002) and the results from
the regression on the whole time period remain robust on the post-2002 period (this
point is discussed at the end of Section 3.4.1). The correlation table is given in
appendix.
The database does not include particularly small turbines (turbine capacity less
than 20 kW or hub height less than 20 m).
3.4. Results and interpretation
Regression results from the probit and tobit analysis are presented. In order to
understand and interpret the probit estimations, the probability distribution they
quantify is then drawn. It is found that past electricity prices have no signiﬁcant
impact on the decisions to connect new turbines to the grid and that the dominant
parameters are the support level and the support policy type. A feed-in tariﬀ sig-
niﬁcantly brings more wind power in than a premium policy. No clear diﬀerence
is observed between the impacts of a ﬁxed and a variable premium on the decision
to connect new turbines. This can be nuanced by the fact that, for the variable
premium regime time period (2003-2004), Supportt is nearly always the full value
of the premium (electricity prices are rather low), and hence the variable premium
actually presented little variability. The cost term does not present any signiﬁcant
impact in the analysis. The site availability does not have a clear eﬀect either. The
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interest rate eﬀect is not visible in the probit analysis but it is signiﬁcant in the tobit
estimations.
3.4.1. Probit estimations
Table 4.2 presents the results of a sample of six representative probit regressions
of Y on the explanatory variables introduced in Section 3.2.1. Lags for electricity
prices are tested from six months to ﬁve years. Results for one or two-year lags only
are presented. Regressions (A) and (E) use a twelve-month lag for electricity price
while regressions (B), (C), and (F) use a two-year lag for electricity prices. Regres-
sions (A) includes the interaction term between Supportt and the dummy variable
V P while the other regressions do not. Regressions (A), (B) and (F) include the
cost term without lag, while regression (C) include a one-year lag for it. Regression
(A) to (D) include the interest rate, regression (E) includes it with a one-year lag.
Regressions (A) to (D) include TotTb, the proxy for the sites availability. As regres-
sion (D) presents the highest Wald χ2 test statistics, it is chosen for calculating the
probability distribution of observing the connection of new turbines to the grid as a
function of the support level and support policy type.
The support level has a clear impact on the decision to build and connect new
turbines to the grid. The support level coeﬃcient is always signiﬁcant (z-value above
2 and p-value below 1%).
The policy type impact is tested through the dummy variables FIT and V P ,
with or without interaction terms. The reference category is the ﬁxed premium
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Table 4.2: Probit regressions of Y , the observation or absence of observation of new turbines
connections to the grid.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Support 0.1006*** 0.0965*** 0.0705** 0.0995*** 0.0896*** 0.0961***
(3.22) (2.61) (2.05) (3.89) (3.57) (3.38)
VP -10.52 2.288*** 1.497 0.3705 0.0979 0.5004
(-1.21) (2.12) (1.61) (0.95) (0.21) (0.57)
FIT 5.7011** 13.806*** 11.13*** 3.9693*** 3.7402*** 10.934***
(2.39) (3.15) (2.76) (3.84) (4.08) (3.22)
Support*FIT -0.1071 -0.2475** -0.2337** -0.1087** -0.0977*** -0.2871***
(-1.55) (-2.15) (-2.03) (-2.08) (-3.17) (-2.93)
Support*VP 0.8483
(1.39)
Cost 0.0025 0.0056* 0.001
(0.77) (1.7) (0.38)
Cost(-12) 0.0028
(1.11)
Elecprice(-12) 0.0243 0.0228
(1.39) (1.41)
Elecprice(-24) 0.0147 0.0084 0.0116
(0.93) (0.52) (0.7)
R -0.7314* -0.8331** -0.8706** -0.5315
(0.38) (-2.1) (-1.85) (-1.62)
R(-12) 0.1206
(0.36)
TotTb -0.0003 0.00424 0.0009 -0.0016
(-0.1) (0.67) (0.15) (-0.91)
Constant -2.1038 -24.67 -6.2745 6.7258 -3.074** -3.7668
(-0.14) (-0.91) (-0.24) (0.87) (-2.06) (-0.9)
Wald χ2 39.74*** 49.03*** 47.46*** 49.82*** 40.08*** 49.1***
Pseudo R2 0.3326 0.3036 0.2945 0.3263 0.3000 0.2664
Observations 122 110 110 128 122 110
Note: The z-value corresponding to each coefficient is indicated in parenthesis below the
coefficient value. ***, ** , and * respectively indicate a 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
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regime. The variables associated with the feed-in tariﬀ regime, FIT and Support ∗
FIT , have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability to observe the connection of
new turbines to the grid, while the variables associated with the variable premium
regime do not.13 Under a feed-in tariﬀ regime, the probability of observing new
turbines connections to the grid is larger than under a premium regime, for the
same equivalent level of support. This is consistent with the fact that a feed-in tariﬀ
regime insures revenue certainty to wind power producers. This observation is in
line with previous observations on the impact of feed-in tariﬀs on renewable energy
(Menz and Vachon, 2006 or Couture et al., 2010). The 2008 IEA report Deploying
Renewables: Principles for Effective Policies (IEA, 2008) also concludes that, for
on-shore wind power, the most eﬀective policies to attain deployment are feed-in
tariﬀ regimes, even with relatively modest remuneration levels.14
No clear diﬀerence is found between the impacts of the variable and ﬁxed pre-
mium regimes.
Past electricity prices do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the connection of new
turbines to the grid.15
The cost term impact is not visible in the probit analysis; the site availability does
not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect either. The coeﬃcient associated with the interest
rate is signiﬁcant in regressions (A) to (C) but it is not signiﬁcant in regressions (D)
13.Given the electricity price data in the time period 2003-2004, the interaction term between V P and
Supportt is nearly collinear with the dummy variable V P . The regression results confirm that the inclusion
of this interaction term does not improve the explanatory power of the model.
14. This IEA report bases its analysis on the comparison between national support policies and effective
deployment of renewable energy.
15. The use of forward contracts electricity price rather than spot prices was tested. It does not change
the results.
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to (E). The impact of the interest rate is clearer in the tobit estimations presented
in Section 3.4.2.
To interpret and understand the coeﬃcients from the probit analysis, the marginal
eﬀect of the support level and the support policy type is computed. The predicted
probability of observing new turbine connections to the grid is plotted as a function
of the support level and type and presented in Figure 4.2. The choice is made to
present the graph associated with regression (D) as it is the one with the highest
Wald χ2. The robustness of the curves as a function of the regression chosen is dis-
cussed afterwards. For the “Mean” curve, the value at each point is the average, on
all observations, of the predicted probability calculated using the speciﬁc value for
the support variable and the sample values for the other predictor variables.16 For
the “Feed-in tariff ”, “Variable premium” and “Fixed premium” curves, the predicted
probability of having new connections depending on the policy type is computed for
each support level, using the average values for the other explanatory variables.
This shows that the probability of investment increases with the support level
regardless of the form it takes. This form makes a considerable diﬀerence with
the feed-in tariﬀ increasing probability considerably. The extra beneﬁt of this form
diminishes as the support level increases. The “Mean” curve shows that, on average,
the probability of observing new turbine connections to the grid is 50% for a support
16. For each point of the “Mean” curve, for example for a support level of 5 e/MWh, the regression
coefficients are used to calculate a probability for each observation. This computation takes account of
the specific value for the support variable (5 e/MWh) and the observation values for the other predictors.
Then, these probabilities for all observations are averaged to give the value that appears on the curve (ex:
0.07 for a support level of 5 e/MWh). The advantage of this curve is that it uses the diversity of all
observations for the explanatory variables other than the support level or the support policy type.
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level of 20 e/MWh. Under a feed-in tariﬀ regime, the probability is higher for the
same support level, while it is lower under a premium policy. For example, for a
support level of 30 e/MWh, the probability of new connections is 0.84 on average,
but it is 0.95 under a feed-in tariﬀ regime. “Fixed premium” and “Variable premium”
curves are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. For the “Feed-in tariff ” curve, the part of
the graph corresponding to support values below 30 e/MWh is not robust as it
is nearly an out-of-sample extrapolation (for the feed-in tariﬀ period, the support
variable is above 30 e/MWh except for two months). The probability diﬀerence of
observing connection of new turbines to the grid between the ﬁxed premium and the
feed-in tariﬀ regimes can be seen as the beneﬁt of certainty on the electricity price
revenue. Indeed, under a ﬁxed premium regime, wind power producers know the
exact premium level but the electricity price uncertainty remains. Under a feed-in
tariﬀ regime, there is certainty on the whole amount they receive, which is equivalent
to certainty on both the electricity price and the premium.
The robustness of the probit results is now discussed. The support level needed
to observe new turbines connections to the grid with a probability of 50% is deduced
from regression (D). It is 20 e/MWh on average. With the other regressions, this
value varies between 19 and 22 e/MWh. Under a premium regime, this value varies
between 24 and 28 e/MWh. The “Mean”, “Variable premium”, and “Fixed premium”
curves as well as the part of the “Feed-in tariff ” curve above 30 e/MWh do not
change signiﬁcantly if they are inferred from the other regressions. On the contrary,
the part of the “Feed-in tariff ” curve below 30 e/MWh is not robust, as previously
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Figure 4.2: Probability of new turbine connections to the grid as a function of the support
policy level and the policy type.
explained. The ranges of probability for each curve at 5, 25 and 45 e/MWh are
presented in Table 4.3. These ranges take account of the standard errors deﬁned
when computing the predicted probability as a function of the support level and
the support policy type, for each regression. This conﬁrms the observation that a
variable premium policy does not have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impact from a ﬁxed
premium policy. Despite the fact that the part of the “Feed-in tariff ” curve for low
support level is not robust, the feed-in tariﬀ regime still does bring more wind power
in than other schemes.
Regressions were also done on the post feed-in tariﬀ period (after 2002) to test
the relative impact of the support and electricity price if the analysis is done on
these years only. The support level remains the dominant factor and past electricity
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Table 4.3: Ranges of predicted probabilities of observing new connections of turbines to
the grid, as a function of the support level and the policy type, and for all regressions
reported in Table 4.2.
.
Support level 5 e/MWh 25 e/MWh 45 e/MWh
Mean 0.00-0.34 0.54-0.82 0.92-1.00
Fixed premium 0.00-0.26 0.16-0.68 0.61-0.96
Variable premium 0.00-0.69 0.10-0.85 0.16-0.86
Feed-in tariff 0.71-0.96 0.85-0.99 0.99-1.00
prices do not have a signiﬁcant and robust impact. In addition, the support level
for which the probability of observing new turbines connection to the grid is 0.5
remains in the range indicated by the regressions on the entire time period, that is
to say, between 19 and 22 e/MWh.
3.4.2. Tobit estimations
The regression results from the tobit regressions of the additional wind power
capacity connected to the grid each month are presented in Table 4.4. The tobit
analysis complements the probit estimations by quantifying the relative impact of
each explanatory variable.
As in the probit analysis, the tobit regressions show that the support level and the
support policy type have a signiﬁcant impact, with a feed-in tariﬀ regime bringing
more wind power in that a ﬁxed premium policy. The tobit analysis suggest that a
feed-in tariﬀ regime increases the additional capacity installed monthly by several
tens MW (28 MW according to regression (J) estimates if I consider an average
support level of 37 e/MWh) while each additional e/MWh of support increases the
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Table 4.4: Tobit regressions of the additional wind power capacity connected to the grid
each month.
AddCap (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L)
Support 779*** 486** 1669*** 663** 1034*** 1636***
(2.66) (2.17) (4.81) (2.36) (3.99) (4.67)
VP -356390* 18928** -200430 -187772 1645* 16310
(-1.34) (2.05) (-0.75) (-0.95) (0.23) (1.37)
FIT 100390*** 71592*** 40805 68604*** 60361*** 33914
(3.72) (3.23) (1.44) (4.07) (2.72) (1.18)
Support*FIT -1155* -1039 -1090* -1856*** -938.6
(-1.71) (-1.39) (-1.82) (-3.13) (-1.17)
Support*VP 27231 15816** 14346
(1.4) (0.82) (1)
Cost 51.94 37.75 50.21 -5.326 39.43
(1.61) (1.36) (1.48) (-0.23) (1.09)
Cost(-12) 15.05
(0.78)
Elecprice(-12) 343*
(1.8)
Elecprice(-24) 157.86 131.44 172.57
(1.1) (0.89) (1.1)
R -6298** -5542* -10355** -5943* -12017***
(-2.05) (-1.77) (-2.42) (-1.85) (-2.79)
R(-12) -662.7483
(-0.21)
TotTb 95.94** 129*** -43.11 56.19* -61.37**
(1.82) (3.12) (-2.39) (1.79) (-1.73)
Dec02 177554*** 197015*** 246058*** 184168*** 187478*** 250305***
(9.2) (11.14) (10.8) (10.07) (9.27) (10.83)
Constant -469840* -588629*** 117162 -247070* -16796 203790
(-1.92) (-3.01) 1.12 (-1.8) (-0.46) (1.13)
LR χ2 152.26*** 145.44*** 157.88*** 160.69*** 140.47*** 140.71***
Pseudo R2 0.1128 0.1077 0.0892 0.1096 0.104 0.0868
Observations 110 110 128 116 110 122
Note: The t-value corresponding to each coefficient is indicated in parentheses below the coefficient
value. ***, **, and * respectively indicate a 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
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additional capacity installed by several hundred kW (up to more than 1600 kW if
I consider the results from regression (I)). This suggests that the revenue certainty
provided by the feed-in tariﬀ regime is determinant for wind power deployment. The
variable premium impact is not clearly diﬀerent from the ﬁxed premium eﬀect. The
coeﬃcients associated with the cost and electricity price terms are not signiﬁcant.
The proxy for the site availability does not present a clear eﬀect.
While the interest rate eﬀect was not obvious in the probit analysis, it appears in
the tobit regressions: when the interest rate increases by one percentage point, the
additional capacity installed monthly decreases by 5 to 12 MW. This is explained by
the fact that when the interest rate is low, it is less costly for wind power producers
to borrow money to build new turbines, while, when it is higher, borrowing is more
expensive.
Finally, the Dec02 dummy variable coeﬃcient is always signiﬁcant. Its value
is beyond 177 MW. This is related to the fact that an unusually large number of
turbines was installed in December 2002, i.e. before the support policy change from
a feed-in tariﬀ to a premium regime. This observation corroborates the previous
results on the impact of a feed-in tariﬀ policy. These results reﬂect the preference
of wind power producers for a guaranteed tariﬀ, which provides them with a higher
revenue certainty than the other schemes.
To conclude, both tobit and probit results indicate that the dominant parameters
for the decision to connect new turbines to the grid are the support level and the
support policy type. A feed-in tariﬀ policy brings more wind power in than a
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premium regime. No diﬀerence is observed between a ﬁxed and a variable premium
regime. On average, a support level of 20 e/MWh17 in addition to electricity price
leads to a probability of 0.5 to observe connections of new turbines to the grid. Under
a premium regime, this threshold value is around 24 e/MWh. Tobit estimations
indicate that the fact that the support policy is a feed-in tariﬀ rather than a premium
increases the additional capacity installed each month by up to several tens MW,
while for each additional e/MW of support, it increases by several hundred kW.
This ﬁnding is also consistent with the observation that an usually large number of
turbines was installed in Denmark in December 2002, just before the wind support
policy changes from a feed-in tariﬀ to a premium regime. The support type seems
to have more eﬀect than the support level. Such a result is explained by the revenue
certainty provided by a guaranteed tariﬀ to wind power producers. This is consistent
with Mulder’s conclusion (2008) that the remuneration level alone is not enough to
attain wind power deployment.
The interest rate eﬀect is not clear in the probit analysis but visible in the tobit
regressions: when the interest rate increases by one percentage point, the additional
capacity installed monthly decreases by 5 to 12 MW. Electricity price eﬀect is not
visible in the analysis, nor is the investment cost impact. Regarding the cost term,
the absence of visible impact might be related to the fact that the wind potential of
the site where the turbine is built is not taken into account in the proxy. Indeed, it
cannot be deﬁned for the months during which no new turbine is connected to the
17.All support level figures indicated from the regression results are in constant e2000.
CARBON PRICE AND WIND POWER SUPPORT IN DENMARK 175
grid although it matters for the levelized cost. The sites availability does not appear
to be a dominant factor in the analysis.
The variability of some of the tobit estimates (for example the coeﬃcients as-
sociated with the Supportt and FIT variables) suggests non-linear eﬀects. Such
non-linearity would be consistent with one of the conclusions of the 2008 IEA report
on the eﬀectiveness of renewable energy support policies (IEA, 2008) that states
that “beyond a minimum remuneration level of about $0.07/kWh, higher remuner-
ation levels do not necessarily correlate with greater policy eﬀectiveness”. On the
contrary, the critical support value deﬁned in the probit analysis as the support level
corresponding to a probability of 0.5 to see the connections of new turbines to the
grid is robust. For this reason, the ﬁgures used for the carbon price comparison in
the next section are based on the probit results rather than on the tobit estimates.
4. Carbon price inference
The econometric analysis presented in Section 3 provides indications on the con-
ditions under which there is wind power deployment. It focuses on wind power
producers only, as most of the wind capacity in Denmark is owned by individual
entities such as farmers. Projections in electricity prices do not have a signiﬁcant
impact while the support level and the policy type clearly matter. The probit re-
gressions show that, on average, a support of 20 e/MWh leads to a probability of
0.5 to observe new connections of turbines to the grid. Under a premium policy, this
probability is attained for a support level of 24 e/MWh. The purpose of this section
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is to infer the necessary condition on the carbon price level to make companies that
also operate gas or coal power plants be equally attracted by wind power projects.
While carbon price is a penalty for fossil technologies, a renewable energy support
policy is an advantage for wind power. The purpose of the following paragraphs is
to infer the necessary carbon price that would provide comparable price advantage
to wind power over fossil technologies as the eﬀective support policies. The compar-
ison between wind power and fossil technologies can be conducted in various ways.
I ﬁrst compare the proﬁt for each kWh produced by the two types of technologies.
I then extend this comparison to the lifetime proﬁt of two installations, taking into
account the diﬀerent capacity credits of the two types of technology. I ﬁnally com-
pare the returns on investment expected from renewable and fossil energy power
projects. Such comparisons may not take account of some other factors that also
play a major role for the deployment of some speciﬁc technologies (for example grid
development or portfolio management within energy companies).
4.1. Comparison between renewable energy and fossil fuel technologies
Using the notations introduced in Section 3.1, I ﬁrst compare the proﬁt per kWh
produced by each type of technology.
Πr = Πf (4.11)
Pr +Xr − Cr = Pf − Cf − Ef (4.12)
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Xr + Ef = Pf − Cf − (Pr − Cr) (4.13)
Equation 4.13 shows an equivalence between Xr and Ef with regard to the proﬁt
per kWh comparison between wind power and conventional thermal energy. If the
carbon market alone has to cover the diﬀerence in proﬁtability between the two
kinds of technology, we have:
Ef = Pf − Cf − (Pr − Cr) (4.14)
Pr−Cr can be deduced from the results of the econometric analysis. Indeed, the
probit technique indicates the support level needed to make wind power producers
have a positive proﬁt. With the same notations as in Equation 3.1, the reasoning
is the following. The positive proﬁt condition expressed in equation 4.15 translates
into a condition on Xr as expressed in equation 4.17.
Πr > 0 (4.15)
Pr +Xr − Cr > 0 (4.16)
Xr > X
∗
r (4.17)
with
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X∗r = Cr − Pr. (4.18)
The probit analysis provides indications on X∗r : it is around 24 e/MWh under
a premium policy.
From equations 4.14 and 4.18, we deduce that, if a technology f becomes prof-
itable (Pf −Cf = 0), the emission penalty needed to make technology r competitive
is equal to X∗r .
I now compare the lifetime proﬁt of two types of installation. To do so, I have
to take into account a new constraint related to the diﬀerence in capacaity credit
between intermittent and fossil energy. Due to its intermittency, a kWh of wind
power is indeed not a perfect substitute of a kWh produced by a coal or gas plant.
Wind power has a capacity factor of about 25-30% while a base load power plant
has a capacity factor of about 90%. The amount of conventional reserve capacity
that can be retired when wind capacity is added to the system without aﬀecting the
system security or robustness can be expressed as a percentage of this wind capacity.
This deﬁnes the wind power capacity credit, CCr. At low levels of penetration,
the capacity credit of wind power is about the same as its capacity factor. When
wind penetration increases, the capacity credit drops. In other words, a wind power
installation of capacity Capr can replace a conventional power installation of capacity
Capf = CCr ∗ Capr.
Under this new constraint, if I express the equalization between the lifetime proﬁt
of the two kinds of installations, I obtain:
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Capf ∗CFf ∗Tf ∗8760∗(Pf−Cf−Ef) = Capr∗CFr∗Tr∗8760(Pr+Xr−Cr) (4.19)
CCr ∗Capr ∗CFf ∗ Tf ∗ (Pf −Cf −Ef) = Capr ∗CFr ∗ Tr ∗ (Pr +Xr −Cr) (4.20)
with
Capr is the renewable energy project capacity (in kW),
Capf is the conventional power project capacity (in kW),
Tr is the typical lifetime of renewable energy project (20 years for a wind turbine),
Tf is the typical lifetime of a conventional power plant (40 years for a coal plant),
CFr is the capacity factor for the renewable technology (around 30% for wind
power),
CFf is the capacity factor for the fossil technology (85% for coal or gas plants),
8760 is the number of hours in a year,
Pr, Xr, Cr, Pf , Ef , and Cf are the levelized variables deﬁned in Section 3.1.
After calculations, I obtain:
Ef + βXr = Pf − Cf − β(Pr − Cr) (4.21)
with
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β =
CFr ∗ Tr
CFf ∗ Tf ∗ CCr (4.22)
Equation 4.21 can be seen as an equivalence between Ef and βXr with regards
to the lifetime proﬁt comparison between a wind power installation and a fossil fuel
power plant with equivalent impact on the power system security.
Finally, I compare the returns on investment of the two types of technologies.
Using the same notations as above, I deﬁne the return on investment for renewable
energy as follows:
ROIr =
Capr ∗ CFr ∗ Tr ∗ 8760
Capr ∗ I0r
∗ (Pr +Xr − Cr) (4.23)
where
ROIr is the return on investment for renewable energy,
I0r is the initial investment cost per kW installed (e/kW).
For a fossil technology in a context where carbon is priced (either by a tax or
through a trading scheme), there is no premium but there is an emission penalty so
that the return on investment is:
ROIf =
Capf ∗ CFf ∗ Tf ∗ 8760
Capf ∗ I0f
∗ (Pf − Ef − Cf ) (4.24)
where
ROIf is the return on investment for the fossil technology considered,
I0f is the initial investment cost per kW installed (e/kW).
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The equalization between the returns on investment for renewable energy and
fossil technology18 leads to:
α(Pr +Xr − Cr) = Pf − Ef − Cf (4.25)
with
α =
I0f ∗ CFr ∗ Tr
I0r ∗ CFf ∗ Tf
and hence:
Ef + αXr = Pf − Cf − α(Pr − Cr) (4.26)
This relation can be seen as an equivalence between Ef and αXr with regards to
the return on investment comparison between a wind power installation and a fossil
fuel power plant.
If an emission penalty alone has to make renewable energy projects as attractive
as fossil technologies installations, the relation becomes:
Ef = Pf − Cf − α(Pr − Cr) (4.27)
From equations 4.27 and 4.18, we obtain:
Ef = Pf − Cf + αX∗r (4.28)
18.As the capacity term appears both in the nominator and denominator of the return on investment,
the capacity credit term does not appear in this equalization.
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If an emitting power production technology f becomes proﬁtable (Pf −Cf = 0),
αX∗r is the necessary emission penalty to make wind power projects as attractive for
investors as this technology.
The three comparisons presented in these sections provides three conditions on
the emission penalty needed to be make wind power equally attractive as conven-
tional thermal technologies. Given the quantity of carbon dioxide emitted for each
kWh of electricity produced by coal or gas plants, this emission penalty can be
converted into a carbon price.
However, as shown in the results of the econometric analysis, the revenue cer-
tainty is an important factor for investment in wind power. In this perspective, any
necessary condition indicated here is to be used with caution. The price stability
provided by a carbon tax could be compared with the stability of a premium received
on top of the market electricity price. A carbon price set by a market would present
more variability than a carbon tax. On the contrary, a feed-in tariﬀ would provide
a higher revenue certainty (it can be seen as a regime that provides a premium on
top of a ﬁxed electricity price) and the corresponding carbon price would be higher
than the one equivalent to a premium regime in a liberalized electricity market.
4.2. Carbon price inference from regression results
For the numerical application of the relations presented above, I assume that the
lifetime of a fossil fuel power plant is 40 years, while it is 20 years for a wind turbine.
I assume a capacity factor of 85% for coal and gas plants, 30% for wind turbines,
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and a capacity credit of 30% for wind power. I consider an initial investment cost
of 1100 e/kW for wind power and 1000 e/kW for fossil technologies. This gives a
value of 0.16 for α, and a value of 0.58 for β.
The econometric analysis shows that, under a premium regime, the support level
needed to observe connection of new turbines to the grid with probability 0.5 is
around 24 e/MWh. This is converted in an emission penalty of 24 e/MWh ac-
cording to equation 4.13, 14 e/MWh according to equation 4.21, and 3.8 e/MWh
according to equation 4.28. The most stringent condition is the one provided by the
equation 4.13. I use the result from it for the conversion of the emission penalty into
a carbon price.
If I consider that electricity production from coal emits 0.85 tons of CO2/MWh
(Sijm, Neuhoﬀ, and Chen, 2006) and that electricity production from gas (combined
cycle) emits 0.48 tons of CO2/MWh, a support level of 27 e/MWh provides a price
advantage to wind power producers that is equivalent to a carbon price of 28 e/ton
if competing with electricity production from coal, and 50 e/ton if competing with
electricity production from gas. However, one of the main conclusions of the econo-
metric analysis conducted in Section 3 is that a feed-in tariﬀ signiﬁcantly brings more
wind power in than a premium. This result underlines the importance of revenue
certainty for wind power investors. In addition, the carbon price set by a market
also presents signiﬁcant volatility. As a consequence a carbon price alone may not
provide revenue certainty equivalent to such policies. A higher carbon price than
the ﬁgures provided here might be needed to provide wind power producers with
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comparable advantage over fossil technologies as the existing eﬀective wind support
policies.19
5. Conclusion
The purpose of the work presented here is to use the Danish experience to conduct
an empirical analysis of the conditions that attain renewable energy deployment and
infer a carbon price level that would provide a price advantage to wind energy over
fossil fuel technologies comparable to the advantage provided by the support level
under which new turbines are connected to the grid. The analysis is focused on
on-shore wind power in the context of a liberalized Danish electricity market, in the
time period 2000-2010. Probit and tobit econometric techniques are used to test
the drivers of wind power deployment on a monthly basis. The potential factors
inﬂuencing it are identiﬁed by the proﬁt function of wind energy. Probit technique
is used to estimate the eﬀects of the support policy type and level, the electricity
price projections, the investment cost, the interest rate and the sites availability on
the observation of connection of new turbines to the grid. Tobit technique is used
to assess the impacts of the same factors on the additional capacity installed each
month.
The analysis shows that the support level and policy type are the dominant pa-
19. Previous analysis demonstrated the importance of long range energy policy in stabilizing the conditions
required for renewable energy development (Meyer, 2007). In all cases, these figures are higher than the
current European carbon price and also higher than the figures obtained under sectoral trading in Chapters
1 and 2. That would explain why sectoral trading does not justify the deployment of renewable and nuclear
energies in the simulations done in these chapters. More work on uncertainty and wind power investment
could be done, based on more general research on uncertainty and irreversible investment, following Favero,
Pesaran and Sharma (1992).
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rameters. A feed-in tariﬀ policy has a signiﬁcantly larger impact than a premium
policy. A variable premium does not have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impact compared
to a ﬁxed premium. The eﬀect of the electricity price projections is not signiﬁcant
in this analysis. Neither are the eﬀects of investment cost or sites availability. The
interest rate impact is signiﬁcant in the tobit analysis but does not appear to be so in
the probit estimations. The probit analysis indicates that, on average, a 20 e/MWh
support in addition to electricity price is necessary to observe connections of new
turbines to the grid with a probability of 0.5. Under a premium policy this proba-
bility is reached for a support policy of 24 e/MWh. The observation that a feed-in
tariﬀ policy brings more wind power in than a premium policy is related to the
revenue certainty insured by a ﬁxed tariﬀ. It is consistent with previous analysis
reported in the literature (Menz and Vachon, 2006; Couture et al., 2010).
The absence of visible eﬀect of the cost term might be related to the fact that,
although the levelized cost of wind power depends on the wind potential of the
site where the turbine is built, the wind power density is not taken into account in
the analysis as it cannot be deﬁned for the months during which no new turbine is
connected to the grid.
The tobit analysis shows that the additional capacity installed each month in-
creases by up to thousand kW for each additional e/MWh of support. The fact that
the support policy is a feed-in tariﬀ rather than a premium increases the additional
capacity installed each month by up to several tens MW. When the interest rate in-
creases by one percentage point, the additional capacity installed monthly decreases
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by 5 to 12MW . The tobit analysis also allows taking into account the speciﬁcity of
December 2002, when a large additional wind power capacity was installed before
the replacement of the feed-in tariﬀ by a premium regime. The tobit estimations
conﬁrm the strength of a feed-in tariﬀ regime to support wind power deployment.
The fact that the range of the estimates obtained in the tobit analysis is quite large
is explained by the fact that the regressions do not necessarily take good account
of potential non-linear eﬀects suggested by the IEA (2008). On the contrary, the
probability distribution used in the probit technique better takes account of such
eﬀects. For this reason, the ﬁnal inference with regard to carbon price is based on
the ﬁgures from the probit analysis.
A limit of this work is that Denmark is a very speciﬁc country regarding wind
power. For energy independence reasons, Denmark is the ﬁrst European country
that made the decision to support wind power, and it has always supported it since
1976. It also presents a lot of good sites for wind turbines, which is not necessarily
the case of all countries. Hence it would be interesting to conduct similar analysis
on other European countries to generalize the results obtained here.
The comparison between the proﬁts expected from renewable projects and fos-
sil fuel power plants is used to infer a carbon price that would provide wind power
producers with comparable price advantage over gas or coal plant owners as the sup-
port level previously mentioned. This induces an equivalence relationship between
a support premium and an emission penalty. Under certainty revenue equivalence,
the support level of 20 e/MWh indicated above can be converted into an equivalent
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carbon price of 23 e/ton if renewable energy competes with electricity production
from coal or 41 e/ton if it competes with electricity production from gas. The sup-
port level threshold of 24 e/MWh observed under a premium regime is equivalent
to a carbon price of 28 e/t if renewable energy competes with coal, and 50 e/t if it
competes with gas.
This ﬁgures are higher than the current EUA price but still in the same order of
magnitude. However, given the importance of revenue certainty for renewable energy
investments, this equivalence has to be handled cautiously. In terms of variability, a
carbon tax may be seen as comparable to a premium on top of a market electricity
price. A carbon market price would present more variability. A feed-in tariﬀ regime
would provide more revenue certainty to wind power producers. The consideration
of these two points would result in a higher necessary carbon price. In all cases, such
a price is higher than what is observed in the simulations of sectoral trading done in
Chapters 1 and 2, which would explain why this new market mechanism does not
induce a signiﬁcant increase in the power generation from renewable energies in the
scenarios reported.
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Appendices
4.a. Electricity price and support variables
Figure 4.3: Real electricity price in Denmark and definition of the support variable.
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4.b. Correlation table of the explanatory variables used in the probit and tobit regressions
Table 4.5: Correlation table of the variables used in the regressions.
Y AddCap Support Elecprice(-12) VP FIT R Cost TotTb
Y 1
-
AddCap 0.3919*** 1
(0.0000) -
Support 0.5575*** 0.2736*** 1
(0.0000) (0.0018) -
Elecprice(-12) -0.0818 -0.1284 -0.3198*** 1
(0.3702) (0.1587) (0.0003) -
VP -0.2542*** -0.1748** -0.4238*** 0.0306 1
(0.0038) (0.0484) (0.0000) (0.7378) -
FIT 0.4906*** 0.4555*** 0.7624*** -0.5152*** -0.3005*** 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) -
R 0.2838*** 0.3309*** 0.6039*** -0.3723*** 0.0055 0.7980*** 1
(0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9510) (0.0000) -
Cost -0.2800*** -0.2328*** -0.3156*** 0.4244*** -0.4063*** -0.6116*** -0.4592*** 1
(0.0014) (0.0082) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) -
TotTb -0.3823*** -0.4154*** -0.7429*** 0.5613*** 0.1685* -0.8546*** -0.8209*** 0.4079*** 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0573) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) -
Note: P-values are given in (); *, **, and *** respectively refer to the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels of the estimated coefficients.
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4.c. Wind power generation in Denmark
Figure 4.4: On-shore wind power generation in Denmark since its early stage.
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General conclusion
Context
Within the international negotiations on climate change, emerging and develop-
ing countries have been involved in carbon markets through the Clean Development
Mechanism. For emissions reduction projects run in these countries, credits can be
issued by the CDM board and then used by entities that signed and ratiﬁed the Ky-
oto Protocol to meet their commitments. For example, installations covered by the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme may use Certiﬁed Emission Reductions
issued under this mechanim for compliance in the European carbon market. The en-
vironmental beneﬁts of this oﬀset mechanim have been questioned, and as the share
of developing countries in global emissions is growing, new market mechanisms are
considered to move to a sector-based mechanism for some countries. According to
the International Energy Agency, non-OECD countries may represent two thirds of
the annual world emissions in 2030, and in countries like China or India, the power
sector would represent more than half of national emissions (IEA, 2009a). Measures
like sectoral trading or sectoral crediting would involve including a sector from a
192
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nation in the cap-and-trade program of another nation or group of nations (IEA,
2009b). For example, electricity sectors in China and India could be coupled with
the carbon market developed by Annex I countries. Although, sectoral agreements
are less eﬃcient than nation-wide cap-and-trade systems (Tirole, 2009), such mecha-
nisms may encourage participation in a global climate agreement (Sawa, 2010)20 and
achieve higher environmental beneﬁts than project-based mechanisms (Schneider et
al., 2009b; Sterk, 2008).
At the 17th Conference of the Parties in Durban in November 2011, one of the
main outcomes was the agreement on a new deal to commit India and China to cut
emissions. Even if the deal indicated that the Clean Development Mechanism would
continue, it was decided to develop new market mechanisms to assist developing
countries in meeting part of their targets under the United Framework Convention
on Climate Change. A review of the existing market-based mechanisms by the
UNFCCC was decided. The European Union is also pushing for the development of
these new market mechanisms.
Focus of the dissertation
The dissertation includes complementary approaches aimed to analyze the im-
pacts to expect from such mechanisms. Chapter 1 is a computable general equi-
librium analysis of sectoral trading between Chinese electricity sector and a hypo-
20. Some analysts suggest that sectoral agreements could be a solution to the competitivity concern
raised by ambitious national climate policies (Bradley et al, 2007). They argue that such agreeements
could potentially level the playing field between competitors in sectors for which international trade plays
a particularly important role.
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thetical cap-and-trade in the United States in the case where no limit is set on the
amount of permits that can be traded between the two countries. The implemen-
tation of sectoral trading in the model allows showing how such a sectoral policy
induces internal leakage in the rest of the Chinese economy, and a welfare loss for
China as the general equilibrium eﬀect due to the carbon constraint sharing between
the US and China overcomes the transfer eﬀect associated with the trade in carbon
permits. Chapter 1 also includes, as an annex, the quantiﬁtication of the impacts of
such a mechanism if it were used between the EU ETS and four emerging countries
(Brazil, Mexico, China, and India). The main conclusions of Chapter 1 suggest that
a limit would be set on the amount of permits traded should such a mechanism come
into eﬀect. Hence, Chapter 2 analyzed sectoral trading between the EU ETS and
Chinese electricity sector if a limit were set on the amount of permits that can be
traded between the two entities. The limit is simulated through the introduction
of a trade certiﬁcate system. This helps expliciting the distributional eﬀects of the
carbon price diﬀerence induced by the limit in the system. Chapter 3 is a time
series analysis of the interactions between CDM credits and European allowances
during the second phase of the EU ETS. The purpose is to take advantage of the
European experience to better explain the short-term interactions between various
types of carbon permits, given the fact that they are traded on ﬁnancial markets and
present some characteristics of ﬁnancial assets. Finally, while sectoral agreements
have been proposed by some organizations as a way to encourage early investment in
low-carbon technologies in developing countries, Chapter 1 shows that this eﬀect is
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minor. Hence, Chapter 4 takes advantage of the European experience of renewable
energy support policies to characterize the conditions of deployment of renewable
energies and infer the carbon price level that would be needed to achieve comparable
results. An econometric analysis of the connection of new turbines to the grid in
Denmark is used. The results of it are then employed to infer the necessary carbon
price level that would provide wind energy with comparable advantage over fossil
technologies than eﬀective support policies.
Contributions
Chapter 1 is a computable general equilibrium analysis of carbon permits trading
between a hypothetical cap and trade in the United States and Chinese electricity
sector if no limit is set on the amount of permits. The implementation of this mech-
anism in the model allows quantifying the impacts to expect from it in terms of
carbon price, emissions reductions, emissions leakages, power generation and wel-
fare changes in the two countries. Carbon price equalization between the two entities
reduces the cost of the climate policy in the US due to cheaper abatement opportu-
nities in China. The general equilibrium eﬀects related to the constraint sharing lead
to carbon leakages in the rest of the Chinese economy. Chinese electricity price de-
creases while the total amount of electricity produced is reduced. As a consequence,
all economic sectors see their activity level diminished. As the power sector is the
main source of demand for coal, the coal price decreases, which results in a substi-
tution from electricity to coal in the sectors where this is possible. The combination
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of this substitution eﬀect and a decrease in the activity level results in an emissions
increase in all sectors except in the transport and oil sectors. In China, despite the
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial transfers associated with the exports of carbon permits to the
United States, welfare is reduced as a consequence of the constraint sharing with the
US. The eﬀect of the latter overcomes the transfer eﬀect. Regarding the impacts on
power generation, although sectoral trading has been proposed by some organiza-
tions has a way to spur investment in low carbon technologies in emerging countries,
the eﬀect on renewable and nuclear energies is minor in the modeling exercice. In
the US, this mechanism partially reverses the technological changes that would oc-
cur if no carbon permits trading took place with China. The analysis also considers
alternative scenarios for which China’s domestic constraint on its electricity sector
is increased.
In the Annex to Chapter 1, the study is extended to the case of sectoral trading
between the EU ETS and China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. The reason is the
likelihood of a cap-and-trade in the US is rather low while the EU ETS has existed
since 2005. In addition, the EU is now pushing for the development of these new
market mechanisms. The simulation shows that the European carbon price would
decrease by more than 75% should sectoral trading be used between the EU and
China or India. The technological changes induced by the EU ETS would be partially
reversed if carbon permits trading is allowed with these countries. In addition to the
welfare loss mentionned earlier, such results suggest that a limit would be set on the
amount of permits that could be traded and that an own action component from
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the developing country involved would also be required, should these new market
mechanisms come into eﬀect.
Chapter 2 analyzes trade in carbon permits between the EU ETS and Chinese
electricity sector if a limit is set on the volume of permits that can be traded between
the two entities. Such a limit induces a diﬀerence between the European and Chinese
carbon prices. Some agents make then take advantage of this diﬀerence to capture
the corresponding rent. The institutional form the limit will take will aﬀect its
welfare impacts. In this exercise, limited sectoral trading is simulated through the
introduction of a trade certiﬁcate system in the model. The rent is allocated to either
Chinese or European households although the allocation could be done to any agent
in the model. The simulation allows quantifying the distributional impact resulting
from the limit induced price diﬀerence. Setting a limit on the volume of permits
that can be traded mitigate the eﬀects observed in Chapter 1: the European carbon
price decreases by 34% instead of 74%, and the technological changes induced in the
European industries covered by the scheme largely persist. In terms of welfare, if the
certiﬁcate rent is allocated to Chinese households, it is possible to ﬁnd a limit that
makes both the EU and China better oﬀ compared to the situation in which they
have their own carbon constraint and no carbon permits trading is allowed between
them. The relative role of the certiﬁcate value for the two parties is explicited.
The allocation of the certiﬁcates revenue to Chinese households results in a 0.04
percentage point increase of the Chinese welfare, while the allocation of the revenue
to European households results in a 0.02 percentage point increase of the welfare
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in Europe. The existence of such a pareto-superior situation makes limited sectoral
trading more politically feasible. In terms of global emissions reductions, limited
sectoral trading achieve better results than unlimited sectoral trading. This is due
to the fact that, in China, the sectoral coverage of the carbon market is limited to
the power sector, while, in Europe, energy intensive industries are also covered. As
a consequence, the leakage to the rest of the Chinese economy is reduced in the case
of limited sectoral trading, and global emissions reductions are higher.
Chapter 3 takes advantage of the European experience of interactions between
CDM credits and European allowances to characterize the short-term interactions
between various types of carbon permits. It consists of a time-series analysis of the
EUA and CER prices. As such permits are traded on ﬁnancial markets and present
some characteristics of ﬁnancial assets, a model is introduced and estimated to test
the impact of this ﬁnancial nature on the carbon permits short-term variations.
This model includes the fundamental economics drivers identiﬁed by Hintermann
(2010) and a term reﬂecting the potential impact of the carbon price volatility on
its return. Indeed, if there is an interest for an agent in holding a carbon permit as
a ﬁnancial asset, the carbon permit return should compensate for its volatility. We
observe that this coumpound has no signiﬁcant impact on the day-to-day variations
of the EUA or CER prices but that the carbon price determinants identiﬁed by
Hintermann (the economic activity, the coal and gas prices) remain predominant.
We observe that the long-term relationship (relationship in absolute level) between
the EUA price and these factors is not the same as the one between the CER price
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and these factors. This reﬂects the fact that the dynamics through which the coal
price, the gas price and the economic activity impact the EUA price is diﬀerent
from the one through which the same factors impact the CER price. While the
eﬀect on the EUA price is driven by a demand-side eﬀect (an increase in the fossil
fuel prices makes the marginal abatement cost rise), the eﬀect on the CER price
might be driven by a change in supply. Indeed as the volume of CER produced
annually is not limited and as CER are traded in other markets than the EU ETS,
the CER market oﬀers some ﬂexibility. Some agents covered by the EU ETS and
who run CDM projects or manage CER credits might supply more CER credits to
the market when the demand for permits increases. The results also suggest that,
for the EUA price, some agents may use their market power to inﬂate the carbon
price when the fossil fuel prices are low. In the short-term estimations (day-to-day
variation), the dynamics by which the coal price, the gas price and the economic
activity inﬂuences the CER and EUA prices are comparable, reﬂecting the fact that
the supply-side eﬀet does not take place for CER in the short-term as it might then
be less easy to take advantage of the CER market ﬂexibility. In the estimation, the
economic activity is more correlated with the EUA price than with the CER price.
This can be explained by the fact that, while the volume of EUA issued is set by
the European cap, the volume of CER issued is not limited and CER can be traded
in other markets than the EU ETS. As the CER market oﬀers more ﬂexibility, it
is understandable that it is less tightly linked with the European economic activity
than the EUA market is.
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After the impact of the coal and gas prices and the economic activity on the CER
and EUA prices is estimated, the interaction between these two types of permits is
characterized. No long-term relationship is observed between the prices of the two
types of permits. This is consistent with the observation mentionned above that the
long-term dynamics through which the coal and gas prices impact the carbon price is
not the same for EUA and CER. On the contrary, in the short-term, the EUA price
inﬂuences the CER price but the opposite is not true. Any shock on the EUA price
is transmitted to the CER price and the EUA price volatility explains 66% of the
CER price volatility. On the contrary, a shock on the CER price is not transmitted
to the EUA price and the EUA price volatility is not explained by the CER price
volatility. The reason for the direction of this causality relationship is that the EU
ETS is the largest market accepting CER for compliance. The dynamic conditional
correlation between the two prices is computed. Its high level is consistent with the
other observations previously mentionned. Finally, the impact of policy changes and
policy announcements on the carbon price is clear. In particular, the increase in the
volatility of the CER price after 2011 is correlated with the decision made at the 17th
Conference of the Parties in Durban in 2011 to develop new market mechanisms,
and announcements made by the European Union to restric the acceptance of CER
credits in the EU ETS.
Regarding the potential development of interactions between carbon markets, an
interesting result of this Chapter is that the absence of impact of the carbon price
volatility on its return suggests that speculative behaviours on this instrument aimed
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at capping emissions are limited. On the other hand, the clear impacts of policy
announcements on the EUA or CER carbon prices suggest that the development
of links between carbon markets might increase the carbon price volatility as any
policy change in one of the entity involved might have an eﬀect on the whole system.
At the same time, the increased market liquidity should limit such a phenomenon.
Deeper analysis on the liquidity and volatility characteristics of the carbon market
would be interesting to conduct in order to better anticipate the consequences of the
development of such couplings.
As Chapter 1 shows that the impact of sectoral trading on the development
of low-carbon technologies in the developing countries would be minor, Chapter 4
aims to characterize the conditions of renewable energy deployment and to infer the
carbon price level that would be necessary to attain comparable results as existing
eﬀective policies. It ﬁrst consists in an econometric analysis of the connection of
new on-shore wind turbines to the grid in Denmark in the time period 2000-2010
(after the liberalization in 2000). It then includes a comparison between the returns
on investment of renewable energy projects and fossil fuel power plants to provide a
carbon price level that would be necessary to have comparable eﬀect on wind power
deployment as eﬀective wind support policies. The proﬁt function of wind power is
explicited to identify the factors to take into account in the econometric analysis.
Probit analysis of the observation of connection of new turbines to the grid each
month is used to estimate their relative impact. The tobit model is used to test
the eﬀect of the same factors on the additional capacity installed monthly. The
GENERAL CONCLUSION 202
estimations show that the dominant factors are the support level and the support
policy type. A feed-in tariﬀ signiﬁcantly bring more wind power in than a premium
policy. This is explained by the revenue certainty that such a scheme provides to
wind power producers. Electricity price projections do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
The investment cost impact is not visible in the analysis. On the contrary, the
interest rate eﬀect is signiﬁcant in the tobit analysis. For a one percentage point
increase in the interest rate, the additional capacity installed monthly rises by 5
to 12 MW. The support policy type seems to matter more than the support level.
The fact that the support policy is a feed-in tariﬀ increases the additional capacity
installed monthly by several tens MW, while any additional e/MWh of support
makes it rise by several hundreds kW. An observation in line with these results is
that an unusally large number of turbines was installed in Denmark in December
2002, right before the feed-in tariﬀ is replaced by a premium policy. The probit
regressions allows quantifying the support level needed to have a probability 0.5
to observe the connections of new turbines to the grid. It is 24 e/MWh if the
support policy is a premium. If the support policy is a feed-in tariﬀ, the support
level needed is much lower. The comparison between the proﬁt expected from wind
power projects and fossil fuel power plants helps to infer a carbon price level that
would be necessary to provide wind energy with comparable advantage over fossil
technologies as such a support level. The carbon price resulting from this comparison
is 28 e/ton if wind power competes with coal plants, and 51 e/ton if it competes with
gas installations. These ﬁgures are higher than the current European carbon price
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but still in the same order of magnitude. They are also higher than the carbon prices
observed under sectoral trading in Chapters 1 and 2. This would explain why this
new market mechanism does not induce a signiﬁcant increase in power generation
from renewable energies in the scenarios considered. However such ﬁgures have to
be handled carefully. A carbon price set by a trading scheme on top of a market
electricity price presents a volatility that is signiﬁcantly higher than a premium on
top of a market electricity price, and even higher than a guaranteed price in a feed-in
tariﬀ regime. A carbon price alone may not actually provide wind power producers
with the revenue certainty needed for investment, or it would need to be signiﬁcantly
higher to compensate for the relative uncertainty.
Perspectives
In this section, I present ideas for further research on these questions. First, if the
link between the Australian and the European trading schemes comes into place,
it might be interesting to conduct empirical analysis on this coupling to provide
more information on the interactions between carbon markets. As pilot trading
schemes are launched in China, and the perspective of setting a national scheme is
announced, it might also be instructive to conduct ex-post analysis on these carbon
markets in order to provide information on the interest to have some limited carbon
permits trading between China and other carbon markets in the world.
In Chapter 3, long-term estimations of the EUA price suggest that some agents
covered by the EU ETS may use their market power when the coal and gas prices
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are low in order to inﬂate the carbon price. This would be related to the fact that
their marginal abatement cost would then be negligible, while the EUA are allocated
for free. As a signiﬁcant part of the European carbon permits is now going to be
auctionned, it would be interesting to see whether such observations of use of market
power persist in time periods of low coal and gas prices.
It would also be interesting to see whether the introduction of auctions will have
an impact on the EUA price and on the use of CER by the installations covered by
the EU ETS. In Phase III, as some installations have to buy their permits in the
auctions while others still receive them for free, it might be interesting to track the
use of CER by installations in Phases II and III and see whether the introduction
of auctions has any impact on it.
In Chapter 3, I explain the results of the long-term estimation of the CER price
by the CER market ﬂexibility. It would be interesting to conduct installation level
analysis to see whether it is possible to provide evidence of a supply-side eﬀect by
agents covered by the EU ETS and who also run CDM projects abroad or manage
CER credits.
Finally the theoretical motivation for extending the carbon market to a larger
number of nations is to have a unique carbon price and to take advantage of the
cheapest abatement opportunities. It is more eﬃcient than juxtaposed systems that
do not interact with one another. In addition, the increase in the total volume
of the market should be correlated with an increased liquidity and hence a lower
volatility. However, the risk of weaknesses in the global system would increase with
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the number of couplings between such trading schemes. The robustness of the whole
system would depend on its weakest element. Some studies on the impact of the
carbon price volatility on the individual installations from a risk management point
of view might help inform the debates on these questions.
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